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(i)
SUMMARY BY CHAPTERS
INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
means by which citizens obtain redress when things go 
wrong in the National Health Service. There are many 
different ways of complaining the main emphasis in 
this work being on how complaints are dealt with by 
the Health Service Commissioner (HSC) or, as he is 
sometimes known, the NHS Ombudsman.
The HSC came into being in 1974 some seven years 
after creation of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (PCA) on whom he is modelled. Perhaps 
because of this the PCA has attracted more attention. 
Certainly, there is very little writing on the HSC 
per se. This is unfortunate because, as succeeding 
chapters will make clear, the structure of the NHS 
and the state of the art of medicine pose some 
peculiar problems of their own. The first chapters 
then (Chs. 1-2) are necessarily of an historical and 
descriptive character.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I 
(Chapters 1-2) discusses the background to the 
problem. Part II (Chapters 3-5) considers the HSC in 
detail. Part III (Chapters 6-7) Ch. 6 examines the 
work of the House of Commons Select Committee on the 
PCA on the PCA and its contribution to the 
effectiveness of the HSC, while Chapter 7 looks at 
other external agencies working in approximately the 
same field as the HSC.
Section/.
(ii)
Section I of the conclusion draws together 
possible criticisms and Section II proposes how to 
remedy these.
1. Chapter 1 considers the inexact nature of 
medicine and the significance of this fact in the 
field of complaints-handling in the NHS. Staff and 
patient expectations about the standards of treatment 
and hope of success may be unrealistic or 
inconsistent and this has consequences in that it 
affects the type of patient who complains and the 
nature of the complaint. The chapter concludes by 
surveying the existing channels of redress.
2. The NHS was omitted from the PCA Bill of 1967. 
This section explains the political circumstances of 
the time and the hospital scandals which were then 
circulating which made the timing inappropriate. The 
government reserved its option to extend the remit of 
the PCA or introduce an independent figure, an option 
which it exercised in a more stable period of NHS 
administration. The medical profession, through its 
trade union and professional association, the British 
Medical Association (BMA), wielded its power to lobby 
Parliament and ensure that its views were taken into 
consideration.
3-5. Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters which 
consider the HSC in detail. It begins by rehearsing 
the statutory provisions regulating the HSC and, by 
reference to these, delineating his function, powers 
and area of jurisdiction. The following chapter uses 
the HSC published reports of selected investigations 
to illustrate the HSC powers and limitations and to 
focus/...
(iii)
focus on borderline cases where the HSC is required 
to exercise his discretion. Case-law is quoted 
extensively to show how the HSC has interpreted the 
constituent legislation and developed his office over 
the years. The Annual Reports are especially 
valuable material and Chapter 5 cites them, as proof 
of the limitations on the HSC and as examples of the 
ways in which he is obstructed.
6. In his work, the HSC is aided by the House of 
Commons Select Committee on the PCA (HC SC on PCA). 
The SC on the PCA is possibly unique in the world of 
ombudsmen and is worthy of our attention. The SC 
gives guidance to the HSC on the interpretation of 
the enabling legislation and is partially responsible 
for the increasingly liberal approach which 
succeeding HSCs have shown when they are called upon 
to interpret their own powers. In addition, the SC 
comments upon the HSC Annual Reports. It uses these 
opportunities to assist the HSC to have his case 
report recommendations implemented by calling 
witnesses to give evidence before it. Chapter 6 
evaluates the work of the SC, the ambiguous nature of 
its relationship with the HSC and explores the 
possible expansion of its role.
7. As the introductory chapter indicates, the HSC 
is not alone in attempting to resolve complaints in 
the NHS. Other agencies also exist and their work 
and philosophy impinge on the HSC office. Chapter 7 
looks at the external agencies in more detail and 
briefly suggests in what ways they have failed or are 
open to criticism and the light this casts on the 
HSC./...
(iv)
HSC.
In the Conclusion, the discussion in the thesis 
is drawn together under the heading "Issues and 
Themes". The chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first reviews the issues which have given rise to 
criticism and assesses the validity of these 
criticisms. It also takes account of certain themes 
which have recurred throughout the thesis and judges 
how far these can realistically be incorporated into 
any proposals for change. The second argues that 
extensive reform is politically unlikely, and 
unwelcome to the protagonists. It argues for lesser 
reforms which are within the discretion of the 
office-holder. The thesis concludes despite many 
criticisms, that the HSC is of more than merely 
symbolic importance and contends that it constitutes 
a firm foundation for future growth.
1CHAPTER I.
1. INTRODUCTION - THE NATURE OF MEDICINE AND 
HEALTH CARE
"Medical science has conferred great benefits 
on mankind, but these benefits are attended by 
considerable risks.... We cannot take the benefits 
without taking the risks." per Denning, L.J. Roe 
v. Ministry of Health, 1954 (2 QB at 83). Medicine 
is not yet an exact science. It is a blend of 
science and skill. The medical profession cannot 
guarantee that the adoption of a particular 
procedure will produce a certain result.1 
Nevertheless, patients may feel a sense of 
grievance when a course of treatment fails to 
achieve the desired result. They may attribute 
this failure to the negligence of the medical 
staff.
Doctors owe their patients a duty of care. In 
the course of "their profession, medical men must 
exercise a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge 
having regard to the circumstances of the case, 
their own qualifications and experience, and the 
medical standards prevailing at the time.2 Where 
doctors fall short of this high standard of care, 
and the patient is injured as a result, the patient 
may hold the doctor liable for damages in a court 
of law.
However, there are many complaints which are 
administrative and not clinical in nature. In this 
area/...
2area the rights of citizens are less clear-cut.
Following the nationalisation of other public 
services, the government established consumer 
consultative committees to voice the opinions of 
the taxpayer.3 When the health services were 
nationalised in 1946 the government did not set up 
a similar structure. This decision was partly 
political - Bevan, the then Minister of Health, 
thought he had already stretched the tolerance of 
the hospital consultants to breaking point when he 
laid down the conditions for the new National 
Health Service.h But the decision was also taken 
because it was felt that the NHS was not analogous 
to other nationalised industries.
Patients are not consumers in the conventional 
sense of the word;5 they do not purchase medical 
services on a fee-for-item basis but pay for them 
indirectly through general taxation. Private 
medical services in Great Britain are very limited 
so even if the "consumers" of health had the 
expertise to exercise their right of choice 
responsibility it would be to no avail. And, 
unlike other nationalised industries, a system of 
accountability already existed vis a vis the NHS in 
the form of the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
who is answerable in Parliament for the performance 
of the NHS in Scotland.6 In reality, the Minister 
normally only lays down broad policy guidelines and 
the area health boards have a wide discretion in 
law as to how to implement these.
2./.
32. CHANGING ATTITUDES OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT
Why then is there a growing interest in how 
complaints can be made against the NHS? The 
interest does not seem to arise from a widespread 
dissatisfaction with the NHS.7 Indeed, the NHS is 
a popular institution.8 However, Ian Kennedy has 
pointed out that the "consumer" movement - 
emphasising the citizen's desire to participate in 
the decision-making processes which affect him - 
has not left the NHS unaffected.9 Research has 
shown that the public is more complaints-conscious 
now than fifteen years ago.10
Increased public awareness of medical issues 
means that the patient no longer stands in such awe 
of his doctor and is more likely to ask questions. 
To some extent doctors welcome this development.
The success of preventative medicine depends on the 
active interest of patients in their health. At 
the same time medical information can confuse 
patients causing them needless worry. Doctors 
believe that the irresponsible dissemination of 
information by the media is to blame for the large 
proportion of patients complaining needlessly.11
The NHS is under pressure, too, and this gives 
rise to ground for dissatisfaction. Waiting lists 
are longer than most people would like. NHS staff 
complain of chronic under-staffing and this results 
in charges of patient neglect. The NHS has not yet 
solved the problem of how to cope with the 
increasing population of the elderly.12
Some/.
4Some of the problems are created by the 
relative successes of the NHS. The discovery of 
new drugs and treatments means that the NHS can 
cater for an increasing proportion of the 
population. This compounds the existing problem of 
under-staffing.
More recently management has changed its 
attitude towards complaints. Complaints are no 
longer seen as time-wasting or frivolous but a 
means of improving efficiency.13 In the free 
market consumers express their views by switching 
to other products. This option is not open to 
patients.lh Only a small percentage of the 
population choose their health care from the 
private market and the range of services it offers 
is limited.15 In a monopoly service like the NHS, 
complaints are one way of drawing defects in the 
service to the attention of the administration.
Despite the renewed emphasis on the need for 
and the right of patient to complain, there has not 
been a discernible increase in the rate of 
complaints in relation to the number of 
doctor-patient contacts in the year.16 The 
reluctance of patients to complain has been well 
researched. Patients are dependent on their doctor 
and are loathe even to ask questions, in case this 
is construed as implying criticism.17 The social 
and educational background of doctors can inhibit 
free and easy communication between patient and 
doctor.18 Carstairs has noted that when the 
patient can identify with the doctor, by reason of 
age, sex or background, communication between 
doctor and patient becomes possible. Established 
channels/...
5channels of communication between doctor and 
patient are a prerequisite of an informal 
complaints machinery.19
Similarly, doctors may find it difficult to 
talk to their patients.20 It is not always 
considered good medical practice to disclose 
details of diagnosis and treatment to a patient. 
This self-imposed restraint can become a habit even 
when it is not necessary or is directly contrary to 
the patient's expressed wishes. The medical 
profession argues that it is a standard of medical 
practice which is ultimately in the patient's 
interest even if it seems overly paternalistic.21
3. KINDS OF COMPLAINTS
When patients do make complaints they do so 
over a wide range of subj ects. One end of the 
spectrum might be labelled "administrative" and the 
other "clinical". "Administrative" complaints 
relate to housekeeping matters, e.g. catering, 
appointments systems, ward routine and so forth. 
"Clinical" complaints relate to decisions taken by 
a doctor in the course of treatment but the 
category is wider than that suggested solely by the 
process of diagnosis and treatment. Doctors make 
many decisions which contain both clinical and 
administrative elements. Some of the most testing 
complaints relate to decisions which are ostensibly 
administrative but which a doctor alleges were made 
on clinical grounds. Normally, however, 
administrative and clinical decisions are taken by 
different sections of the NHS and with different 
results./...
6results.
Administrative mistakes may cause annoyance or 
even distress but their effect is not long lasting. 
Errors in clinical judgement, whether anyone's 
fault or not, may cause irreparable mental or 
physical harm. The harm suffered will determine 
the kind of solution people seek and to some extent, 
has determined the remedies made available. Where 
only distress is caused by an administrative error 
the patient may be satisfied with an explanation.22 
At the other extreme, if a patient has sustained 
injuries attributable to negligence by the doctor, 
he will be looking for monetary damages as 
recompense.
4. COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of 
redress procedure: judical and non-judical. In 
addition, there are a number of bodies whose 
activities are significant though not central to 
this which are worthy of comment.
i. Judicial Remedies.
Doctors owe their patients a duty of care 
but the law is uncertain as to what constitutes 
this duty. Merely to make a mistake is not 
negligence.23 The law recognises that 
doctors must have the opportunity to acquire 
their skills and experience without the 
constant threat of legal action hanging over 
them. The reasonable exercise of professional 
judgement is deemed to allow for errors. To 
adopt/...
7adopt any other course might result in the 
practice of defensive medicine. In the U.S.A. 
this takes the form of undertaking unnecessary 
and expensive diagnostic procedures and 
inhibiting the performance of experimental 
surgery.2* Defensive medicine implies a 
degree of caution which is not in the public 
interest.
Actions for medical negligence have less 
chance of succeeding than other types of 
delictual action.25 This factor, accompanied 
by the costs and time involved in legal 
actions, deters complainants. The Pearson 
Committee on civil liability also pointed out 
that a court is not always the best forum in 
which to resolve complaints. Our adversarial 
system deals only with a narrow range of 
precise issues and complainants find this 
frustrating. The legal system does not cater 
for cases where something has gone wrong but 
no-one is at fault, or at least, it cannot be 
proved. Judges say that they are being asked 
to make decisions which they would prefer not 
to make.26 In adhering strictly to the law 
they are having to ignore the real needs of 
victims who appear before them. Consequently, 
there is increasing interest in and support 
for the idea of a no-fault system to 
compensate accident victims, of the kind which 
operate in New Zealand and Sweden.27
ii. Service Committee Procedure.
If a patient has a complaint against a GP 
he/...
8he may sue in the courts in the ordinary way.
In the event of a finding of negligence the GP 
will be personally liable.28 The Health Board 
(HB) will not be vicariously liable for 
damages since GPs, unlike hospital doctors, 
are not HB employees.29 Similarly the HB does 
not involve itself directly in investigating 
informal complaints against GPs.
Informal complaints against a GP should be 
directed to the Area Primary Care 
Administrator (APCA). The APCA will clarify 
the issues, obtain evidence from the GP 
concerned and, on the basis of this, decide 
whether the complaint should be referred to a 
medical services committee (MSC) for 
investigation. The Medical Services Committee 
consists jointly of GPs and laymen and is 
constituted under the NHS service regulations.30 
The Medical Services Committee cannot look at 
complaints relating to clinical treatment. It 
can only look at a complaint alleging a breach 
of the service regulations.31
These regulations set out, in a very 
general way, the duties of a GP. Few 
complainants are succesful in obtaining a 
finding against a GP.32 Many complaints are 
not fully encompassed by the service 
regulations or the regulation is too vague to 
form the basis of a finding. The ban on legal 
representation or paid advocacy can put the 
complainant at a disadvantage in presenting 
his case. The Scottish Association of Local 
Health/...
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of CABx members to assist the complainant in 
order to redress the balance.33 An amendment 
to the service regulations has gone some way 
towards mitigating the effect of the ban on 
legal representation.3h Legally qualified 
assistance is now permitted providing the 
advocate is acting without payment. Local 
Health Councils argue that this does nothing 
to contribute to the informality of the 
occasion nor to aid the complainant who 
generally does not have legal contacts. In 
England, too, the Medical Services Committee 
or, as they are known there, the Family 
Practitioner Committees (FPC) have come under 
fire for their opposition to what are seen as 
much needed changes.35
NHS complaints procedures are full of 
"special cases". GPs are one such, another is 
the field of mental health.
iii. The Mental Welfare Commission (MWC)
In Scotland, the Mental Welfare Commission 
was constituted in 1960 to safeguard the 
interests of the mentally ill.36 The majority 
of commissioners are lay people but the 
commission also contains a number of doctors 
and other individuals who have experience in 
the field of mental health. It is this mix of 
personnel which the Mental Welfare Commission 
believes will retain the confidence of staff 
and patients when investigating allegations of 
improper detention. The Mental Welfare 
Commission/...
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Commission also hears complaints relating to 
care and the administration of patients' 
property. The Mental Welfare Commission will 
not investigate complaints relating to 
clinical matters. The majority of the 
complaints it receives allege ill-treatment of 
patients by staff members.
One of the difficulties the Mental Welfare 
Commission faces is that many of the 
complaints it hears are completely unfounded 
but arise from the nature of the patient's 
illness. Other patients who are abused by 
staff are incapable of complaining on their 
own behalf. The Mental Welfare Commission is 
dependent to a large extent on staff reporting 
deficiences. This system has its obvious 
drawbacks and some hospitals have an 
unnaturally good record.37
The Mental Health (Scotland) Act, 1960 
requires the commissioners to visit hospitals 
regularly.38 This gives the Mental Welfare 
Commission the opportunity to talk to the 
patients at first hand and hear complaints.
In this way many matters are brought to their 
attention which would otherwise pass 
unnoticed. -
Scotland's record in the field of mental 
health is better than England's and this is 
sometimes attributed to the existence of the 
Mental Welfare Commission. Its success was 
recognised publicly at an enquiry into the 
escape of two prisoners from Carstairs 
Hospital./...
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hospital. The Sheriff-Principal who conducted 
the inquiry reported: "It is clear that 
self-appointed groups of unqualified persons 
with no legal powers to investigate complaints 
are in a position to do little compared with 
the range of action open to the Mental Welfare 
Commission. The existence of this powerful 
and independent body reduces to near vanishing 
point the necessity for other guardians of the 
interest of patients."39
The local Medical Services Committee 
structure has existed since the inception of 
the NHS and is formalised in the NHS Service 
regulations. The statutory responsibilities 
of the Medical Welfare Commission have already 
been mentioned. In the hospital service there 
is no comparable statutory procedure.
Different methods of handling complaints have 
arisen as they were required.
iv. Formal Inquiries.
One of these methods is a formal inquiry 
set up by a Health Board to investigate the 
occurence of serious incidents, e.g. the death 
of a patient under anaesthetic. Normally the 
chairman is a legally qualified person but the 
committee of inquiry does not have the powers 
of a court of law to compel the presence of 
witnesses or take evidence on oath. The 
principles the committee should observe were 
regularised by the publication of the 
Elliott-Binns/..
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Elliott-Binns report in 1969.110
The decision to set up a committee of 
inquiry on what action should be taken on the 
basis of the committee's recommendations rests 
entirely with the Health Board. It is not 
open to the complainant to request an inquiry. 
In the event of such an inquiry being held the 
complainant will not usually be present nor 
see the full report. If the Health Board 
refuses to set up an inquiry the Secretary of 
State for Scotland41 has power to set up a 
formal inquiry with powers of compulsion. 
However such inquiries are exceptional and 
will be determined by the public interest.
i '
Formal inquiries arise from matters which 
cause general concern and may have 
far-reaching implications; they do not exist 
to resolve individual complainants' anxieties. 
So from the complainant's viewpoint the 
inquiry procedure is not entirely 
satisfactory. But the existence of this 
process reassures the public that Health 
Boards are committed to uncovering errors and 
not to maintaining a defensive face against 
external criticism.
Ultimately the complaints handling system 
is dependent on the goodwill and co-operation 
of staff. When medical staff withdraw their 
help the system becomes unworkable.42 
Recently, medical defence and protection 
societies have advised their members not to 
give/...
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give evidence before hospital inquiries or 
co-operate with them in any other way.*3 
Their advice is based on the case of Waugh v. 
BRB (1980) AC 521 which they believe now 
prejudices the rights of doctors in civil 
proceedings following on an inquiry.4* In 
Waugh, the Court of Appeal held that a railway 
inspectorate report into the death of an 
engine driver, which was the best evidence 
available and had not been prepared for the 
chief purpose of determining legal liability, 
was not legally privileged and could be used 
in evidence in court by the other party to the 
action. Medical defence societies believe 
that this means that anything a doctor says 
before an inquiry could be used later in civil 
proceedings against him. The legal position 
has not yet been tested in court. The 
Minister of Health is at present trying to 
regularise the position by arranging for 
written statements to be taken.*5
v. Non-Clinical Complaints arising in Hospitals.
In addition to the formal inquiry, all 
Health Boards have adopted local procedures 
for dealing with non-clinical complaints.*6 
In 1968, The Farquharson-Lang report drew the 
attention of the old hospital boards of 
management to the fact that despite the 
existence of the NHS for twenty years, 
hospitals still did not have a recognised 
complaints channel nor any means of recording 
and monitoring those complaints which were 
made./...
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made. The report said that boards had a 
responsibility to represent the consumer. One 
of a board's duties had to be the maintenance 
of standards, and complaints could play a part 
in fulfilling this duty:
"Boards should make use of 
reasonable complaints as an aid to 
efficient management and should 
therefore obtain regular reports, 
both to ensure that individual 
complaints are being handled 
effectively and to ascertain in what 
respects the services provided are 
not meeting the needs of the patients 
collectively".
SHHD " Administrative Practices in 
Hospital Boards in Scotland" HMSO, 
Edinburgh, 1968, para 159.
The report also recommended that a working 
party should be set up to devise a complaints 
procedure to fill the gap it had identified.
A working party was set up and reported in 
1969 under the chairmanship of 
Elliott-Binns.h7 Elliott Binns stated that 
the final procedure had to contain certain 
elements if it were to be effective. Firstly, 
the staff and patients had to know how to 
complain. In the case of staff this was to be 
done by training, in the case of the patients 
it was to be achieved by issuing information 
booklets to the patients on their admission to 
hospital or giving the information on 
appointment cards and on noticesin out-patient 
departments. Secondly, the emphasis was to be 
on informality. Oral complaints were 
preferred to written ones. Thirdly, it was 
essential to keep records of complaints. 
"Comments"/...
15
"Comments" books were to be kept in the wards. 
An officer of the board was to maintain a 
register of complaints received by mail. 
Fourthly, each board was to designate one 
officer as their "nominated recipient" who 
would handle investigations into written 
comments.
Hospital boards were asked by the 
Secretary of State to introduce the procedures 
recommended by the report as soon as possible.u8 
The boards recognised the need for a 
complaints procedure but thought it would be 
impossible to produce one system which would 
meet all the varied situations in the NHS of 
all the varieties of complaint which could be 
made. Elliott-Binns had recommended that to 
ensure consistency of approach there should 
only be one system. Finally, the Health 
Boards compromised by introducing a complaints 
system which abided by the basic principles 
set out in the Elliot-Binns report but allowed 
for variations to cope with local 
circumstances.
The major drawback to the system is that 
it does not deal with complaints relating to 
the exercise of clinical judgement. In 1977 
the Select Committee on the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration commented 
adversely on this state of affairs.1*9 The 
Select Committee recommended the introduction 
of amending legislation to permit the Health 
Service Commissioner to look at clinical 
complaints. This proposal was opposed by 
almost/...
16
almost the entire medical profession.50 
Doctors did not welcome the scrutiny of a 
layman in such a specialised field nor being 
judged by the very high standards of The Royal 
Colleges represented by the nominees who would 
assist him. The government made it clear to 
the profession that if these proposals were 
unacceptable an alternative would have to be 
found or the Select Committee recommendations 
would be implemented without the agreement of 
the profession.
vi. Clinical Complaints Arising in Hospitals.
Accordingly, the government invited the 
profession to present counter proposals. The 
Joint Consultants Committee of the British 
Medical Association set up a joint working 
party with the Department of Health and Social 
Security and produced a new procedure which 
became effective in Scotland in January, 1982. 
The system is to operate on a trial basis for 
several years while being carefully monitored 
by the Department of Health and Social 
Security.51
The new procedure consists of three 
stages52 and is based on the well-established 
medical tradition of second opinions. The 
first stage is designed to elicit a response 
from the consultant concerned, whether the 
complaint is oral or written. An interview or 
written reply may be sufficient to satisfy the 
complainant. If the complainant remains 
dissatisfied the next stage is to put the 
complaint/...
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complaint into writing if that has not already 
been done. The Chief Administrative Medical 
Officer (CAMO) of the Health Board must also 
be informed at this stage by the consultant. 
The consultant may consider that a further 
talk with the complainant might resolve the 
issue but if not the CAMO and consultant 
should consider the possibility of invoking 
stage three. Stage three provides for 
independent professional review by two 
consultants. They will be chosen by the 
Scottish Joint Consultants1 Committee and one 
of the consultants will come from outside the 
original board area. The two independent 
consultants discuss the case with the staff 
and the patient. If they consider that the 
patient's concern is justified they will bring 
the matter to the attention of the consultant 
concerned and the CAMO. They will them inform 
the patient, as far as appropriate, what 
problems have been identified and what steps 
have been taken to overcome them.
Although it is too early to say how 
Successful the procedure will be in practice, 
on the face of it, it does little to meet the 
criticisms which brought it into being. This 
convoluted procedure, which one member of the 
medical profession has described as the "BMA 
Charter to protect the doctor"53 does little 
to inspire public confidence. Patients' 
associations have said that like other forms 
of professional self-regulation the new 
procedure lacks the lay element which 
reassures/...
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reassures complainants of the neutrality of 
the process.51*
The new procedure is completely 
dependent on the co-operation of the 
consultant concerned, which cannot always be 
guaranteed.55 Stages one and two of the 
procedure are mere duplications and no doubt 
simply duplicate what the patient has already 
done to reach the new procedure. It is 
open-ended and indecisive. No mention is made 
of what happens if the patient remains 
dissatisfied after stage three.56 Health 
board officials have voiced disquiet over how 
practical the new procedure will prove to be. 
The new procedure may have to be aborted if at 
any stage in an individual case there is a 
risk of legal action. This may have the 
unwelcome side-effect of inhibiting doctors in 
the quantity and detail of their written 
case-notes.5 7
Two external agencies exist to meet the 
criticism that complaints agencies in the NHS 
operate in breach of the rule of natural 
justice, 1 nemo iudex in causa sua” viz. no man 
should sit in his own cause. These are local 
health councils and the Health Service 
Commissioner.
5. LOCAL HEALTH COUNCILS (LHCs).
The Farquharson-Lang report was the first to 
draw attention to the responsibilities of lay 
members of hospital boards to represent the 
patient. It introduced the concept of "consumer” 
councils in the NHS. In the 1970s the government 
was/...
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was pledged to streamline NHS administration and 
make it more efficient. It hoped to do this by 
creating a new management structure separating 
staff, management and patient interests.
Specialist committees were set up to represent and 
advise management on staff views. Consumers were 
to be represented by Local Health Councils set up 
in their district58 consisting of a paid secretary 
and a committee of Health Board nominees.
Salaries, accommodation and expenses were all to be 
met by the Health Board.
The primary function of the Local Health 
Councils was to review Health Board policy and 
suggest improvements but they also have a duty to 
advise the public on complaints procedures, and in 
some cases they actually take up cases on behalf of 
individuals.59 Local Health Councils had some 
difficulty in establishing their identity and power 
base; they have been more successful as an advisory 
agency than a pressure group.
6. THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER.
The Health Service Commissioner is doubly 
unique in that the office is part of an experiment 
in British Administrative Law and is also one of 
the few outside bodies which can investigate 
complaints in the health service. The following 
chapters will explore these two themes in more 
detail.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ORIGINS OF THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER
1. The Origins of the Health Service Commissioner
It is possible to trace the legislative origins 
of the Health Service Commissioner back to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act, 
1967.1 The Parliamentary Commissioner Act in turn 
was inspired by a report "The Citizen and the 
Administration" undertaken by Sir John Whyatt and 
sponsored by the group, Justice.2 The main 
recommendation of the Whyatt report was to advocate 
the adoption by Britain of a Scandinavian-style 
Ombudsman. The Conservative government of the day 
rejected this recommendation as being 
irreconcilable with ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament, and a serious threat to the efficient 
handling of public business.3 The Labour party, on 
the other hand, was favourably disposed towards the 
idea of a Parliamentary Commissioner as a balancing 
mechanism to off-set the dangers of centralised 
bureaucracy. The future Prime Minister, Sir Harold 
Wilson, made an election speech, committing the 
incoming government to the proposal1 and it was 
finally incorporated into a government White Paper 
in 1965.5
However, the government did not propose that 
the new Ombudsman, or PCA as he would be known 
officially, should be allowed to investigate 
complaints concerning the NHS. The jurisdiction of 
the PCA was ostensibly based on the criterion that 
the new office would reinforce existing 
constitutional/...
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constitutional arrangements for protection of 
individuals viz. the MP as a grievance chaser. 
Therefore the new PCA would only be able to 
investigate complaints alleging maladministration 
arising from the acts or omissions of departments . 
for which a minister was accountable to Parliament.
This proposal allayed the fears of MPs that 
their traditional function would become redundant 
but, as Lord Hailsham pointed out, also resulted in 
an over-specific and almost arbitrary abstraction of 
certain problem areas to the neglect of others.6 
For example, MPs commonly received complaints about 
local government and the NHS, both of which were 
excluded from the Act.
These omissions cannot be attributed to an act 
of political will since the Parliamentary Act was 
not really a politically motivated idea. Rather any 
undue caution arose from an unrealistic expectation 
of the potential volume of complaints and their 
gravity. Later, it became apparent that the 
criterion was not being applied so stringently to 
other subject-areas.
An amendment was moved at Standing Committee 
stage to extend the PCA's Act jurisdiction to the 
NHS but Crossman, then Leader of the House of 
Commons, opposed it and it was withdrawn.7 He made 
it clear, however, that his opposition was not in 
principle but that he felt the time was not 
propitious. Only the previous year (1965) the 
profession had been thrown into a state of turmoil 
by/...
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by the GP's Charter with the consequent crisis in 
morale.8 In 1966 the Minister of Health had 
introduced a new method of dealing with complaints 
in the form of a circular and it was thought that 
the Department should wait and see how this was 
received by the public and the profession.9
The result, as MPs pointed out was almost a 
foregone conclusion. The circular in question was 
merely advisory and had no legal authority. Even if 
the circular were implemented the procedure did not 
provide the element of independence vouchsaved by 
the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner.
Others criticised the secrecy and lack of publicity 
which surrounded these internal procedures ("In this 
instance, neither the Minister or anyone else drew 
the attention of those concerned to the existence of 
any such circular or any such procedure." - Sir Hugh 
Lucas-Tooth.10)
Crossman was also concerned that extending the 
PCA's jurisdiction would result in him looking at 
one small sector of medical care. Crossman wanted a 
complaints system which could examnine any 
complaint, no matter from which sector of the 
medical process it arose. His preference was that 
an independent commissioner should evolve.11
Some sections of the press were also surprised 
that the NHS had not been included. But the Medical 
Defence Union (MDU) was already sufficiently 
appalled by the "interference" of MPs in NHS 
affairs; "The Union deplores the Minister's view, 
expressed/...
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expressed in the House of Commons that it is 
absolutely vital that any member of Parliament on 
behalf of his constituent can get up in the House of 
Commons and ask him why the constituent was not - 
treated properly at such and such a hospital....
If an MP receives a complaint from a constituent he 
should refer it to the normal investigative 
machinery without prejudicing the constituent's 
rights in any way. The MDU is alarmed by the number 
of cases in which MPs prefer to act instead as 
'inquisitors' at large."12
Interestingly, the PCA did have jurisdiction 
over a number of hospitals which were administered 
directly by the DHSS e.g. Carstairs and Broadmoor 
and in the years to come proved himself capable of 
handling these complaints, including ones which 
involved questions of clinical judgement. But this 
provision did not attract any publicity at the time. 
That the issue did not assume greater proportions is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that the medical 
staff of prisons and high-security hospitals are not 
regarded by the rest of the profession as having the 
same degree of autonomy as their colleagues who work 
in the NHS. Furthermore, possible criticism was 
deflected by the fact that the PCA was assisted in 
his investigations by the advice of the Chief 
Medical Officer of the DHSS, in the case of special 
hospitals, the Chief Medical Adviser of the relevant 
department in pension cases, and the head of the 
Prison Medical Service in the case of complaints 
from prisoners. They, in turn, could call on the 
services of an independent professional 
adviser/...
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adviser if they felt they were too involved in the 
case themselves to make a truly objective assessment 
of the complaint.
The Select Committee on the PCA were quick to 
point out that this arrangement was no guarantee of 
the neutrality of the advice proferred by the 
medical advisers, although they were anxious not to 
impugn the integrity of the officials concerned.13
As a result of the Select Committee report, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner invited the Royal 
Colleges to nominate a panel of advisers who could
be called upon whenever a case involved their
\
speciality arose.
The new procedure was tested in a number of 
cases which were resolved to the satisfaction of the 
parties involved without any feeling that the 
PCA had over-stepped his powers. The PCA 
experience in handling medical cases convinced the 
Select Committee that they had a good case for 
advocating the extension of the PCA's remit to cover 
all hospitals.
2. The Movement to Create a Health Service 
Commissioner
(i) Scandals and Inquiries.
Developments took place in Scotland and 
England which prepared the ground for the Health 
Service Commissioner and also explained why the 
time/...
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time was particularly ripe in Scotland. In 
England, Barbara Robb was responsible for 
revealing the scandal of conditions and 
treatment in long term carehospitals for the 
elderly in a book entitled, "Sans Everything".14
This resulted in a general enquiry into 
conditions for the elderly in hospitals and also 
individual enquiries at a number of hospitals 
which were named in the Book by Robb. They all 
reached broadly similar conclusions as to the 
necessity of establishing a watchdog to over 
look the system. The enquiry at Cardiff voiced 
the opinion of other committees when it said: 
"Consideration should be given to the 
establishment of an independent body on the 
lines, as has been suggested in several quarters 
recently, of the Parliamentary Commissioner.... 
who could, in the last resort, undertake 
consideration of complaints and disciplinary 
matters which had not been handled 
satisfactorily in some other way."15
The "Sans Everything" scandal had assumed 
even greater proportions when Crossman revealed 
that the alleged state of affairs did, in fact, 
exist and had done so with the full knowledge of 
the DHSS for many years.16 In order to be seen 
to take immediate action, Crossman proposed to 
set up a Hospital Advisory Service (HAS) for the 
long-term psychiatric and geriatric 
institutions. It was to take effect from 1st 
April, 1970 and was simply to delay the 
introduction of the Health Service Commissioner 
rather/...
29
rather than supplant it. In fact it had never 
been intended otherwise. Sir Harold Wilson 
said: "We accepted the need for a similar system 
in the National Health Service over and above 
the proposals for a new hospital advisory 
service which Dick Crossman had announced".17 
And in reply to a PQ Crossman said: "I made it 
clear earlier that I am not pressing ahead as 
fast as possible with this because I first want 
to establish the hospital advisory service under 
its director and see how far that meets one side 
of the problem.... I myself am convinced that 
there is a substantial case for a public health 
commissioner".18
In Scotland the situation was slightly 
different. As MPs were to continue to point out 
in debate, Scotland benefited from the. existence 
of the Mental Welfare Commission (See Ch. 1). 
This body, consisting mainly of laymen with a 
number of medically qualified staff heard 
complaints from the inmates of mental 
institutions as well as having a roving 
commission to seek out abuses. The smaller 
geographical area also means that the Mental 
Welfare Commission can visit all the hospitals 
within its remit at least once in the year.
This is something the Health Advisory Service 
has been unable to do in England. The result 
has been that scandals have not occurred in 
Scotland to the same extent as in England. The 
successful record of the Mental Welfare 
Commission has also demonstrated to the medical 
community in Scottish hospitals that they have 
nothing/...
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nothing to fear from laymen looking into their 
affairs.
(ii) Pressure in the House of Commons.
Although there was no mass populist 
movement in the House MPs continued to press for 
appointment of a commissioner, particularly 
after the publication of "Sans Everything". On 
25th July, 1968 Mr. Moonman, MP, asked the 
Secretary of State for Social Services if he 
were considering the appointment of a 
commissioner. The then Secretary, Kenneth 
Robinson, replied" I have no evidence to suggest 
that the present arrangements for the handling 
of complaints in the hospital service are not 
working satisfactorily."19 But he did mention 
that the Green Paper, published only the week 
before did contain some proposals for possible 
changes.20 A Cabinet shake-up resulted in the 
appointment of a chief minister more sympathetic 
to the idea of a commissioner. When Mr.
Whitaker, MP, asked Mr. Crossman whether he 
would "now appoint an ombudsman for hospitals" 
the new Minister gave a less negative response 
than his predecessor. He said he was still 
considering the views of interested 
organisations on the Green Paper which included 
the tentative proposal that the Health Service 
Commissioner be established.21
A change of government did not result in a 
lessening of the demand for a Health Service 
Commission, even although the previous 
Conservative/...
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Conservative administration had declared its 
opposition to the idea of an ombudsman. Between 
2nd February, 1971 and 1st February, 1972 one MP 
alone asked the Minister for Social Services on 
six separate occasions whether he was about to 
announce the establishment of an office of 
Health Service Commissioner. Sir Keith Joseph's 
reply was always that he was still considering 
the proposals. Evidently the government had 
genuinely not decided what course to take 
because on 14th August, 1971 the editorial 
column of the British Medical Journal commented 
that the government had not yet decided whether 
it might not be better to extend the PCA's scope 
of inquiry to cover hospital complaints rather 
than set up an entirely different body. The 
British Medical Association preferred this 
compromise solution to any radical reform but 
the SC on the PCA in its report on the Act 
wanted to go further in the powers that the PCA 
would have regarding clinical complaints 
although they two wanted the PCA to assume this 
new role.22 Sir Edmund Compton had retired in 
April of 1971 to be replaced by Sir Alan Marre 
who said he was unperturbed by the difficulty of 
clinical complaints and would have a panel of 
experts to assist him.23
iii) Government Papers.
In 1966 the Farquharson-Lang Report on the 
"Administrative Practices of Hospital Boards in 
Scotland"/...
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Scotland1 re-assessed the role of voluntary 
members of hospital boards and called for 
increased delegation of responsibility. It 
emphasised that the hospital board not only 
represented management but the consumer and that 
the intelligent use of consumer reaction can be 
an aid to efficient management. The analogies 
it drew from private industry foreshadowed the 
1971 Conservative government reforms but their 
most immediate recommendation was that a Working 
Party (WP) should be appointed by the Secretary 
of State to devise a procedure for the handling 
of complaints. The Working Party reported as 
the Elliott-Binns Report in 1969. It was to 
identify the problems involved more accurately 
than ever before and so prepare the ground in 
Scotland, for the establishment of the HSC.
The Working Party had a very wide remit:
(1) to devise a procedure that covered all 
complaints from the most serious to the most 
trivial, (2) to devise a procedure which covered 
out and inpatients (3) to publicise the 
procedure, (4) to suggest ways in which the 
Health Boards could use the information and (5) 
to take into account the needs of patients and 
staff. It was in the emphasis placed on the 
last pointthat a different slant emerged from 
that which was to become the dominant theme in 
the later reports of the PCA, SC and 
HSC. In fact, the Working Party placed so much 
importance on guarding staff interests that at 
one/...
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one point in the drafting of the report the 
Working Party proposed making this issue the 
subject of a separate chapter. Finally, they 
decided that it was so important that it had to 
be in the forefront of their minds throughout 
but, to indicate their feelings, they changed 
the order of wording in their report by 
entitling it, "Suggestions and Complaints" 
instead of vice-versa. Moreover, the Working 
Party explicitly said that they felt that the 
question of an independent body was outside 
their remit. Nonetheless the results of their 
research all pointed to the HSC as the 
solution.
The debates on the PCA Act Bill kept the 
topic of the HSC in the forefront of government 
minds. In 1968 two documents appeared which 
proposed either the extension of the 
PCAs remit to the NHS or the creation of a 
separate Health Commissioner. The Ministry of 
Health published a Green Paper, "The 
Administrative structure of the Medical and 
Related Services in England and Wales" (HMSO 
1968). This report was devoted, in the main, to 
the future re-organisation of the health 
services but also had a section on dealing with 
complaints. It proposed that the PCA 
remit be extended, or that the Privy Council 
appoint a person or persons to investigate 
complaints or that a National Health 
Commissioner/...
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Commissioner with oversight of a network of 
local Health Commissioners should assume the 
responsibility. In Scotland the SHHD 
published "The Administrative Re-organisation of 
the Scottish Health Services". It noted the 
special role in Scotland of the MWC and took 
account of the Elliott-Binns Working Party which 
was then still considering the handling of 
complaints and suggestions in all types of 
hospitals. But it warned that the "extent to 
which any procedure could cover complaints on 
matters involving clinical judgement would 
require careful definition".24
In 1970 the DHSS published a second Green 
Paper "The Future of the National Health 
Service". The idea of the commissioner had 
become sufficiently concrete for it to be 
retained and modified. It was now acknowledged 
that the commissioner could not be allowed to 
investigate matters concerning clinical 
judgement. He could only ask himself whether 
the doctor had put himself in a position to make 
a reasonable judgement and acted upon it. (In 
short, they had adopted the formula devised by 
the SC to enable the PCA to look at complaints 
involving clinical affairs). The government 
proposals were still hazy as to how the HSC 
interact with the Health Advisory Service 
and Mental Welfare Commission. Even so, the 
profession felt sufficiently threatenedto 
denounce even these modest suggestions.25 
More/...
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More liberal sections of the profession asked 
"Is it not time the profession shook itself free 
of its occupational obscurantism?"26
A change of government prevented these 
ideas coming to fruition. The new Conservative 
administration in its first publication 
"National Health Service Reorganisation" put the 
emphasis on improving management structure 
rather than improving the complaints 
procedure.27 However, the reports of committees 
of inquiries into scandals uncovered by the 
press and the publication of "Sans Everything", 
meant that the government could no longer refuse 
to consider reform but was not prepared to incur 
the wrath of the medical profession on whose 
co-operation any scheme would depend. It 
therefore took the time-honoured step and set up 
a committee of enquiry under the chairmanship of 
Michael Davies to investigate the possibility of 
devising a new complaints system for 
hospitals.28 (In the event it was to be eight 
years before a divided committee submitted a 
report which ignored everything which had 
occurred in the intervening years! )29
3. Parliamentary-BMA Negotiations on the Bill
By the end of 1971, the British Medical 
Association was being sounded out for its opinion 
but the government itself had no definite proposals 
to present. It could not decide whether to enlarge 
the PCA's scope of inquiry to include hospitals, in 
accordance/...
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in accordance with the recommendations of the 
SC on the PCA and the wishes of the newly appointed 
Sir Alan Marre/ or to create an entirely new 
institution, perhaps drawing on the experience of 
the PCA. In the event, the government did opt for a 
HSC but negated the import of this by appointing the 
PCA as office-holder. Negotiations proper were 
entered into by the British Medical Association 
Council and the Department of Health and Social 
Security. With hindsight it is obvious that the 
government did feel constrained to take 
purposiveaction for the initial discussion document 
was quite far reaching. This much is obvious from 
the protracted length of proceedings and the 
allegations of back-tracking by the government, 
expressed by the opposition MPs.
One of the main obstacles to commencing 
negotiations on the creation of the HSC 
was that the British Medical Association refused to 
concede that any maj or reforms were required in the 
first place. In its annual Report for 1971-72 the 
British Medical Association Council expressed its 
anger that investigations into the complaints 
procedure were being carried out simultaneously by 
the Davies Committee, which only added to the 
confused atmosphere and no doubt to the confused 
results. In its evidence to the Davies Committee 
the Council said: "The Council takes the view that 
the existing machinery for dealing with complaints 
is sufficient in itself, and that improvements in 
the existing arrangements are needed 
rather/...
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rather than the introduction of an entirely new 
procedure." But "At the outset the Secretary of 
State made it clear that he was predisposed towards 
the appointment of a Health Commissioner of some 
kind." In turn, the British Medical Association 
left Sir Keith Joseph "in no doubt" that the case 
for the need for a Health Service Commissioner had 
not been made out.3 0
Negotiations with the British Medical 
Association presumably moved slowly because when the 
National Health Service (Scotland) Bill was 
introduced to Parliament it contained no provisions 
relating to the appointment of a Health Service 
Commissioner.31 The Bill, to re-organise the 
National Health Service in Scotland, was based both 
on the Green Papers of the previous Labour 
administration and the current Conservative 
government and was therefore regarded as a consensus 
bill.32 Consequently, it was given its first 
reading in the House of Lords (by Baroness 
Tweedsmuir) on 19th January, 1972. Lord Hughes, 
commenting on the absence of provisions for the 
Health Service Commissioner said this was for 
reasons "which I think we all understand",33 viz. 
the inability of the Department of Health and Social 
Security to secure the co-operation of the British 
Medical Association. But, in the event of the 
government not resisting British Medical Association 
pressure Lord Hughes promised that the opposition 
party would table an amendment to make it possible 
to introduce the Health Service Commissioner.
On 29th January, 1972 the British Medical 
Association/...
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Association Council considered a memorandum it had 
received from Sir Keith. As a direct result of 
their representations the Department of Health and 
Social Security had modified its earlier proposals 
expressed in the Green Paper that the Health Service 
Commissioner should be able to inquire into clinical 
matters. Sir Keith met again with the Council on 
2nd February 1972 and "agreed to continue discussion 
on points of detail before the the introduction of
legislation." Later that day in response to a
\
Parliamentary Question (PQ) the Secretary of State, 
asked whether the government was yet ready to 
announce the appointment of a Health Service 
Commissioner gave a curt reply - "Not yet!".34 The 
Secretary of State was not only struggling with the 
defenders of Parliamentary traditions and the 
recalcitrance of a professional group, there were 
financial considerations too. The enquiries of the 
early 1970s had shown that many of the complaints 
arose from inadequate facilities and under-staffing. 
These public expenditure implications also made the 
government wary of conceding too much. Abel-Smith 
concluded that this would force the government to 
search for a formula "which will concede the shadow 
rather than the substance of the commissioner 
idea."35 The main difficulty, other than 
substantive provisions, was to find the appropriate 
wording to deal with such sensitive areas as 
clinical judgement. It is evident from the 
memorandum that the British Medical Association were 
concerned by three main issues:36
(i) clinical judgement
(ii)/
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(ii) cases which could be taken to a court of 
law
(iii) complaints against independent contractors 
arising from their contracts with the 
Health Boards
(i) The government has relinquished its
earlier stand that the Health Service 
Commissioner should be able to investigate all 
aspects of health care in favour of a purely 
administrative remit. The difficulty was in 
how to incorporate this exclusion into the Act. 
By June of 1972 the situation stood at the form 
which finally made its way into Schedule 5 of 
the National Health Service (Scotland) Act,
1972, paragraph 2. Action which could not be 
made the subject of investigation was to 
include: "Action taken in connection with the 
diagnosis or the care or treatment of a 
patient, being action which, in the opinion of 
the Commissioner, was taken solely in the 
exercise of clinical judgement, whether formed 
by the person taking the action or by any other 
person".
The British Medical Association fought 
this draft, right up to the last movement; it 
was still not prepared to allow the Health 
Service Commissioner to investigate instances 
which included clinical judgement however 
incidentally.
Despite their fears, the last clause of 
the section ensured that complainants would not 
be able to reach the heart of clinical 
decisions/...
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decisions on the strength of a technicality 
where other members of staff were acting on the 
instructions of a doctor.
The decision as to whether the action 
taken was taken solely in the exercise of 
clinical judgement is one which the 
Commissioner reaches in consultation with 
medically qualified advisers.37
Initially the British Medical Association 
refused to co-operate with the Health Service 
Commissioner by providing a list of medical 
advisers. The main bone of contention was that 
the British Medical Association insisted that 
there is no such thing as uniform national 
standards applicable universally. Really, the 
British Medical Association was acting in 
defence of its members' interests, It did not 
want to have its members judged by top 
specialists from the Royal College. Finally, 
the British Medical Association did issue a 
list of doctors who were prepared to advise the 
Health Service Commissioner on whether or not a 
complaint involved clinical judgement.
(ii) The British Medical Association was
particularly worried by the problem of double 
jeopardy i.e. investigations by the Health 
Service Commissioner might be used by the 
complainant as a fishing expedition to obtain 
evidence which could be used later in 
litigation. It was pointed out that most legal 
proceedings relate to medical negligence and 
would/...
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would therefore be excluded from the Health 
Service Commissioner's remit under the terms of 
the legislation. The government proposed that 
in these few cases which overlapped the 
jurisdiction of both the courts and the Health 
Service Commissioner the complainant would not 
have a right of recourse to the Health Service 
Commissioner unless the Health Service 
Commissioner was satisfied that it would not be 
reasonable in the circumstances to expect the 
complainant to have recourse to the courts.
The British Medical Association did not believe 
that the HSC could be expected to exercise this 
discretion correctly in every case.
Furthermore, this still left a residual 
number of cases which did not appear to involve 
negligence at first instance but which emerged 
as such at a later stage in the investigation 
and where the complainant did not enter into 
the HSC investigation intending to go to court 
but who later changed his mind on the basis of 
the evidence disclosed.
Not only did this lay doctors open to the 
danger of being "prosecuted" twice but it gave 
complainants an advantage in terms of evidence. 
Under the present law doctors are under no 
legal duty to reveal medical records to their 
patients.38 Where access is opposed the 
patient would have to resort to the courts, and 
even there disclosure is often made only to the 
patient1s/...
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(iii)
patient's solicitor and not the patient 
himself.39
But the government was prepared to stand 
firm on this issue since it had the evidence of 
the PCA's experience that the discretion was 
not abused. And where a complainant did 
uncover a good case through a Health Service 
Commissioner investigation it seemed unfair to 
penalise the complainant by barring him from 
judicial remedies because he had not obtained 
his evidence in a more conventional manner.
It is interesting in retrospect that the 
question of how complaints against General 
Practitioners should be dealt with was such a 
burning issue at the time, for now there is no 
controversy over the fact that different 
arrangements exist for General Practitioners. 
The British Medical Association however felt 
real concern that the government or future 
governments might try to bring General 
Practitioners within the ambit of the HSC.
The British Medical Association wanted 
assurances that the General Practitioners would 
not have to live in a state of uncertainty as 
to their disciplinary procedures under future 
administrations. The British Medical 
Association Council asked for an explicit 
confirmation by the government of Crossman's 
assurance that General Practitioners would not 
be/...
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be included in any new legislation. Sir Keith 
gave this assurance and, for good measure, 
included it again in his statement to the House 
on 22nd February, 1972 when he announced the 
government's intentions for a HSC.40
The nearest thing that the government 
could offer to a cast-iron guarantee was to 
provide that these provisions of the Act, 
alone, could not be amended by Order in Council 
but could only be altered by the introduction 
of new legislation which calls for much more 
concerted time and effort.41
On 8th February, 1972 the National Health 
Service bill received its second reading in the 
House of Lords, still without the new clauses 
appended. However, significantly, on 12th 
February, 1972 the British Medical Journal 
carried as its leader an article entitled 
"Ombudsman Imminent?" - a full ten days before 
the announcement was finally made in the House. 
It reported that the British Medical- 
Association Council had tried to delay the 
introduction of the commissioner on the grounds 
of the upheaval that would already be created 
by the re-organisation of the National Health 
Service and a desire not to pre-empt the 
conclusions of the Davies Committee. But, it 
alleged "political pressures appear to have 
convinced the government but it dare not 
delay".42
4./.
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4. The Passage of the NHS Bill through Parliament
On 22nd February, 1972 the Secretary of State 
in the House of Commons (and Lord Aberdare in the 
House of Lords) made statements regarding the 
introduction of legislation to establish a Health 
Service Commissioner. The statement was still 
deliberately vague on certain points which had not 
yet been settled between the government and the 
British Medical Association but was padded out with 
provisions on the mechanics of the office borrowed 
from the PCA Act, 1967. Two days later Baroness 
Tweedsmuir announced that the time-factor involved 
in drafting new provisions meant that the clauses on 
the Health Service Commissioner were to be 
introduced into the Bill in the House of Commons, 
and the National Health Service Bill went into its 
House of Lords Committee stage without the sections 
on the Health Service Commissioner. In this slimmer 
version the Bill received its third reading in the 
House of Lords on the 23rd March, 1972.
In the House of Commons, the Bill received its 
second reading having been referred to the Scottish 
Grand Committee (SGC) under Standing Order No.67 
(Public Bills relating exclusively to Scotland) on 
the 13th April, 1972. Scottish Grand Committee sat 
twice on the 2nd and 4th May. On the second 
sitting, Mr. Smith complained that "any discussion 
of this matter in this committee is greatly 
inhibited by the fact that the committee has very 
little idea of what the government actually 
propose". And he went on to suggest that the 
government was actually withholding the draft 
clauses/...
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clauses deliberately - he could not believe that it 
was possible that they did not yet exist.*3 Mr. 
Millan pointed out that the Ombudsman idea was 
hardly a new one - even in National Health Service 
circles. "I warmly welcome the idea of a Health 
Service Commissioner. Such an appointment should 
have been contained in the Act which set up the 
Parliamentary Commissioner. Had it not been for 
medical, departmental and ministerial obstructions - 
Ministers were divided on this - it would have been 
in the original Act.1'** This was an interesting 
observation since Mr. Millan was in a unique 
position to know, having been Under-Secretary at the 
Scottish Office, 1966-1970 and having worked on the 
Scottish Green Paper.
On 8th May, 1972 the Bill went into its 
standing committee stage for detailed 
clause-by-clause examination. The committee was to 
meet on nine separate occasions between May 16th and 
June 22nd. At these meetings Mr. Wolrige-Gordon 
defended his government from charges of dilatoriness 
or the suppression of information: "As for this 
tremendous reaction against the way these Clauses 
have been produced I should point out that the 
general aims and nature of the Health Commissioner 
have been known since 22nd February, when my Rt.
Hon. friend, the Secretary of State for Scotland 
made it clear that legislation was going to be 
drafted with the intention of making it as 
flexible4 5 as possible. I strongly suspect the 
difficulties which would be involved ...I suspect 
that they have been practical and not theoretical 
difficulties."46
In/.
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In fact, the government succeeded in publishing 
the new clauses on 12th May, 1972 the Friday before 
the first standing committee meeting. Mr. Munro, 
Under Secretary for Health and Education at the 
Scottish Office, echoed his colleagues's words:
"This is not a proposal out of the blue. It was 
mentioned in the previous government's White Paper 
in 1968, in paragraph 60. A discussion paper was 
circulated in July 1970,*7 and it was announced in 
February in another place that this would be brought 
into this Bill. There is no question of the matter 
being rushed in any way. The Clauses could not be 
tabled until as near agreement as possible with the 
profession and all who were interested was 
completed, and this only happened last week."1*8
Mr. Jim Sillars moved an amendment to increase 
the number of sittings but the chairman refused to 
countenance these. And so a feature of this Bill, 
as so many others in Parliament, was the shortage of 
time to consider its implications, exacerbated in 
this case by the prolonged negotiations with the 
British Medical Association.
Clause I (Appointment of Commissioner and 
Security of Tenure) was given its first and second 
readings on 20th June, 1972. At this point MPs 
were aware that the legislative framework laid down 
by them would probably be the basis for the English 
situation, too. They were therefore concerned that 
some of the proposals contained in the legislation 
seemed to restrict the Health Sarvice Commissioner 
unduly. But they were aware that the shortage of 
time and the nature of the extra-Parliamentary 
negotiations /...
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negotiations left them little leeway. !'lf the 
Health Commissioner does not operate in the manner 
some of us would like then again it is not our 
fault. It is really the government's fault for 
having bungled their timetable to such an extent 
that we cannot adequately discuss the issues before 
us.... Any of the arguments we convey to the 
Under-Secretary, either now or on the second 
reading, or on amendments, will be resisted by him, 
because he has probably fully committed himself in 
internal negotiations to the profession. Having 
given the profession that commitment he is likely to 
resist whatever blandishments we put before him."119
Mr. Hughes confirmed these suspicions: 
"...discussing the clauses in a meaningful way 
assumes that the government are prepared to think 
flexibly. This is impossible because the government 
has done a deal with the medical profession. If 
anything there has been evidence of attitude, and a 
bias more towards the medical profession".50 His 
evidence of this was that: "It seemed that there had 
been some backtracking between the issuing of the 
(discussion) document and the Secretary of State for 
Social Services making this announcement,"51 i.e. 
backtracking between the 1970 discussion paper (see 
footnote 45) which implied that the Health Service 
Commissioner would be able to investigate the 
actions of General Practitioners, and Sir Keith's 
statement to the House of Commons on 22nd February, 
1972.
On 22nd June, 1972 Mr. Munro gave a first and 
second reading to new clauses on salary, pension, 
administrative/...
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administrative provisions along with clauses on 
bodies and action subject to investigation. Even at 
this stage the British Medical Association were 
pressing for changes. Sir John Gilmour raised a 
number of points on its behalf. "I was approached 
by the British Medical Association and asked to 
raise this matter ...n52 Even at Scottish Grand 
Committee stage Sir John asked the government to 
withdraw the Health Service Commissioner's 
discretionary power to handle cases where the 
complainant already had a right of recourse to a 
tribunal or court but the government refused.
MPs moved amendments on a number of points 
which interested then, e.g. they wanted to widen the 
range of bodies and actions subj ect to 
investigation. They did succeed in restoring the 
Health Service Commissioner's power to investigate 
complaints to the status quo ante of the discussion 
paper, i.e. that the Health Service Commissioner 
could investigate complaints arising from an 
allegation that a patient had been unfairly or 
unreasonably treated. This particular provision had 
disappeared during the period between the 
publication of the discussion document and the new 
clauses. In addition, the committee succeeded in 
extending the period for acceptance of complaints 
from six months to one year but this kind of 
amendment was easily justifiable in the light of the 
PCA Act from which the HSC borrowed so heavily in 
other spheres. More radical amendments, e.g. to 
permit direct access or include independent 
contractors in the legislation were mooted but 
barely discussed for any time before division since 
it/...
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it was acknowledged by all that these suggestions 
were not politically realistic. Other aspects of 
the bill were simply altered at the negotiation 
stage between British Medical Association and 
Department of Health and Social Security. Sometimes 
the British Medical Association was not so 
successful as it might have liked and congratulated 
itself on non-existent victories as a public 
relations exercise for its own members: "the
Council is happy to report that, as a result of its 
repeated representations to the Secretary of State, 
the Health Service Commissioner will not have power 
to investigate action taken (or action not taken) 
solely in the exercise of clinical judgement".53 
The government had conceded this from the first, the 
real battle was over whether the Health Service 
Commissioner should be allowed to investigate 
complaints which even involved clinical affairs 
incidentally.
Although the British Medical Association was 
unable to resist the tide of opinion in favour of 
establishing a Health Service Commissioner it could 
take comfort from the fact that once this decision 
had been taken professional interests were paramount 
in determining how it should be given effect.
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liamentary Commissioner for Administration.
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to defer work on the implementation of a computerised 
information retrieval system.
OTHER SERVICES (OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER 
\  AND HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONERS)
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Amount required in the year ending 31 March 1983 for the expenditure of the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
and the Health Service Commissioners for England, Scotland and Wales, including an international subscription.
The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner and Health Service Commissioners will account for this vote.
£  ■ , / .. !
Net total 1,216,000
Allocated in Vote on Account (HC 43) 550,000
Balance to complete 666,000
H
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£ t
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131,850
- *5 (3) Subscription to the International Ombudsman Institute who disseminate material regard­ing ombudsmen worldwide '
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Forecast
Outturn
£’000
1,1(0
m EXTRA RECEIPTS PAYABLE TO THE CONSOLIDATED FUND
No extra receipts were received in 1980-81 or are expected in 1981-82 and 1982-83
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Symbols are explained in the guide at the front of the volume.
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r
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CHAPTER 3
THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER FOR SCOTLAND: THE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(All references to the National Health Service 
(Sc) Act 1978, an act consolidating inter alia, the 
National Health Service(Sc) Act, 1972 and the 
National Health Service Reorganisation(Sc) Act,
1973)
In many respects the Health Service 
Commissioner was modelled directly on the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (PCA) 
and, at some points, the National Health Service 
(Sc) Act, 1978 actually incorporates the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967. In turn, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner was modelled on the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General (C & A-G).1 For 
example, all these share in common their method of 
appointment, security of tenure and independence in , 
carrying out their functions.2 Where they differ is 
in the nature of those functions. Neither the 
Health Service Commissioner nor the Parliamentary 
Commissioner were conceived of as auditors, although 
it could be argued that they do perform an auditing 
function indirectly in that many complaints arise 
from management inefficiencies. Nor are the Health 
Service Commissioner and Parliamentary Commissioner 
identical, even thought it was envisaged right from 
the start that in all probability one man would hold 
both offices.3 It was accepted that the statutory 
provisions relating to the Health Service 
Commissioner would need to take account of the kinds 
of problems thrown up by the health service.
Appointment/.
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Appointment of Commissioner and Tenure of Office
The legislation establishing the Health Service 
Commissioner is couched in terms of powers, duties 
and jurisdiction. It does not create patients1 
rights. Medical ethics recognise to some extent the 
patients' "rights" to self-determination in 
experimentation, surgery, consultation etc. Local 
Health Councils similarly recognise the patients' 
"rights" as taxpayers but patients have few legal 
rights. The Health Service Commissioner does not 
judge staff or administration by rules but by norms 
which have evolved through time in the case-law, 
which reflect notions of fairness or good practice.
S.90(1) creates the title of "Health Service 
Commissioner for Scotland". However, the words of 
the sponsoring minister - and the terms of the rest 
of the Act - make it clear that specifically 
Scottish legislation was passed for technical 
reasons only. The nomenclature of the Scottish 
National Health Service administrative structure 
differed from that of England and Wales and the 
administrative structure was itself more varied. 
There were also specifically Scottish rules 
regulating the conditions of service for General 
Practitioners and dentists. In addition, special 
account had to be taken of the position of the 
MWC.
However, it was made clear that in all other 
respects there would be the "closest 
correspondence"/...
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correspondence" between the functions of the Health 
Service Commissioner for Scotland and his 
counterparts in England and Wales.* In this way it 
would be possible for one person to hold all three 
posts. Nonetheless, the statutory provisions allow 
for the appointment of a Health Service Commissioner 
for Scotland alone if the case load justified it.
(As the present rate of complaints runs at 62 p.a. 
approximately from Scotland the probability of such 
an appointment seems remote.)5
S.90(2) provides for the appointment of the 
Commissioner by the Crown, by Letters Patent and 
that he shall hold office during good behaviour, 
subject to s.90(3) (see infra). The Crown appoints 
the nominee suggested by the Prime Minister. This 
method of appointment is traditionally a guarantee 
of independence. When the Ombudsman idea was first 
mooted in 1967 it was proposed that one possible 
method of appointment might be by Privy Council.6 
But, the government finally preferred to appoint the 
Health Service Commissioner, like the C & A-G, by 
the more authoritative exercise of the Royal 
Prerogative and Letters Patent.7
In its 1971 review of the Ombudsman, the group 
Justice criticised appointment by Letters Patent in 
relation of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act.8 
This method of appointment, it said, made the 
Ombudsman seem like a servant of the Crown rather 
than a servant of the House. The real point at 
issue was not the method of appointment but the way 
in which the name of thfe nominee was reached.
Justice thought it wrong that the Select Committee 
on/...
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on the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
should be entirely ignored in the process, not even 
having the name of the Commissioner before the rest 
of the House of Commons.
The Select Committee was impressed by this 
argument and in its report for 19759 put forward a 
number of suggestions for involving the SC on the 
PCA and the House of Commons in general, in the 
selection process. The SC asked the government 
that, at the very least, the SC on the PCA 
or its chairman should be asked to consider the 
Prime Minister's list of candidates or ideally that 
the chairman should, after consultation with the 
SC, choose the candidate and his decision should be 
confirmed by resolution of the House.
The government, in its reply,10 took issue 
with the description by Justice of the PCA 
as a "servant of the House". The description was 
"strictly colloquial" since the Parliamentary 
Commissioner cannot carry out any instructions of 
the House unless they are within the scope of the 
Act. It would be more correct to say that the 
Ombudsman is an officer of the House.
The government rejected the SC proposals. It 
said debate in the House on the merits of a 
candidate was "disagreeable" and "invidious" and 
that, anyway, any proposals for consultation would 
limit the sovereign's discretion and prejudice the 
independent nature of the appointment. But the 
government/...
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government compromised by saying that in future it 
would be the practice of the Prime Minister to 
consult the chairman of the SC on the PCA 
on what qualities might be desirable in a 
commissioner, and to consider any names the chairman 
might wish to put forward. In addition, the 
chairman, but not the whole SC would be shown the 
short leet, then the name of the commissioner before 
the official announcement is made.
The present position is that the SC does enjoy 
a special role in relation to the appointment of 
commissioners.11 The SC through the chairman, 
suggests names and the chairman is consulted at all 
stages relative to the appointment.
S.90(3) provides for the removal of the 
commissioner either at his own request, or upon an 
address by both Houses of Parliament or upon 
reaching the age of 65.12 It is this provision 
which has been responsible for the relatively high 
turn-over of Ombudsman in the last fifteen years; 
most office-holders already having reached the end 
of one career already.
S.90(4) disqualifies any person holding office 
as commissioner from sitting as an MP in the UK or 
in Northern Ireland. The relevant present 
legislation goes further in attempting to avoid 
possible conflicts of interest by barring these 
office holders from standing in local government 
elections/...
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elections.13 The only conflict of interest which 
seems to have arisen in the UK has been in relation 
to the civil service background of the first three 
Ombudsman. In >1976 the SC on the PCA received a 
letter alleging that Sir Alan Marre, then 
Parliamentary Commissioner, had displayed 
unwarranted leniency in handling a complaint against 
the Department of Health and Social Security of 
which he had been 2nd Permanent Secretary between 
1968-7-1. 14 The Select Committee concluded that the 
allegation was unfounded. The House knew of Sir 
Alan's background on his appointment and thought it 
an aid to his work.
S.90(5) reduces the possibility of similar 
complaints being made against the Health Service 
Commissioner by providing that he cannot be a member 
of the body subject to investigation. This 
precludes the commissioner from being a member of a 
Health Board although he can be a past member.
Salary and Pension of Commissioner
S.91(1) provides that the Commissioner shall be 
paid the same salary as if he were employed in the 
Civil Service and at a rank to be determined by 
resolution of the House. This change was brought 
about by the 1978 Act. The 1972 Act s.43(1) simply 
provided that the Commissioner be paid a salary to 
be determined by the House of Commons. Events have 
shown that the majority of the Commissioner's staff 
is drawn from the civil service, presumably to 
create a career structure, and the Commissioner has 
now been allotted the civil service rank of 
Permanent/...
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Permanent Secretary (the remaining staff range from 
Higher Executive level to Under-Secretary).
S.91 ss.2-4 provide that the pension provisions 
relating to the Parliamentary Commissioner also 
apply to the Health Service Commissioner and that in 
computing salary any other pensions or salaries 
payable to the Health Service Commissioner shall be 
deducted. The financial provisions of the Act make 
it clear that the salary is not the main inducement 
to become Commissioner and that the office holder is 
actively discouraged from having other interests 
which might potentially prejudice the independence 
of the office.
S. 91(5) when Sir Keith Joseph made his 
statement to the House regarding the establishment 
of the Health Service Commissioner he announced that 
he would consult with the SC on the PCA 
as to the future relationship between the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and 
the Health Service Commissioner.15 The SC responded 
by saying that while it recognised that it was 
inappropriate to extend the Parliamentray 
Commissioner’s remit to the health service 
nevertheless the Health Service Commissioner was 
modelled on the PCA and would have the closest 
association with the Parliamentary Commissioner in 
his work concerning the Department of Health and 
Social Security therefore it was appropriate that 
one man should hold both offices. S.91(5) provides 
that where this is the case the Commissioner shall 
receive only the one salary.
While/.
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While the financial arrangements acknowledge 
that in practice only one man is going to hold both 
offices they do allow for the future possibility of 
two office-holders, if circumstances warranted it. 
Paragraph (b) of the same sub-section goes further 
by providing that where one person is Health Service 
Commissioner of Scotland, England and Wales, but not 
the Parliamentary Commissioner too, he shall still 
receive only one salary. This acknowledges that 
these three posts are distinct and, again if 
circumstances warranted it, they could be held by 
three different people. The conclusion is that the 
statutory provisions do exist for future development 
of the Commissioner’s office.
S91 ss6-7 deal at greater length with the 
salary and pension difficulties created by one 
person holding a number of posts.
S91(8) provides that the salary and pension of 
the Commissioner shall be met from the Consolidated 
Fund (like the C & A-G and judges) to emphasise the 
non-political nature of his position.
Administrative Provisions
S92(1) provides that the Commissioner may 
appoint officers to assist him (numbers and 
conditions of service to be approved by the Minister 
for the Civil Service). The Commissioner presently 
employs twenty seven staff of whom a number are 
seconded from the National Health Service.16 The 
first Commissioner, Sir Edmund Compton had been C & 
A-G/...
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C & A-G for eight years and he continued the C & A-G 
tradition of drawing staff from the Civil Service. 
Successive Commissioners have justified the practice 
on the basis that the back ground of the staff has 
been an invaluable aid in their investigations 
especially on the National Health Service side. In 
fact, the Health Service Commissioner would have 
liked a greater balance between civil servants and 
National Health Service staff on his own unit.17 
National Health Service staff would have experience 
of the health service and would inspire confidence 
amongst doctors and nurses but National Health 
Service staff have been reluctant in the past to 
apply for posts. National Health Service 
administrative staff are loathe to give up job 
security or possibly promotion at a time of 
administrative upheavel and view experience in the 
Health Service Commissioner office as irrelevant to 
their career.18 Seconded staff allegeddifficulties 
in being re-absorbed into the National Health 
Service. Together, the Health Service Commissioner 
and SC have succeeded in obtaining for National 
Health Service-seconded staff a guaranteed right of 
return and it is hoped this will improve the 
recruitment problem.
There are no plans at the moment to increase 
the complement of staff so the imbalance remains but 
is mitigated to some extent by the fact that the 
Deputy Commissioner and one of the two Investigatory 
Directors are drawn from the National Health 
Service.
S92(2) provides for the delegation of functions 
by/...
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by the Commissioner to his staff. There are 
investigatory units in Edinburgh, London/ Liverpool 
and Cardiff.19
S92(3) allows the Commissioner to obtain paid 
advice from experts. The two most likely areas are 
legal and medical. The present Commissioner is a QC 
but in the past Commissioners have sought advice 
from the government's Treasury Solicitor. In 1978 
Sir Idwal Pugh, newly appointed as Commissioner, 
changed his practice to give the process a more 
independent air and employed private counsel.20 
Presumably this practice would be revived in the 
event of a future Commissioner having no legal 
qualifications.
For medical matters, the Health Service 
Commissioner relies for his advice on a panel of 
three doctors in Scotland, nominated by the 
Presidents of the Scottish Royal Colleges and 
Chairman of the Scottish Council of the British 
Medical Association.21 This arrangement was reached 
only after some disagreement among the medical 
profession. The British Medical Association 
initially objected to the unfair imposition of the 
elitist standards of the Royal Colleges on hospital 
doctors but later withdrew their objections.22
S92(4) All the expenses incurred by the 
Commissioner are met by Parliament. In 1982 the 
combined expenses of the PCA and HSC ran to 
£154,95523 of which 39% is attributable to the Health 
Service Commissioner side.2k
This/.
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This figure is disproportionate to the ratio of 
Health Service Commissioner to Parliamentray 
Commissioner staff (27 out of 87) but is easily 
explained by the more expensive Health Service 
Commissioner practice of interviewing almost every 
complainant compared to the Parliamentary 
Commissioner practice of relying more frequently on 
correspondence.
Bodies and Action subject to Investigation
S92(1) defines "body subject to investigation" 
as the Health Boards and the Common Services 
Agency.
S93(2) is crucial because it defines action 
subject to investigation. It is worth quoting in 
full:
"Subject to the provisions of this section, the 
Commissioner may investigate -
(a) an alleged failure in a service provided 
by a body subject to investigation, or
(b) an alleged failure of a body subject to 
investigation to provide a service which 
it was the function of the body to 
provide, or
(c) any other action taken by or on behalf of 
a body subject to investigation,
in a case where a complaint is duly made by or 
on behalf of any person that he has sustained 
injustice or hardship in consequence of the 
failure or in consequence of maladministration 
connected with the other action."
The/.
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The original definition as laid down in the 
1972 Act was one long sentence broken down into 
clauses but still quite difficult to read and 
understand.25 In the following year it was 
re-written in its present form but a clause relating 
to unfair or unreasonable treatment was dropped.
This has had no discernible effect on the number of 
cases being rejected and presumably it was thought 
that the phrase could be subsumed under the broader 
heading of "maladministration". The Commissioner is 
on record as saying that he will interpret the 
legislation as widely as possible.26
The Commissioner's remit is drafted in very 
broad terms. Providing the complainant can show 
injustice or hardship consequent to alleged 
maladministration or an alleged failure in the 
service or any other action connected with the 
subject of complaint then the Commissioner will 
investigate. Initially, the government wanted to 
confine the Commissioner to cases of 
maladministration. It did not want the Commissioner 
to be able to look at generalised complaints 
alleging deficiences in the health services27 since 
these so often came down to arguments about public 
expenditure which are more properly the concern of 
the C & A-G.
What the government overlooked was that if it 
extended the Commissioner's remit beyond 
maladministration it would not open a floodgate of 
complaints about the level of National Health 
Service financial provision since each complainant 
had/...
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had to show personal hardship. There was little 
possibility of the section being used by pressure 
groups to bring class actions.
The legislation and consequently the 
Commissioner require two things of the 
complainant:28 (a) that a named individual has 
suffered injustice or hardship and that (b) there is 
prima facie evidence of a causal link between the 
hardship suffered and the maladministration, action 
or failure of service complained of. Where a 
complainant fails either of these requirements the
Commissioner will reject his case in limine. On
occasions, the Commissioner has protested that these 
requirements are a limitation on his jurisdiction 
which conflict with the public interest. In one 
case he received, the Patients' Association 
complained that the Area Health Authority refused to 
recall patients who had been treated by a butcher 
masquerading as a surgeon. The Commissioner had to 
reject the case because there was no individual 
patient to make the complaint.29
In his report for that year the Commissioner 
asked the SC to consider: "Whether I should be 
empowered to initiate investigations where in my 
discretion I think that an investigation would be in 
the public interest."30 This would be in line with 
the powers of the Swedish Ombudsman, the Justice 
recommendations and the views of the SC on the PCA 
itself, but the idea has not been mentioned since 
the 1979-80 report of the Health Service 
Commissioner and seems unlikely to be revived unless 
a/. . .
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a similar case appears to prompt it.
The most difficult problem posed by the section 
is the meaning of the term "maladministration" 
borrowed from the PCA terminology. Neither the 
PCA nor the HSC legislation provides a statutory 
definition or guide to interpretation of this word. 
Neville Brown31 has posed the theory that this 
omission was deliberate. He believes that the 
Ombudsman idea is essentially extra-legal, and 
conceived of as a means of avoiding the 
technicalities of the law. To attempt to provide a 
legal definition for the word maladministration 
would only destroy the very simplicity which is 
supposed to be a major attribute of the Ombudsman.
Marshall has reacted quite differently to the , 
term. He says it is so vague as to be useless; it 
does not even have the symbolic value Neville Brown 
claims for it and he would like to see it 
abolished.32
In fact we do have some idea of what it means. 
During the passage of the PCA Bill, Mr. Crossman MP 
suggested to the House that maladministration would 
include "bias, neglect, inattention, ineptitude, 
perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on."33 
Clearly, this Crossman catalogue is sometimes at 
variance with the proposals contained in the 1965 
White Paper and the Whyatt Report. The government 
paper proposing the creation of a PCA said the 
Commissioner was not intended to act as a court of 
appeal/...
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appeal from discretionary decisions but to focus on 
procedural defects. Similarly the Justice Committee 
chaired by Whyatt was particularly influenced by the 
Danish Ombudsman and they interpreted his remit as 
being concerned with procedural defects.
The Crossman catalogue, with its emphasis on 
incompetence, ineptitude and perversity implies that 
the Commissioner can re-examine discretionary 
decisions. Clearly if the Commissioners permitted 
themselves to so this they would be stepping outwith 
the terms of the Act and setting themselves up as a 
court of higher appeal, which would be completely 
unacceptable to those working in the Civil Service 
or National Health Service.
The early experience of the PCA proved that a 
purely procedural interpretation of 
maladministration throws up some hard cases. In 
1968 the SC on the PCA urged the PCA to review cases 
which appeared to him to be "Thoroughly bad in 
quality" and infer maladministration or improper 
procedure from the quality of the decision itself.34 
The chairman of the Select Committee was to call 
this "the doctrine of constructive 
maladministration".35
Although the Commissioner adopted this practice 
it seems to have made little difference to the way 
he carries out his work. Of course, 
maladministration is only one of the three main 
grounds/...
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grounds on which an investigation may be based, even 
if it is the least comprehensible.
Alarmed by the ease with which the Health 
Service Commissioner and the Commissioner for Local 
Administration in Scotland can look at confidential 
medical records, the Executive Committee of the 
British Medical Association gave the following 
guidance to its members on the extent of the 
Commissioners' powers:
"They are concerned solely with 
administrative matters ... and 
they cannot question the merits of a
decision made unless that decision was reached
as a result of maladministration. Therefore, 
a professional judgement cannot be 
questioned... so long as it was properly made 
in the administrative sense. This means that 
account was taken of established procedures 
and that all relevant letters and reports were 
considered."36
Perhaps this interpretation is rather 
simplistic. The New Zealand Ombudsman, commenting 
on cases he deals with, has said that despite what 
doctors think professional judgements do not lie on
the one hand and administrative decisions on the
other. In any large organisation, particularly in 
the more senior posts, there is an intermingling of 
the two.37
In 1971, Justice admitted that perhaps the 
Whyatt report had taken too narrow a view of what 
remit would be appropriate to the Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act. No doubt the provisions of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967 were 
well-intended but there now seemed to be evidence 
that they deterred complainants. Therefore, in its 
report/...
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report "Our Fettered Ombudsman", Justice argued that 
the Commissioner should no longer be limited to 
investigating complaints about maladministration but 
should be able to look at acts which were 
"unreasonable, injust or oppressive". Justice 
backed up its arguments with evidence of the 
experience of the New Zealand Ombudsman which had 
shown that such a wide remit was workable.
The idea did not receive the support of either 
the Commissioner or the SC. The Commissioner said 
that if the Justice formula were a device to enable 
him to look at those kinds of discretionary 
decisions then it was misguided.38 He said he 
already looked at those kinds of decisions providing 
they contained elements of maladministration. What 
he did not do was to investigate discretionary 
decisions taken without maladministration.
In the end, the Commissioner and the SC 
agreed that the argument was really about semantics. 
He could do everything his opponents said he could 
not do under the existing legislation and to change 
it would make little practical difference.39
Unfortunately, the Ombudsman's office has not 
carried out any in-house research which could 
support either party's claims. Anecdotal evidence, 
however, suggests that complainants are completely 
ignorant of the provisions of the relevant 
legislation and leave it to the Ombudsman's staff to 
frame the substance of their complaint around the 
Act/...
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Act thus bearing out the view of the Ombudsman and 
SC.
There does seem some evidence that successive 
HSC are gradually crystallising a definition of 
failure and maladministration through the build up 
of case law. Unfortunately this is not available to 
the public to enable them to use the Commissioner's 
office properly. The case law that exists does help 
the HSC maintain a consistency in decisions. In 
1978 the PCA revealed that his office (and 
presumably also the HSC) kept a subject index of all 
decisions and it is possible to speculate that he 
follows some informal law of precedent.40 (The 
following chapter on case law will demonstrate this 
is in fact what happens). The Supply Estimates 
reveal that when sufficient funds are available the 
Commissioner would like to install a computer 
information retrieval system and it is presumably 
for this purpose.41
S.93(3) "... the Commissioner shall not conduct ah
investigation in respect of any of the 
following matters -
(a) any action in respect of which the 
person aggrieved has or had a right of 
appeal, reference or review to or 
before a tribunal constituted by or 
under any enactment or by virtue of 
Her Majesty's prerogative;
(b) any action in respect of which the 
person aggrieved has or had a remedy 
by way of proceedings in any court of 
law; but the Commissioner may conduct 
an investigation notwithstanding that 
the person aggrieved has or had such a 
right or remedy, if he is satisfied 
that in the particular circumstances 
it is not reasonable to expect that 
person to resort or have resorted to 
it."
Paragraphs/.
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Paragraphs (a) and (b) deal with the problem of 
double jeopardy. This means the possibility and 
harassment of someone being penalised twice for the 
same failing: in this context, once under the Act 
and once again either by court or tribunal. The Act 
attempts to resolve this problem by providing that 
the Commissioner must not normally investigate a 
complaint if the complainant has failed to exhaust 
the remedies available to him in court or before a 
tribunal. But a discretion is vested in the 
Commissioner to investigate a complaint if he has 
ground to think it is not reasonable to expect the 
complainant to have resort to the court or tribunal. 
This is in keeping with the established judicial 
principle that the superior courts retain an 
original jurisdiction which enables them to 
determine all alleged illegalities unless statute 
has clearly expressed otherwise and perhaps even 
then).42
The provision is also an implicit recognition 
that, while the Commissioner might be seen as a 
cheap and accessible alternative to the law, he is 
also a substitute working in the twilight areas of 
the jurisdiction of the courts. The Commissioner 
looks both at complaints which can be resolved by 
the judicial process and those which cannot.
The difficulty of vesting such a discretion in 
the Commissioner is that he is bound to make 
mistakes, or the complainants genuinely change their 
minds so the possibility of double jeopardy 
remains.43 The only solution would be a positive 
statutory/...
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statutory bar which might seem unnecessarily harsh 
to an unsuspecting complainant who forfeits his 
right in law because he was unaware, possibly due to 
the difficulty of obtaining evidence, that he had a 
good case.
When the idea of the HSC was first raised the 
then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Health, 
Sir Arnold France, objected on precisely these . 
grounds.114 He said that a very large percentage of 
complaints relating to the National Health Service 
might result in court action therefore on a narrow 
reading of the Act the Commissioner would have to 
reject them causing more frustration than was 
realised. This seems a rather fatuous argument. 
Added to this was the difficulty of telling, at 
first instance, whether a complaint might result in 
legal action.
The SC on the PCA ignored these objections 
since it felt that some improvement was better than 
none. It also pointed out that since all complaints 
would have first been filtered through the Health 
Boards, their legal departments would have screened 
all those likely to give rise to legal action.
S93(4) The Commissioner cannot investigate the
actions detailed in Sch. 14 (see infra).
S93(5) Her Majesty may, by Order in Council,
amend Sch. 14 paras. 4 and 5 so as to include these 
actions in the Commissioner's jurisdiction.45-
S93(6)/.
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S93(6) The Commissioner alone decides whether 
he is competent to investigate a complaint and if 
so, enjoys unfettered discretion as to whether to 
initiate, continue or discontinue an investigation. 
(The point has not yet been tested in court in 
relation to the HSC but has been decided in the case 
of the PCA in his favour).46
Provisions relating to Complaints
S94(1) provides that the Commissioner may hear 
a complaint from any individual or group of people 
providing they are not a local authority or 
nationalised industry (for which separate complaints 
systems exist) nor any body appointed by the Queen 
or government or funded by Parliament. This has the 
important effect that the HSC cannot accept 
complaints from Local Health Councils since they are 
publicly funded bodies. However, he will accept 
complaints from LHCs under S94(2).
S94(2) Where a potential complainant had died 
or is unable to act for himself, someone else, 
whether an individual or group, may act for him. 
Under this heading the HSC accepts complaints from 
LHCs.47 However, most of the complaints which the 
HSC receives under this heading are from relatives 
or MPs acting for elderly people. The HSC has 
identified these complaints as being amongst his 
most difficult since the representatives' motives 
for complaining are so often confused with their own 
personal/...
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personal feelings of guilt regarding the possible 
neglect of a relative.48
S94(3) complaints must be made in writing 
within 12 months of the matter coming to the 
complainant's notice. Although complaints must be 
made in writing, the HSC also handles several 
hundred telephone enquiries each year. Many of 
these are general health queries rather than 
complaints and have to be redirected. The remainder 
have to be advised as to the correct procedure for 
making a complaint. The number of telephone calls 
and their nature seems to show all too clearly that 
the public is confused about the Ombudsman and 
prefer an oral to a written procedure. Ombudsmen 
elsewhere in the world accept complaints by 
telephone or assist the complainants to draw up 
their complaint. Although the Commissioner for 
Local Administration in Scotland49 would like to see 
a similar system operating at his level this 
particular proposal had not been espoused by the 
HSC.
Complaints must be submitted to the HSC 
within one year. It was thought that a period any 
longer than this would make investigation 
impracticable. Even within the present remit the 
HSC can find it difficult to contact National Health 
Service staff because the turnover is so fast. The 
Commissioner has discretion to waive the time bar 
which he does only rarely. He used the power most 
frequently in the first year to take account of 
cases which had taken place before his office came 
into/...
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into being.
S94(4) stipulates that the Commissioner may 
consider a complaint only after the body subject to 
investigation has considered it. This filter is 
analogous to the role of MPs in relation to the PCA. 
It was not only designed to minimise the number of 
complaints but to "recognise the board's 
responsibility for dealing with complaints as an 
integral function of management, and... to avoid 
complaints going to the health commissioner 
unnecessarily."50
S94(4) remained in this form despite the 
protests of Mrs. Castle, MP that it failed to take 
account of staff who wanted to complain.51 Mrs. 
Castle said this was a grave weakness since the Ely 
scandal had shown that staff fear of victimisation 
was a major factor in the scandal remaining 
unreported for so long. It was important that staff 
should be able to bring a complaint without first 
taking it to their employer.52 The National Health 
Service reorganisation (Sc) Act, 1973 Sch. 4 para. 
145 (2) removed this limitation on the HSC. The HSC 
still retains a discretion to refuse to accept such 
a complaint referred in this way if he is not 
satisfied that the particular circumstances warrant 
it.
S94(5) provides that a body subject to 
investigation may itself refer a complaint to the 
Commissioner subject to the same time limit as other 
complainants of twelve months. The complaint may be 
one/...
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one against itself or the complaint may be brought 
on behalf of an aggrieved person. In the former 
case the Health Board may not have been able to 
resolve the complaint to the complainant's 
satisfaction and think that intervention by a more 
apparently independent body will bring the matter to 
a satisfactory close.53
The process is entirely dependent on the 
patient complaining. The HSC has no power to 
initiate his own investgiations. This was 
negatively commented upon at the time of passing the 
Act54 and has also attracted criticism from the HSC 
and SC (see infra).
Application of Certain Provisions of the 
Parliamentary Act, 1967 viz. ss.7,8,9,11.
S7 (procedure in respect of investigations) The 
procedure is not laid down in detail.
The Commissioner has complete discretion as to 
how to conduct the investigation, what information 
to obtain and from whom. He must give the person 
against whom the complaint is made an opportunity to 
reply and may decide to permit him legal 
representation. The Commissioner may also pay 
expenses to the parties involved, if he thinks fit, 
for loss of time or expenses incurred (e.g. in 
taking time off and travelling to X for the purposes 
of an interview). The initiation of an 
investigation by the Commissioner does not affect 
actions already taken by the body subj ect to 
investigation/...
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investigation or which it may take in the future.
The statutory provisions only give a hint of 
what happens in practice. When the HSC first 
receives a complaint it is screened by a member of 
his investigatory unit.55 They may make informal 
enquiries of the Health Board. On the basis of this 
the case is submitted to the HSC with a 
recommendation for investigation. The HSC contacts 
the Health Board and requests the name of a liaison 
officer to handle the Health Board side (e.g. 
providing interview rooms, arranging appointments 
for interviews etc.). The HSC sends the liaison 
officer a proforma for completion with a covering 
letter explaining HSC procedure. Any individuals 
named in the complaint also receives a summary of 
the complaint so that they can present their case in 
writing. The investigatory unit normally interviews 
all the staff involved and examines all the records 
including medical records, ward reports, waiting 
lists, appointment lists etc. until a dossier of 
information has been built up.56
This very thorough and time consuming method of 
investigation has earned the Commissioner's 
investigations the description "Rolls-Royce". But 
it has also been judged as inefficient use of staff 
time. Gwyn has said that in this respect the 
British Ombudsman suffers from the legacy of the C & 
A-G.57
In/.
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In keeping with this inquisitorial style of 
procedure, the HSC draws up a draft report which is 
sent, without findings, to the Health Board and 
staff member concerned for comment. The complainant 
does not receive a copy of the draft report and does 
not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence 
from the hospital as he would be able to do before a 
court or tribunal. These provisions really give the 
lie to the accusations of the British Medical 
Association that in these investigations the HSC 
is a kind of despot.58
Bradley makes the point that it is all too 
obvious that when these provisions were drawn up 
there was "almost total lack of recourse to legal 
techniques, the legal profession and judicial 
process."59 This remains true despite the 
appointment of a QC as the most recent Commissioner 
(although it is significant that in his reports he 
is more likely than his predecessors to mention the 
difficulty of weighing up the credibility of a 
witness; he was the first HSC to use his powers to 
hold a judicial hearing),60 and, most recently, 
published cases are also summarised, rather like the 
rubric to a case report.
The procedure is designed to be cheap, private, 
quick, and inquisitorial in nature with all its 
attendant advantages. But when conflicting facts 
must be established or witnesses are loathe to give 
evidence then the Commissioner must fall back on the 
adversarial style of procedure.
S8/.
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58 (evidence) requires those concerned to 
furnish information or documents. The Commissioner 
can hold a hearing, having the same powers as a 
court to compel witnesses, take evidence on oath and 
compel the production of documents. No plea of 
confidentiality will be accepted including Crown 
Privilege. For a short time, it appears that the 
HSC could have looked at Cabinet documents, too, but 
this was removed in 1973.61 Even so, very wide 
powers have been conferred on the Commissioner 
although he uses them rarely.
59 (Obstruction and Contempt) both punishable 
by the court on the certificate of the 
Commissioner.
Sll (Secrecy of Information) The Commissioner 
and his officers are bound by the Official Secrets 
Act 1911. It is this provision which compels the 
Commissioner to publish anonymised reports.
Sll(3) The section also provides that 
notwithstanding the preceding provisions the 
Commissioner may communicate the contents of 
documents certified by a Minister of the Crown as 
containing information or belonging to a class of 
documents disclosure of which would be contrary to 
the safety of the state or public interest. As far 
as we know no such certificates have been issued.
Reports by the HSC
S96(l) This section deals with the 
Commissioner's/...
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Commissioner's reports. It is also an oblique 
reference to the remedies which the HSC can obtain 
since it is only through the medium of his reports 
that the HSC can hope to do anything for the 
complainant.
There are four recommendations open to the
HSC:
(i) an apology
(ii) an apology and an invitation to the 
offending Health Board to review their 
practices
(iii) an ex gratia payment
(iv) advise on need for departmental guidance 
on a particular point
The HSC has no powers of enforcement. He must reply 
on his own authority, the quality of his reports and 
the backing of the SC. Health Boards have proved 
particularly reluctant to grant ex gratia payments. 
This controversy raised questions as to whether the 
HSC should have powers of enforcement.
The HSC has said that if the complainants want 
damages he advises them to seek a legal remedy. But 
if they want moral satisfaction only, he will 
proceed with the case.62 The only element of 
compulsion open to him is the back up of the SC. 
Obviously there is a less direct relationship 
between/...
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between SC and HSC than the SC and PCA, since the 
management of the NHS is in the hands of local 
boards, not a minister. But the ,SC has so far 
always succeeded in using its authority to ensure 
the implementation of the recommendations.63 The 
HSC acknowledges that the system is not perfect but 
thinks it works well enough especially since the 
alternative - powers of compulsion in the hands of a 
non-accountable figure - is unacceptable in a 
democracy.
At the end of each investigation the HSC 
sends a copy of his report to the complainant, the 
Health Board, the person who took the action 
complained of and the Secretary of State. An 
omission in the legislation which the HSC 
has identified is that where someone brings a 
complaint on behalf of an aggrieved person the 
former is not entitled to a copy of the report, but 
only to know that one has been issued.64 This has 
caused offence in the past to Local Health Councils 
acting for individuals.
S96(3) where the HSC decides not to investigate 
a complaint he must give a statement of his reasons 
to the complainant and to the Health Board 
(remembering that the Health Board will have already 
been contacted during the screening process).
S96(4) where a body subject to investigation 
refuses to remedy an injustice identified by the 
HSC/...
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HSC he may publish a special report. So far the 
HSC has not had to publish any special reports 
mainly because of the success of the SC on the PCA 
(see ch.6 on SC).
S96(5) the HSC makes an Annual Report to the 
Secretary of State and may make other reports as he 
thinks fit, though he has not done so yet. The HSC 
for Scotland, England and Wales submit a joint 
report as so far no significant differences have 
arisen between the complaints from the three 
countries to justify separate reports.
S96(6) The HSC may also lay occasional reports 
before Parliament. He has not done so yet because 
presumably, unlike the PCA no significant cases have 
turned up.
S96(7) in everything he says and writes the 
HSC enjoys absolute privilege. Without this 
dispensation the HSC would find his work 
impossible.
The reports of the HSC, whether annual or of 
selected investigations, have attracted some 
criticism. Their anonymity makes them unattractive 
to the layman and newspaper reports. This in turn 
creates the relatively light case load. Although 
the HSC has become increasingly liberal in providing 
statistics it is still difficult to relate these to 
the/...
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the investigations. Only a selection of the more 
interesting are published and they are arranged 
geographically by country and not by subject matter. 
The HSC says the main deterrent to a more attractive 
and coherent presentation is cost.65 At one time 
full reports were published quarterly, now only 
selected reports are published.
There is no provision for the HSC report to be 
debated in the House, although this is true of other 
government publications too. It is regrettable in 
this case because the reports themselves receive so 
little publicity. The SC recommended that a set 
time should be set aside for debating HSC reports66 
but, not surprisingly, the government was not 
prepared to set aside time.67 To date there has 
been only one full-scale debate on the Ombudsman and 
that was brought on a private member's motion by the 
Chairman of the SC.68
Interpretation of Part VI.
S97(1) interprets phrases used throughout the 
act (but not maladministration.)
S97(2) a final declaration that the HSC 
cannot question the merits of a decision taken 
without maladaministration which is in exercise of a 
discretion vested in a body subject to 
investigation. This accords with the HSC's own view 
that he is empowered to look at the merits of a 
decision if in the exercising of the discretion 
there/...
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there is maladministration, (see infra).
Action not subject to investigation by the 
Commissioner.
Schedule 14
Schedule 14 concerns subjects which the HSC 
may not examine, but it should be noted that where a 
complaint has as its grounds a number of areas of 
which only some are excluded the HSC will conduct a 
partial investigation. In a very few difficult 
cases each year he commences an investigation in the 
belief that the complaint may be within his 
jurisdiction only to discontinue the investigation 
when he discovers that this is not the case.69
i
In his evidence to the SC the HSC admitted that 
these partial and discontinued investigations are 
possibly more puzzling and unsettling to the 
complainants than if he had rejected their cases 
outright from the start.70
The terms of Schedule 14 are stated without 
ambiguity and have caused, with the possible 
exception of paragraph 2, little difficulty for the 
HSC. The HSC has not asked for any changes in the 
content of Schedule 14, most of the arguments for 
and against their inclusion having been exhausted in 
relation to the PCA Act, 1967. If the remit of the 
PCA were extended to, for example, personnel matters 
or/...
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or contracts, no doubt the remit of the HSC 
would be brought into line.
Paragraph 1
Services provided by the Executive Councils, 
e.g. medical, dental, optical and pharmaceutical are 
excluded from the HSC's remit. These services had 
their own statutory complaints procedure since the 
inception of the NHS and this machinery remained 
unaltered by the decision to establish a health 
commissioner. This is a good illustration of the 
rule giving priority to statutory remedies.
The Ministry of Health used this exclusion as a 
reason for not establishing a commissioner. The 
Ministry agreed that it would be illogical, in a 
re-organised health service, to create a 
commissioner who could only look at one part of a 
complaint71 while ignoring the fact that many 
complaints related solely to the hospital service.
Paragraph 2
The HSC may not investigate complaints relating 
to the diagnosis of an illness or the care or 
treatment of a patient if, in the opinion of the 
HSC, the action was taken solely in the exercise of 
clinical judgement.
Initially, there was cautious support in 
Scotland from the medical profession for the 
inclusion/...
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inclusion of clinical judgement in the jurisdiction 
of the HSC but their English colleagues dissuaded 
them.72 Later, in 1977 when the SC on the PCA was 
reconsidering the HSCs jurisdiction and took 
evidence from interested parties, the Scottish 
contribution was marked by its conservatism and vote 
for the status quo. The SC attributed this change 
of heart to the superior system of hospital internal 
review operating in Scotland.73
The medical profession was opposed to the 
inclusion of clinical judgement because it thought 
that it would harm patient confidence in their 
doctors, damage the self-respect of doctors, reduce 
work satisfaction and encourage the slow and 
expensive practice of defensive medicine. Knowing 
that the HSC scheme would be totally reliant on 
co-operation from staff the government was anxious 
that there should be proposals to make it clear 
that- "He (the HSC) must not be pictured as a person 
entitled to say at leisure and with the advantage of 
hindsight whether the treatment given in a 
particular case was absolutely right".71*
Although the HSC may not question clinical 
judgements per se he may investigate the complaint 
in order to establish whether the professional 
person concerned had put himself in a position to 
make a reasonable judgement and acted upon it. It 
should be noted that in terms of the Act it is the 
HSC/...
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HSC who decides whether or not something is 
"clinical".
Doctors are sometimes surprised by the extent 
to which the HSC does involve himself in the 
clinical issues of a case. This is particularly so 
where the HSC and his staff ask to look at the 
clinical records75 (this is usually only to 
establish appointment times etc.)
In contrast, the restriction on clinical 
judgement does not apply to the PCA when he is 
investigating complaints about health services 
provided by central government e.g. in military 
hospitals or in prison. The SC have tried to use 
this as an argument in favour of similarly extending 
the remit of the HSC but the analogy is not 
accurate; doctors working in the army or civil 
service are traditionally regarded as enjoying less 
clinical autonomy than their counterparts in 
civilian life.
Although the HSC has commented upon the large 
number of complaints he has to reject because of 
Paragraph 2 he has never recommended that he is 
necessarily the best solution to meeting this need. 
In his Annual Report for Session 1981-82 he reported 
that he is watching with interest to see whether the 
new procedure for resolving clinical complaints in 
hospitals will be successful.76
Paragraph 3/.
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Paragraph 3
Action taken in relation to the service 
committee procedure (referred to in comments on 
paragraph 1) is excluded from the purview of the 
HSC.
In England, an informal procedure exists for 
settling complaints between patients and GPs, 
dentists, etc. without implementing the formal 
procedure. The HSC is free to investigate 
complaints at this informal stage. These cases have 
been among his most difficult, and, on at least one 
occasion, the SC has had to add its backing to the 
recommendations of the HSC to obtain a remedy.77
Klein has also commented upon the 
unsatisfactory procedure in operation in his book 
"Complaints against doctors" where he exhaustively 
details the weakness of the Services Committee 
procedure.78
Paragraphs 4 and 5
Personnel and contractual matters are excluded 
from the remit of the HSC. Both have been discussed 
at length by the SC in relation to the PCA but the 
government has stood firm in its opposition to any 
changes in these areas.
Paragraph 6
The/.
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Paragraph 6
The HSC may investigate any action which has 
been or is the subj ect of an inquiry under the 
National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947 s.69 
or the NHS (Scotland) Act 1978 s.76 (an inquiry by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland into a matter of 
"grave public concern"). This exclusion is in 
keeping with the general principle of priority 
accorded statutory remedies and also avoids wasteful 
duplication of investigative resources. Ss69 and 76 
inquiries are intended for generalised, not 
individual, complaints unsuited for investigation by 
the HSC.
Paragraph 7
This is intended to avoid any overlap in the 
functions of the HSC and the MWC.
The MWC exists for quite different purposes 
from the HSC therefore it was excluded from the 
remit of the HSC and not abolished. The MWC does 
examine individual complaints (including clinical 
judgement) but its protective functions go far 
wider. Far from abolishing the MWC or minimising 
its functions to a residual state the NHS 
(Scotland) Act 1972, S52 strengthened the powers of 
the MWC to obtain evidence.
The group Justice have made their own attempt 
to/...
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to establish "Principles of Good Administration" and 
the next chapter will illustrate, through the use of 
case law what the HSC believes these are.
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CHAPTER 4
THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER : INVESTIGATIONS AND
REPORTS
INTRODUCTION
The HSC reports quarterly on selected 
investigations. With time, these reports have become 
longer and more detailed. They are longer because 
the total volume of complaints made is greater. They 
are more detailed because the complaints themselves 
raise more complex points, and more of them.1 In 
addition, it seems to indicate a greater openness on 
the part of the HSC.
We do not know on what basis the HSC selects 
investigations to be published. We do know that in 
the Annual Reports the cases which the HSC 
chooses to discuss, because they reveal general areas 
of weakness in the health service, are invariably to 
be found in these published reports. However, not 
all cases are chosen for this reason. Other 
published cases seem to be merely of curiosity value, 
to arouse public interest. Others again may have 
been proven to be entirely injustified and are 
included to illustrate abuses of both the NHS and the 
office of HSC.
It could be said that this series of published 
reports now constitutes a body of case law. The term 
should be used advisedly. It must be stressed that 
the reports available to the public do not constitute 
the/...
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the entire body of cases available to the HSC.
The published reports do not constitute a complete 
record of HSC activities. There must always be some 
doubt whether the published cases are modified by 
those which remain unpublished. Furthermore, until 
Sir Cecil Clothier took office, the HSC was always a 
civil servant without legal qualifications. The term 
"case law" can only be used in the loosest sense as 
meaning the consistency of one case with another. 
Writers have characterised the office of the HSC 
as being essentially "non-legal".2
Professor Bradley believes that the process of 
evolving a system of precedents has already taken 
place in the office of the Ombudsman though his 
remarks are specificially directed to the PCA.3 In 
support of his assertion he cites the "frequent 
practice" of the PCA of referring back in his reports 
on cases to earlier investigations into similar 
complaints and also the publication of a 
subject-index of decisions in 1978. Most other 
observers would suggest that Professor Bradley has 
exaggerated the frequency of the PCAs referrals, and 
note that the published index was discontinued after 
only one year. Furthermore, financial cuts have 
forced the HSC to defer implementation of a 
computerised information retrieval system which would 
make an extensive indexation system possible.
In his report for 1981-82 (HC419) para. 32 the 
HSC did remark on a group of cases which all came 
from the same department of one hospital. The HSC 
has/...
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has never published a subject index but in his Annual 
Report he publishes an analysis of grievances 
according to subject-matter giving numbers raised in 
each category, and the number found justified. 
However, the HSC does hold ad hoc surveys within the 
office and in addition, staff make informal use of 
files relating to previous investigations.4
The significance of case-law is that it is the 
major source of information available to us about 
the HSC (with the exception of the.Annual Reports to 
be discussed in a later chapter). The legislation 
tells the HSC on what grounds he may conduct an 
investigation and how to proceed, but only in the 
broadest terms. For the details we have to look at 
case law.
The headings under which I have chosen to 
discuss the case law do not coincide with those of 
the HSC. I propose tp divide the material into three 
broad categories: ■ ~ ,
(1) Procedural
(2) Jurisdictional
(3) Substantive
In his Annual Reports, the HSC categorises the 
cases in six broad headings and, most recently, 23 
sub-headings relating to content. In the published 
reports, each investigation is headed by a distinct 
title/...
Analysis ol separate grievances contained in results reports issued 
1 April 1981—31 March 1982—Table DI
Unable
, Sub-Justification Justification Resolve Total Total
Administration 
—policy decisions (manner in which
reached)   ... 7 4 — 11
—day-to-day (hospital in-patient) 25 18 —  43
—day-to-day (hospital out-patient) 1 2 — 3
—day-to-day (hospital casualty) ... 9 4 — 13
—day-to-day (family practitioner
services) ... .   ... 2 — — ‘2
—day-to-day (community health)... 1 — — 1 73 (79)
Failures in service
■ —ambulance .............  ... 1 3 — 4
—catering . ...    1 4 1 6
j —community   ... 1 — . - — 1
—domestic ...   ... 2 1 1 4 .
—facilities on wards .............  . 4 3 — 7
—paramedical ...   — 3 — 3j —portering ...   ... — — 1 1 26 (27)
Medical ■
—lack of or incorrect information... 13 26 1 40
—attitudes ...   9 35 8 52
| —failure in non-clinical procedures 18 24 2 44 136 (93)
i Dental
% —practitioner ... ... ... — — — — — (1)
> Nursing
—failures in care   ... - 14 43 8 65
) —lack of or incorrect information 2' 9 1 12
/  —attitudes ....   6 16 3 25
I —clerical procedures ................... 2 — 1 3/ —maltreatment ...   — 2 — 2 107 (125)
)  ■ ^  ■/  Handling by Authority .... 34 31 — 65 65 (74)
Totals 152 228 27 407(399)
( )• 1980-81 figures
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title which is essentially a summary of the major 
source of grievance raised by the complaint. Given 
the variety of circumstances under which complaints 
can arise in the health service this kind of 
categorisation, according to content, is not 
particularly helpful, (see page interleaved for 
table)
Therefore, any discussion of the case law has 
to be qualitative rather than quantative in nature. 
The cases are made available to the public in a very 
selective way and those which are important to the 
HSC are not necessarily revealing for our purposes.
Part I.1 Procedural
1. Receipt of Complaints.
The question of who may make a complaint is 
more properly dealt with under the heading of 
jurisdictional matters but the HSC has imposed 
procedural stipulations himself, outwith the Act, and 
on occasions overlooks the requirements of the Act.
(a) "direct access".
On occasion, the HSC permitted some 
complainants "direct access" to him.2 A woman 
made a number of complaints about the care her 
mother had received while in hospital. As 
required by the Act, these were referred to the 
AHA but their response was unsatisfactory. 
During/...
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During the course of the HSC investigation, 
officers interviewed the woman and her mother. 
During the interviews they raised additional 
points of complaint which had not previously 
been put to the relevant AHA. But, in this case 
the officers of the AHA agreed with the HSC 
that the HSC should investigate all the points 
raised.
This is an interesting case if only because 
it is such an isolated example. Given the type 
of person who complains, the subjects which 
concern them and the unstructured way in which 
they present their complaints it is surprising 
that there are not many more cases like this.3 
Of course, this approach depends on the 
co-operation of the AHA officers and if they 
withhold it, as they are entitled to do, it may 
be that the HSC persuades the complainant to 
proceed on the basis of the complaints 
originally made.
(b) Vicarious application.
In another case, the HSC 
permitted a case to be brought on behalf of 
someone who remained unaware of the 
investigation.1* The Act permits relatives and 
friends to make complaints on behalf of 
patients but in the majority of cases the 
complaint emanates from the patient. In this 
case a father made a complaint about his son's 
treatment while in a psychiatric unit and later 
in/...
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in the psychiatric ward of a hospital. The son 
was still receiving medical care during the 
period the investigation took place. The 
father wished his son to remain ignorant of the 
complaint for the sake of his peace and 
stability of mind. The HSC accepted this 
condition to his investigation and it is a 
sensible decision for if the Act was designed 
to enable those who are incapable of 
articulating their complaints to do so then it 
is logical to extend it to those who are 
incapable of judging whether they have been the 
subject of questionable behaviour.
(c) Potential abuse of the service.
In relation to private patients, the HSC 
insists that they pay their bill before he 
undertakes his investigation. In SW44/76-77 a 
private patient complained that the hospital 
administration had misled him as to the true 
rate of charges with the result that the bill 
was higher than he was led to believe it would 
be. And, that the high rates levied were not 
an accurate reflection of the standards of food 
or accommodation. Consequently, he refused to 
pay his bill. The HSC undertook to conduct an 
investigation only if the bill were paid. The 
bill was paid, the HSC investigated the 
complaint, upheld it, and the Health Authority 
repaid the complainant the excess charge.
The/.
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The HSC adopted this attitude because he did 
not want patients using his investigatory 
procedure as a means of delaying the payment of 
their bills.
The investigation: sources of information.
(a) Witnesses.
During the course of his investigation the 
officers of the HSC interview the parties named 
in the complaint and anyone else who can 
usefully shed light on the incidents. A 
continual problem has been tracing staff. NHS 
staff regularly move from department to 
department, hospital to hospital. Until 
recently, the emigration rate was high. In 
most cases the HSC states that he is confident 
that the omission of one person's evidence is 
not material but his approach was called into 
question in WW28/761-77.
In that case a woman, aged 103, was taken 
to the Accident and Emergency Unit of her local 
hospital with a suspected fracture, late at 
night. The Senior House Officer on duty 
confirmed that the old lady was unhurt, then, 
despite, the fact that it was late November and 
2 a.m. in the morning, he discharged her. She 
died shortly after arriving back at her home.
Before the complaint was brought, the 
Senior House Officer left Britain to work 
abroad. The HSC did not ask him for a written 
statement because, he said, the complaint was 
against/...
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against the AHA and not the doctor who was not 
named in the complaint. Certainly the HSC 
could not have questioned the Senior House 
Officer since discharge is an occasion for the 
exercise of clinical judgement but, on the 
administrative grounds, the HSC condemned the 
action as "inhuman". This statement resulted 
in the local medical committee of the hospital 
in question passing a resolution of no 
confidence in the HSC. In effect, the HSC 
had condemned the doctor without hearing his 
case or giving him the opportunity to comment 
on the complainant's allegations.
(b) Third Parties.
The HSC sometimes interviews people whom he 
believes to have relevant information even 
although they may not work in the health 
service. In W239/78-79 the complainant's 
daughter died suddenly at home. The 
complainant understood that the pathologist had 
to conduct a post mortem examination but stated 
that he did not want any further experimental 
work carried out on the body. In spite of 
this, the pathologist removed several organs 
from his daughter's body for further analysis. 
The HSC said he could not examine the actions 
of a Coroner nor a pathologist who, though a 
NHS employee, was acting for the Coroner. But 
the Act empowers the HSC to take evidence from 
anyone/...
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anyone with relevant information as he did 
here.
3. Handling of Evidence.
In the published reports, the HSC begins by 
briefly stating the complaint in numbered clauses and 
giving the background to the complaint. If necessary 
he may include a short paragraph on his statutory 
position and jurisdiction. This is not uncommonly 
followed by a short paragraph on the nature of the 
investigation. This usually consists of an 
examination of all the relevant correspondence, 
clinical and nursing notes as well as interviewing 
all the parties named in the complaint.
In W450/78-79 for the first time ever the 
HSC used his powers to hold a formal hearing and take 
evidence on path in a case where there was so much 
conflicting evidence that he could not reach any 
satisfactory conclusions.
(a) the burden of proof.
Many incidents take place without other 
witnesses. Where this happens, the Ombudsman 
will come down on the staff side. The onus of 
proof, therefore, rests upon the complainant.
The onus is not the more easily discharged 
because the complainant has expert knowledge.
In WW13/75-76 the complainant was a nurse 
herself and her allegations were very detailed 
but nonetheless unsuccessful. Patients who are 
doctors themselves are less likely to bring 
complaints/...
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complaints since they feel bound by the rules of 
professional etiquette. The problem is that 
complaints from nurses or doctors contain an 
amount of detail which lends them an air of 
veracity they would not otherwise have. In any 
case, expert knowledge is not essential to a 
complaint brought under the Ombudsman 
procedure.
(b) The need for corroboration.
In one case, the HSC was concerned because 
although medical records existed and were 
undisputed they were incomplete for the purposes 
of an investigation.5 An expectant mother was 
admitted to hospital and the nursing staff on 
duty telephoned for the Senior Registrar to 
attend her. The Senior Registrar was on night 
duty and, after receiving the call, 
inadvertently feel asleep. The baby was still 
born. In this case the lack of written evidence 
was not an obstacle since the staff freely 
admitted that the delay in obtaining a doctor 
was the cause of the baby's death. The HSC 
expressed surprise that the AHA had no policy on 
the recording of incidents and recommended that 
they devise a procedure without delay for 
dealing with this situation.
Corroborative evidence is therefore 
particularly important in the HSC investigative 
procedure.
(c)/.
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(c) Attitude towards medical records and case 
notes.
The HSC emphasises the importance of 
meticulous record keeping. Like the courts, in 
cases of doubt, he prefers written 
contemporaneous statements to oral evidence 
after the event. Although the HSC does not 
quote from records, for reasons of 
confidentiality, he does rely heavily on his 
reading of them and a clearly written entry in a 
record will always overcome an allegation. An 
exception to that general rule must be 
W450/78-79. A complainant alleged that her baby 
was still born because staff failed to attend to 
her. An investigation failed to reach a 
satisfactory conclusion because staff gave 
contradictory statements. There was evidence 
that the medical evidence had been made up after 
the event, and parts of it fabricated. The HSC 
had no hesitation in dismissing the medical 
records as reliable evidence and preferring the 
evidence of the complainants.
4. Adversarial Influence.
The previous comments may appear over-legalistic 
especially since the absence of legal i.e. 
adversarial techniques and legal professional 
interest has been such a feature of the British 
Ombudsmen.6
This comment remains valid despite the 
appointment of a QC to the offices of PCA and HSC. 
Nonetheless/...
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Nonetheless it is interesting to see the intrusion of 
legal concepts and legal terminology. In considering 
evidence, the present HSC is more likely than his 
predecessors to say "on balance" or on "the balance 
of probability".7
The HSC is also responsible for introducing the 
concept of "culpable maladministration", a device he 
uses to uphold a complaint but propose no remedy 
because he does not believe that he could alter the 
outcome in any way.8
Exceptionally, he uses his own legal expertise 
to challenge the advice or interpretations of 
legislation offered by legal adviser to AHAs.
In W414/78-79 the HSC quoted the Institutes of 
Justinian in English and in the original at some 
length to support his own contention that medical 
records belonged to a doctor and not to the Secretary 
of State. But this departure does not invalidate the 
statement made before, that the HSC is non-legal in 
character. In that case the HSC went on to say that 
for his purposes the uncertainty of the law was not 
crucial since the technicality of ownership should 
not affect the higher principle that a patient's 
records should remain confidential.
No formal system of precedent exists but it has 
already been pointed out that the creation of a body 
of case law inevitably gives rise to an informal 
system.
Conclusion:/.
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Conclusion:
A reading of the case law does not make it 
immediately apparent what precedents have been 
created. The HSC style of reporting is very spare. 
The details of the case are meticulously recorded but 
the interpretation put on the facts is never made 
explicit. When the HSC has to come done on one side 
or another he does not say why. The key to 
understanding HSC decisions is not the seriousness of 
the allegations made nor the credibility of the 
complainants but the standards of evidence the HSC 
requires complainants to meet. Often the only 
complaint that the HSC upholds is that the AHA 
failed to handle the complaint competently at first 
instance and this is because he relies on the written 
correspondence.9
Even where there is sufficient evidence to 
uphold a complaint the HSC cannot recommend a 
satisfactory remedy. Perhaps it is this dilemma 
which has made him evolve the concept of "culpable 
maladministration". In Wll/77-78 a consultant 
psychiatrist complained that the AHA refused to 
follow the DHSS guidance on payment of pocket money 
to long term patients. The HSC upheld the complaint 
but said he could not suggest an appropriate solution 
since the AHA was prevented from carrying it out by 
lack/...
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lack of funds. We can increasingly expect this 
situation to arise.
When the investigation is complete and the 
report filed the matter is at an end. But in 1981 
the HSC re-opened an investigation first conducted 
in 1977.10 He did so, prompted by information 
received from the General Nursing Council. It has 
set an important precedent although in this case the 
new information did not affect the outcome. In a 
later case where new information emerged after the 
investigation was complete the HSC simply appended an 
amending note.
As time has advanced, the cases for 
investigation have become more complex, especially 
those which overlap the jurisdictions of the 
different Ombudsmen. When these occur the HSC 
conducts a joint investigation, but each Ombudsman 
makes a separate report.11
Part II
Jurisdictional Questions
The case law is also illustrative of the way in 
which the HSC interprets the provisions of the Act 
relating to jurisdiction. During the preliminary 
screening process the HSC must address himself to two 
considerations. Firstly, threshold issues i.e. is 
the complaint competent under the Act and, secondly, 
jurisdictional issues arising thereafter in the 
course/...
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course of the investigation.
1. Threshold issues
(a) negation of competency
(b) affirmation of competency
(a) The first and most obvious category of 
incompetent cases are those whose 
subject-matter is expressly excluded by the 
Act in Schedule 14. The main provision of 
Schedule 14 which is responsible for the 
majority of rejections (see infra Ch. 5) is 
Sch. 14(2) dealing with actions taken solely 
in the exercise of clinical judgement.
(i) If the HSC is satisfied that such 
action was taken solely in the 
exercise of clinical judgement then 
he may not investigate it. The 
crucial word is "solely" since, if 
the HSC believes that the basis for 
action was formed by other factors, 
he is free to continue his 
investigation. Generally speaking 
though, the provision has a broad 
ambit. The HSC does not abuse this 
provision in order to allow himself a 
means of looking at cases of clinical 
judgement otherwise forbidden him.
He is aware of the sensitivity of the 
medical/...
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medical profession to any 
encroachments on their clinical 
freedom.1 Consequently, some of the 
material which the HSC has judged as 
constituting clinical judgement has 
surprised outside observers.
In W265/76-77 the HSC 
said that a doctor's decision as to 
whether to allow a patient out of bed 
is clinical judgement. In W275/77-78 
the HSC held that a doctor's decision 
to discharge a patient from the 
Accident and Emergency Department of 
a hospital was a question of clinical 
judgement (but see WW28/76-77 infra). 
Case W40/79-80 concerned the care of 
a psychiatric patient who committed 
suicide while in hospital. The crux 
of the case was the adequacy of the 
supervision but the HSC said that the 
extent of the surveillance was 
determined by the doctor and once 
this had been set the HSC could only 
investigate whether it had been 
followed, not its adequacy.
In W124/77-78 the complainant's 
husband was admitted to hospital and 
died there. The ground of complaint 
was that the doctor gave the wife 
insufficient information on the 
seriousness/...
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seriousness of the husband's 
condition and failed to explain it 
adequately. The HSC said the way in 
which a doctor described a patient's 
condition is a matter for clinical 
j udgement.
Schedule 14(2) does not say that 
doctors are the only people who can 
make clinical judgements. In 
W269/75-76 a mother, a trained 
midwife herself, alleged that nurses 
refused to call a doctor to attend 
her baby, resulting in its death.
The complainant's MP put the matter 
to the DHSS on her behalf. The DHSS 
said that the decision to call a 
doctor or not was a clinical 
judgement. The HSC accepted this 
statement. However, the volumes of 
cases amply demonstrate that the HSC 
is far less likely to accept that a 
nurse was making a clinical judgement 
than a doctor, and in W269/75-76 was 
no doubt influenced by the prior 
pronouncements of the DHSS.
The HSC has further limited his 
jurisdiction by evolving the concept 
of "professional decision" to meet 
the dilemma referred to above.2 He 
uses this phrase in conjunction with 
clinical/...
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clinical decisions or as an 
alternative to them, but not a 
substitute. The commissioner seems 
to use the phrase to imply a decision 
which contains clinical elements 
which is not clinical judgement and 
which the nurse has taken on her own 
but with which he is loathe to 
interfere.
Schedule 4 provisions exclude 
the possibility of a HSC 
investigation but they do not 
preclude the possibility of gathering 
information on clinical matters if 
the HSC regards it as a necessary 
preliminary, consequence or is 
dissociated from the subject of the 
complaint itself.
In W25/74-75 (W7/76-77) a widow 
complained about certain aspects of 
her deceased husband's treatment.
Many of the allegations concerned his
medical treatment. The HSC
said:
"Certain of the points raised by 
her touch on matters of 
clinical judgement which are 
outside my jurisdiction. I 
have, however, had to seek 
information from the doctors 
about the patient's condition 
and treatment in order to 
arrive at an understanding of 
the circumstances which gave 
rise to the complaints."3
On/.
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On other occasions, according to 
the circumstances of the case, the 
HSC may construe the complaints as 
going beyond the exercise of clinical 
judgement. In one case, W7/73 
(C311/T), this brought the HSC 
into conflict with the DHSS.
A man complained about his late 
wife's hospital treatment and, in 
addition, about the way the DHSS 
handled his complaints. The HSC 
did not find the complaint 
substantiated but noted that the 
reason the complainant was annoyed 
with the DHSS was because the DHSS 
refused to deal with his complaints 
since it considered that all the main 
complaints related to clinical 
judgement. The HSC investigated the 
case on the basis that the complaints 
of inadequate supervision and poor 
communications raised matters going 
wider than the exercise of clinical 
judgement. This is a decision which, 
on the facts, seems contrary to other 
decisions (see supra).
As well as the "wider than" 
formula the HSC has also taken the 
view that where a decision could be 
both clinical and administrative, and 
is questionable on administrative 
grounds the complaint will be upheld. 
In/...
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In the infamous Rhyl case 
(WW28/76-77) a 103 year old patient 
was admitted to the Accident and 
Emergency Unit of a hospital late at 
night. After determining that the 
patient had not sustained any 
fractures, the Senior House Officer 
discharged her. The old lady died 
shortly after being delivered to her 
home, The HSC 
said:
"No doubt he (SHO) took his 
decision to discharge her in the 
exercise of clinical judgement 
on which I cannot comment. 
Nevertheless I can only consider 
a decision to discharge a lady 
of 103 at 2 a.m. on a cold 
November morning as inhuman"
The two sentences seem to contradict 
one another. The SC on the PCA 
explained it like this; the Senior 
House Officer made a clinical 
decision to discharge the patient but 
then he should have made an 
administrative decision to detain her 
until the morning because of her 
age. *
Sometimes the HSC can use other 
provisions of the Act to give 
complainants satisfaction where the 
main body of their complaints relates 
to/...
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to clinical judgement. In W290/75-76 
under the heading of 
"misunderstandings" the HSC 
investigated a man's complaint about 
his treatment. The HSC said he could 
not look at clinical judgement.
"But, because the complainant 
clearly felt he had not had a 
satisfactory explanantion of 
what had happened to him, I 
decided to investigate whether 
this had been due to some 
failure in communication."
And again in W265/76-77 the HSC 
investigated a doctor's decision to 
allow a patient out of bed on the 
basis that the doctor did not have 
all the information to hand to make a 
reasoned decision.
Successive HSCs seem to be 
increasingly flexible on this matter. 
This is illustrated particularly well 
in a case which involved first, Sir 
Alan Marre, then Sir Idwal Pugh. In 
W112/74-75 Sir Alan Marre rejected a 
complaint brought by a widow about 
her husband's treatment in hospital 
and in particular the actions of his 
consultant. The complainant then 
wrote to her MP and as a result of 
his intervention the HSC 
agreed/...
116
agreed to investigate the complaint 
on the grounds of the AHA1s inept 
handling of the complaint at first 
instance.
Even in cases which manifestly 
concern themselves with complaints 
about clinical judgement the HSC 
may find a means of conducting an 
investigation. In W209/75-76 the 
HSC examined the actions of doctors 
taken during the diagnosis and 
treatment of illness in order to 
determine whether or not they stemmed 
solely from the exercise of clinical 
judgement. In W433/79-80 the HSC 
initially refused to investigate a 
complaint about the discharge of a 
patient with an undiagnosed fracture 
but in the course of investigating 
other complaints he discovered the 
existence of a missing radiologist's 
report on the fracture and then 
agreed to take up the case.
In W342/76-77 a patient 
complained that for three months 
during 1976 his consultant had 
refused to treat him. This was a 
clinical decision taken by the 
consultant because the patient's 
medical records were lost. The HSC 
was thus excluded. But the 
consultant freely admitted that he 
had/...
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had exploited this patient's dilemma 
in order to demonstrate to the 
administration the inefficiency of 
the medical records services and to 
protest about the loss of a valued 
clerk. The HSC said the consultant's 
motives took him well outside the 
normal meaning of clinical judgement, 
and he upheld the complaint.
In W439/79-80 a patient 
complained about a consultant's 
refusal to authorise the supply of a 
breast prosthesis following an 
operation. On the face of it, this 
was a clinical decision but the HSC 
discovered that the consultant had 
never, thoughout his long career, 
made such an authorisation. The 
consultant admitted that his decision 
was taken on personal not clinical 
grounds and the HSC investigated the 
case.
W236/75-76 a woman was 
sterilised without her consent 
because, though capable of 
functioning in the community, she was 
mentally defective and in the opinion 
of her parents and consultant was at 
risk of being sexually exploited.
The consultant had taken the advice 
of the Medical Protection Society and 
obtained/...
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obtained the opinion of the parents. 
The HSC investigated the case to see 
if the decision to sterilise the 
woman stemmed from solely clinical 
and not social reasons. As a lawyer 
he was possibly influenced by the 
gravity of a case which constituted 
delict but which was unlikely to be 
pursued through the courts. It is 
also significant that this practice 
is condemned by the MDU.5
However, in case W414/80-81, the 
HSC did, in effect, criticise a 
consultant for a clinical decision. 
The HSC appeared to think that the 
consultant was hiding behind the 
shield of clinical judgement and in 
the under-stated restrained language 
of government papers told him so.
The case concerned a fatal accident 
to a patient following discharge from 
hospital. The complainant (the 
patient's brother) contended that the 
consultant in charge had not seen his 
brother's medical records and 
therefore did not know of the 
patient's suicidal history.
The complainant based his 
contention on the events at the 
coroner's inquest. The solicitor 
asked/...
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asked the consultant why he had 
discharged a patient with a record of 
suicide attempts. The consultant had 
replied that he had no knowledge of 
any previous suicide attempts.
In fact, the consultant had read 
the medical records including a 
reference to a drug overdose but he 
said there was a clinical difference 
between suicide threats and suicide 
attempts. The drug overdose just 
referred to was not a suicide 
attempt, he said, but just an act to 
draw attention.
Conscious that he could not 
argue the point, the HSC made this 
acerbic comment:
"In his evidence to me the 
consultant said that he saw the 
clinical notes and he explained 
why, in his clinical judgement, 
which I cannot question, he told 
the coroner that he had not seen 
any reference in them to an 
attempted suicide... But I am 
not surprised the complainant 
made this complaint to me 
because not every layman could 
reasonablybe expected to 
appreciate the clinical 
distinction drawn by the 
consultantwithout explanation."
(ii) The HSC will also reject cases
relating to other matters excluded by 
Schedule 14. These occur less 
frequently and the HSC
is/.
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is more willing to penetrate below 
the surface of a question which 
apparently relates to an excluded 
matter to find something which can be 
made the subj ect of an 
investigation.
Schedule 14(5) prevents the HSC 
from investigating contractual or 
commercial transactions between 
health authorities and outside bodies 
but the HSC investigated case number 
Q117/75-76 in which a guest-house 
sued the hospital for compensation 
for damage caused by one of their 
patients.
Scheduled 14(3)(a) prevents the 
HSC from investigating complaints 
dealt with under the NHS service 
regulations. But in WW15/75-76 the 
HSC investigated the handling of a 
complaint during the informal stage 
prior to invoking the regulations. 
Some FPCs, in England, are unwilling 
to bear even his slight intrusion 
into their jurisdiction and in this 
case the FPC refused to release 
papers to the HSC or comment on the 
case until the SC intervened.
Recently,/...
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Recently, the HSC initiated an 
investigation into the actions of a 
FPC to compel it to invoke the formal 
procedure as requested by the 
complainants.6
Schedule 14/(4) prevents the HSC 
from investigating personnel matters 
but in HSC AR HC407(1974-75) the HSC 
took up a complaint that a hospital 
staff member had been dismissed for 
taking complaints to the hospital 
authority. The HSC acknowledged that 
personnel matters were excluded from 
his jurisdiction but that since the 
subject of his investigation was the 
way that the AHA had handled the 
complaint he was also entitled to 
enquire into the associated 
allegation of victimisation.
(b) Affirmation of Competency.
The HSC has to satisfy himself that the 
complaint concerns a failure in the service 
or a failure to provide a service or some 
other act arising from maladministration. 
This can result in the HSC being brought 
into the area of policy making where 
political/,. . .
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political considerations loom large. In 
WW11/76-77 he investigated the closure of a 
hospital, in SW43/76-77 he investigated the 
change of use of a maternity hospital and in 
W313/75-76 he investigated the refusal by 
the AHA to introduce a comprehensive family 
planning service.
In Wll/75-76 the guestion was whether 
the inability of a NHS hospital to accept a 
geriatric patient resulting in her enforced 
admission into a private nursing home 
constituted a failure to provide a service 
as laid down by S93(2)(a) of the 1978 Act. 
The HSC had regard to the future resources 
of the NHS and to the infinite number of 
competing demands made upon it but concluded 
that there had been a failure.
In W5/55/79-80 (C429/79) the question 
concerned the refusal of a hospital to 
release medical records to the patient. The 
complainants had a legal remedy7 without 
doubt, so was it maladministration for the 
AHA to require the complainants to go to the 
trouble and expense of taking legal action 
to secure their rights? The HSC held that 
it was.
In W246/77-78 the HSC had to decide 
whether/...
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whether the failure of a hospital authority 
to obtain the consent of both parents to 
surgery on their child amounted to 
maladministration. The father possibly had 
a legal remedy since there is case law on 
the subject of consent to treatment.
However, there was no court decision on this 
particular point and the doctor's actions 
were consistent with DHSS guidance so that 
the HSC concluded that the father had not 
made out his case.
In comparison in case W414/78-79 the 
complainant alleged that the hospital 
authority released her medical records 
without her consent. The AHA took the view 
that there was no maladministration since 
case notes do not belong to the patient 
because their consent to release is not 
required. The HSC challenged the legality 
of this view.
2. The exercise of jurisdiction.
The HSC will only undertake an investigation if 
he is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence 
that a failure or act of maladministration took 
place. He will only uphold the complaint if he finds 
that the failure or other act resulted in hardship or 
injustice and that there was a direct causal link 
between the two.
In/.
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In W136/77-78 a boy was found guilty of burglary 
and committed to a special hospital under the Mental 
Health Act, 1959. His health region did not have 
such a hospital and the boy was transferred to 
another region, causing him to be isolated from his 
family. The question was whether this amounted to 
hardship or injustice. The HSC concluded that 
failure to implement government strategies could not 
be construed as causing hardship.
Similarly in W334/76-77 an MP complaining about 
a two year delay in the conversion of a hospital had 
to show hardship.
In these cases, where the HSC has been drawn 
into the policy arena, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that any decision taken by the HSC 
will be largely subjective. The HSC tries to place 
his decisions in an objective context in order to 
divert this kind of criticism. For example, in 
W324/77 a patient•complained of the lengthy waiting 
times in the out-patient department of the eye 
clinic. In considering whether or not the 
complainant had established maladministration the HSC 
looked at a number of reports and comparative studies 
of out-patient department management in the NHS 
before reaching his decision.
As the enclosed photocopied letter of rejection 
shows/...
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shows the HSC requires there to be more than trifling 
injustice or hardship.
In most cases it is easy to establish the causal 
link between the act complained of and the hardship 
or injustice suffered e.g. poor kitchen management 
leading to cold food in the wards. It is more 
difficult when patients suffer pain, injury or death 
and complainants leap to attribute it to some 
supposed act or omission. Many complainants seem 
unwilling to accept that the present state of 
medicine is still unable to deal with all illnesses 
and the consequent suffering. This is particularly 
true in maternity cases where the patient expects a 
happy outcome and will inevitably link an untoward 
conclusion with any unsatisfactory incident which 
took place.
In W43/79-80 an expectant mother was admitted to 
hospital for the delivery of her baby. During the 
oversight of labour nursing staff only were present 
but when they thought the baby was about to be born 
they telephoned the senior registrar. The registrar 
was asleep in his hospital room while on night duty 
call. He answered the telephone and then 
inadvertently fell asleep again. He awakened 40 
minutes later and remembering the case rushed to the 
maternity suite. When he arrived he found the baby 
had been born dead. Not surprisingly, the parents 
complained that if the doctor had come promptly the 
baby would have lived. The nursing staff said they 
had not thought to telephone again despite the 
electric monitor readings showing foetal distress 
because/...
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because they did not really expect the doctor to 
arrive in under fifteen minutes and anyway they 
thought they were qualified to deliver the baby 
themselves. The HSC was not able to establish that 
the presence of a doctor was necessary at a delivery 
despite the parents' opinion and naturally could not 
say that the baby would definitely have lived if the 
doctor had been present.
Part III Substantive Issues.
Introduction
The group "Justice" said in relation to the PCA 
system that one of its principal advantages was 
that:
"The PCA helps to set and maintain 
standards of good administration for 
government departments." It qualified 
this by saying that "he (PCA) does not 
seek to formulate these standards in 
any single document or code, and no 
formal system of precedent exists."1
This statement is equally true of the HSC 
Nowhere are the standards by which NHS staff are 
judged made explicit. Staff, and the wider public, 
have little or no idea what constitutes a valid 
complaint. We can only deduce what the standards 
of good administration might be from the published 
reports. This is not always easy. The reports 
sometimes/...
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sometimes give the impression that the conclusions 
have been plucked from the air, as if the HSCwere 
trying to attain justice without reference to 
objective standards. Yet gradually, inevitably, the 
HSC has developed standards since otherwise no 
concept of "maladministration" or "failure" could 
have emerged. This is a well-recorded legal 
phenomenon. Robson described it thus (in the context 
of tribunals):
"What appeared at first as an arbitrary 
discretion wielded by an irresponsible 
official, gradually crystallised into a 
body of known, ascertainable and 
consistently applied law.2
One of the difficulties for the HSC in 
'formulating' standards is the wide variety of 
problems thrown up by the NHS.
In 1971, Justice tried to circumvent some of 
these problems by proposing the formulation of 
principles of good administration to be of universal 
application.3 Justice agreed with the later comments 
of the HSC that the main difficulty would be in 
formulating principles which would be wide enough to 
meet all the circumstances, but not so vague as to 
be meaningless.
Further controversy surrounded the question of 
whether such a code would be advisory or mandatory.
If the code were merely advisory then what sanctions 
could/...
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could be imposed for non-compliance? On the other 
hand, if the code were mandatory there would be all 
the attendant difficulties in drafting legislation, 
already touched on, as well as the difficulty of 
raising support in the House.
In the end, Justice recommended the publication 
of a code of "guiding principles". If one were 
flouted this would constitute prima facie evidence of 
a breach but would not give rise to any automatic 
right of resort to the Ombudsman.
We do not seem to be any nearer to the 
implementation of the Justice proposals. Meanwhile, 
we rely on the HSC as a kind of mediator between 
officials who are required to meet certain standards 
and individuals who might be prejudiced by a failure 
to meet those standards. It is therefore possible to 
discern a process by which administrators may deduce 
what is expected of them, and the public benefits 
from this. The HSC has publicly regretted the high 
cost of his reports which prevent their free 
circulation throughout the NHS administrative staff 
circles.*
The process of evolving standards has been a 
slow and low-key one. Perhaps for this reason the 
HSC's work has not always been fully appreciated.5 
The SC reports have not been as scathing in their 
criticism as observers would like. Critics assume 
that because the reports are mild in tone they are 
ineffective/...
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ineffective but any Ombudsman-watcher can discern 
just how strong the HSC views are, if not the words. 
In W535/80-81 the HSC investigated another complaint 
from a hospital previously investigated by him. He 
said "I sincerely hope that their (hospital staff) 
efforts this time will mean I do not have again to 
investigate a complaint about communications with 
relatives at this particular hospital."
The remedies obtained by the HSC are not always 
concrete or substantial. The office of HSC 
helps redress the balance between vulnerable 
individuals and a large bureaucratic organisation.
It does this by upholding their rights established in 
law but not fully enjoyed because of other obstacles 
e.g. the unlawful detention of patients in homes for 
the mentally ill, and by extending their rights 
beyond the law into other areas, e.g. the right to be 
treated kindly.6
In his Annual Report, the HSC analyses 
complaints according to their subject matter. The 
six main headings are:-
I. Administration
II. Failures in service 
III. Medical 
IV. Dental 
V. Nursing 
VI. Handling by authority
Each/.
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Each of these headings is then further sub-divided 
into more specific subject headings e.g. under I you 
might find "outpatients". The process of subdivision 
could be a long one, so it is best to follow the more 
general headings. Some headings throw up rules which 
are applicable only to the subject matter at hand 
e.g. I might throw up very detailed rules for 
handling of waiting lists whereas under III and V we 
expect to find certain rules being universally 
applicable e.g. need for considerate treatment of 
patients.
The following are some of the areas which the 
HSC has considered in the past, and criticised.
I. Administration.
(a) Manner in which policy decisions reached.
Both in the closures of surgeries 
(W17/73) and the closures of hospitals 
(WW11/76/77) (SW19/78-79) the HSC 
stressed the need for full and speedy 
consultation with local groups; the 
importance of acting on full and accurate 
data; and the necessity of considering the 
hardships which might be imposed upon local 
residents. A DHSS circular already exists 
incorporating these principles but its 
status is merely advisory. The fact that 
where the Health authority concerned flouts 
the consultation procedure the HSC 
is/...
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is likely to hold this as maladministration 
means that the HSC has given the DHSS 
circular mandatory status. But, in 
W255/78-79 where there was a proven failure 
in the consultation procedure the HSC . 
held that, in the circumstances of the case, 
this did not amount to maladministration.
The case is an interesting practical 
illustration of the difficulties which 
Justice have already considered, in theory, 
in relation to codes of good administration. 
The case shows the inflexibility of a 
mandatory code and the weakness of an 
advisory code because it will only become 
public knowledge when a determined and 
well-organised pressure group make efforts 
to uncover it.
(b) Need for Procedures.
The HSC has been particularly 
successful in highlighting areas of NHS 
administration where there are no standard 
administrative procedures in practice. In 
the early days, many complaints related to 
the inadequacy of administrative 
arrangements for investigating and taking 
action on complaints, despite earlier 
government reports on the subject. The HSC 
found that some health authorities and some 
individual hospitals had not taken action to 
implement/...
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the government's recommendations. There was 
confusion at every level of hospital 
administration.
The impact of the HSC on the NHS 
has been such that he no longer receives so 
many complaints about complaint-handling at 
ward or hospital level, which suggest that 
he has been responsible for hospitals 
formulating and adhering to new procedures. 
But he is still concerned by the way in 
which health authorities tackle complaints, 
so much so, that this forms a separate 
category (VI) in his analysis of 
grievances.
The HSC has also held that the lack of 
procedures for handling patients' property 
constitutes maladministration. In some of 
these cases he has been successful in 
obtaining compensation for lost articles 
from health authorities in the form of ex 
gratia payments. (W310/75/76) (W149/74-75).
The public is concerned by the more 
public scandals of surgical waiting lists 
and waiting times in out-patient 
departments. The HSC accepts the need for 
both but says that where they exist a more 
efficient and imaginative system of 
management would, at least, make them more 
acceptable/...
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acceptable to patients.8
In W6/73 the HSC sympathised with the 
difficulties of administering admissions to 
an intensive care unit and showed 
appreciation of some of the finer points of 
inaccurate statistics for patient turnover 
with the resultant difficulty in compiling 
balanced operating lists. But, he then went 
on to criticise poor and incomplete record 
keeping which perpetuated an inefficient 
system. And, he accused staff of all levels 
of insensitivity to patients' anxiety caused 
by delays and postponements. He said that a 
provision for information and regular review 
of waiting lists was an important component 
of any efficient management system.
Of course, waiting lists are not 
entirely within the administrative domain. 
Consultants are responsible for determining 
priorities within waiting lists. This is an 
exercise of their clinical judgement with 
which the HSC cannot interfere. In 
W204/78-79 a consultant carried out no 
operations at all because she considered the 
accommodation to be unsuitable. The HSC 
called this a "professional decision" (a 
recognition that it was not entirely a 
clinical matter but certainly had a bearing 
on clinical affairs) and refused to 
comment/...
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comment on it.
In Scotland the HSC was responsible for 
highlighting a gap in the complaints 
procedure and having it remedied. In 
SW18/78-79 the complainant found that 
neither the principal doctor nor the Health 
Board (acting through its service committee) 
was responsible for a GP's locum. The HSC 
found that there was a responsibility gap in 
the legislation and succeeded in securing 
from the Scottish Office a new reading of 
the NHS service regulations which resolved 
the problem.9 It is indicative of the power 
of attention the HSC commands because the 
Scottish Office of the British Medical 
Association had already raised the matter in 
Parliament through Scottish MPs without 
success.
(c) Detention in mental hospitals.
The HSC has encountered some of his 
most difficult and controversial cases in 
mental hospitals. The Annual Report for 
1981-82 concentrates on the need for 
adequate supervision of patients but in the 
past he has had notable success in cases of 
unlawful detention.10 The HSC's 
vigilance has nudged health authorities into 
an increased awareness of mental patients' 
rights./...
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rights. The HSC made the health authorities 
realise that breaches of the Mental Health 
Act, 1959 are not merely technicalities. In 
W329/75-76 the HSC was successful in 
obtaining a substantial ex gratia payment 
for a patient unlawfully detained in 
hospital.
II. Failure in Service.
e.g. Ambulance.
The majority of complaints in this category 
relate to the delay in obtaining an ambulance either 
from home, or from the hospital itself. However, 
occasionally there are complaints about the total 
unavailability of ambulances. Most members of the 
public are unaware that where an ambulance is 
medically indicated, the patient is entitled to the 
use of a private taxi. But misunderstandings between 
patients and administrators do occur. In W282/75-76 
the HSC was successful in obtaining compensation from 
a health authority for a patient who had been 
required to take a taxi to hospital.
III. Medical
(a) lack of or incorrect information.
Complaints about the low level of 
communications between patients and doctors 
are now an accepted public response to 
alleged medical arrogance. This is a matter 
of/...
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of some importance since effective 
communication is believed to be a crucial 
element in patient compliance with 
treatment.11 It is also important since it 
may result in an infringement of patients' 
rights. There may be a patient's right to 
dignified treatment: e.g. in W309/77-78 a 
patient was not told that she had a right to 
object to the presence of students during 
treatment.
Complete and accurate information is 
also the basis of informed consent to 
treatment, the lack of which constitutes 
maladministration.12 The HSC has had to 
exercise special caution in cases of consent 
to the administration of electro-convulsive 
therapy (E.C.T.) Wherever mental patients 
are concerned it is difficult to prove the 
absence of consent or otherwise. In two 
cases (W397/76-77) (W249/75-76) the HSC 
went beyond the minimum legal requirements 
in instituting safeguards for the interests 
of patients e.g. obtaining the consent of 
two doctors to treatment rather than just 
one.
(b) Attitudes.
The HSC has said: "... there is an
underlying consideration which seems to me 
to be present in most if not all the cases. 
That/...
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That is the problem of communication.1113 
This is a problem common to doctors 
(category 3) and nurses (category 5). It 
underlines much of what has been said 
already in section (a) (supra) and 
contributes to some of the complaints which 
arise in section (b).
In W48/77-78 a woman complained about 
staff rudeness when she attended a dental 
hospital for treatment. The staff there did 
not think that the woman had an appointment 
and mistakenly ordered her to leave. The 
HSC concluded that the whole affair should 
be dismissed as a misunderstanding.
In W19/79-80 a pregnant woman who had a 
miscarriage complained of the doctor's 
callousness. The HSC concluded that the 
woman had mistaken clinical detachment for a 
lack of sensitivity. Whereas in W181/77-78 
the HSC condemned staff for the abrupt 
manner in which they had told a mother that 
her baby had Down's Syndrome.
In most cases of this kind the HSC 
is unable to come to a firm conclusion.
Even where witnesses are present to an 
altercation, they are usually unwilling to 
go as far as saying that a colleague was 
rude or insulting. In W38/79-80 a 
complainant said that a consultant had been 
rude and insulting. The consultant/...
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consultant himself admitted that he had been 
"short" in his dealings with the patient.
The HSC held that this was by itself 
insufficient and that there was no other 
evidence to support the complainant's 
allegations.
IV. Dental.
The HSC receives very few complaints about the 
provision of dental services. There is no empiric 
evidence to explain why this should be so but it is 
interesting to speculate on the significance of the 
patient's right to choose his dentist at will. In 
W387/80-81 the HSC investigated a case which typified 
a widespread but unknown practice; dentists were 
providing treatment, charging the patient private 
fees and then belatedly pointing out that the patient 
had not made it clear that they wished to be treated 
under the NHS. In this case, Mrs. A. had assumed 
that she would be treated under the NHS 
unless she expressly asked for private treatment.
She complained to the FPC who refused to handle her 
complaint because it was out of time. She then 
referred the matter to her MP who asked the FPC 
Administrator if he would, nevertheless, give the 
matter some consideration since it gave rise to 
public concern. The Administrator refused. The HSC 
investigated the case and made his displeasure clear 
but the Administrator refused to apologise to either 
the/...
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the MP or the complainant. The Administrator in 
question was called before the SC and the apology 
demanded was made.1 *
V. Nursing.
Failures in care.
The HSC cannot investigate nurses' actions which 
are in exercise of their professional judgement or 
that of a doctor but he does investigate allegations 
of neglect, dilatoriness or abuse. Such complaints 
can arise from the public's natural ignorance of 
modern nursing procedures. Some patients' relatives 
are shocked by the very business-like approach which 
hospital staff adopt towards their charges. For 
example, in X3/74-75 allegations of cruelty were made 
against the staff of a hospital for the mentally 
handicapped. The HSC found that a degree of physical 
restraint used in the wards was typical of that used 
elsewhere in the country. It may have upset visitors 
but it was in accordance with standard nursing 
practice, and as such the HSC could not criticise 
it.
In another case (W7/77-78) a complainant found 
that her elderly mother's body had developed bruises, 
and accused the nursing staff of cruelty. The HSC 
commented that he heard so many cases of this kind 
that he might be forgiven for suspecting widespread 
abuses in the NHS. Only experience had proved 
conclusively that elderly people, especially inactive 
and/...
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and prone ones, were all too easily susceptible to 
bruising and anxious relatives often misinterpreted 
this.
But, in a similar case, (W153/80-81; death from 
infection caused by pressure areas) the HSC 
criticised the prevailing nursing philosophy that bed 
sores are a fact of life in a geriatric ward. No 
doubt he was influenced by the seriousness of the 
case but he was able to go as far as this supported 
by the report of the area nursing officer that 
conditions were superior in other geriatric wards.
VI. Handling by Authority.
This category deals exclusively with complaints 
about the way Health Boards and AHAs handle the 
complaint at first instance. Case W140/75-76 is 
typical of many which the HSC receives. The 
complainant said that the AHA's replies to his 
letters were unsympathetic to the point of 
callousness and totally inadequate: they did not 
answer the questions he had put. The HSC concluded 
that AHAs wrote letters so as to discourage 
complainants from pursuing the matter because they 
were overly concerned with the comparatively remote 
possibility that litigation was pending. The HSC 
has said that authorities must adopt a less secretive 
manner. Specifically, they should answer the 
question put to them and make some sympathetic 
reference to a bereavement, or other tragedy, without 
legally compromising themselves.
But/.
141
But in WW40/80-81 the HSC praised the authority 
for the way thay had handled a complaint. The 
authority in question had admitted the error, 
apologised for it and proceeded to remedy it.
Where a complaint made to a health authority 
reflects on the competence of staff the authority may 
hold an internal inquiry. As these inquiries are 
prompted by complainants' allegations they may find 
it difficult to understand why they are excluded from 
the process or finding out its conclusions.
In W14/77-78 the HSC criticised an authority for 
failing to report to a complainant the findings of an 
inquiry. In W19/76-77 the HSC condemned an authority 
which had suppressed and misrepresented an inquiry's 
findings of negligence to a complainant because they 
had feared the threat of legal action. But the HSC 
has not said that complainants have a right to be 
present throughout inquiries.
Conclusion:
Usually the HSC is content to uphold a complaint 
without further comment. He saves his worst for the 
people who bring complaints and those against whom 
they complain. The HSC performs a delicate balancing 
act between not wishing to deter complainants but 
condemning those who use his services frivolously.
It is important that from the point of view of 
NHS/...
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NHS staff, the HSC should not just be seen as a 
critical, negative institution. In a case which was 
to receive nationwide publicity the HSC condemned the 
complaints brought as "trivial", "unreasonable" and 
fatuous." In another case, involving the forcible
administration of.electroconvulsive therapy the HSC 
was unable to find evidence of maladministration but 
this did not prevent him from accusing the clinical 
assistant involved of being "less than frank" in his 
interview.16
Doctors and AHAs are in a very powerful1 
position and the HSC is particularly quick to condemn 
if they seem to be abusing it. In W122/74-75 the 
HSC deplored the consultant's decision to withdraw 
from a case because his patient had complained to the 
HSC and allegedly forfeited his trust. The HSC 
used the strongest terms possible to condemn this 
action which he thought jeopardised and undermined 
the entire complaints procedure system in the NHS.
But in W134/74-75 the HSC accepted that a consultant 
had a right to withdraw from the case where the 
patient had complained to the HSC about an 
administrative matter connected with her treatment 
simply because the terms of the complainant's letter 
could be construed as implying that the patient was 
questioning her consultant's treatment of her.
It must be obvious from the examples cited above 
that in some cases the principles enunciated by the 
Commissioner/...
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Commissioner are too specific to be of general 
interest. But, through all of them runs a theme, 
uniting them:
"The public have a right to expect that 
it will be provided with a full sense 
of service to them. This goes well 
beyond efficiency...
People... want to feel... they have 
been treated with understanding, 
courtesy and consideration."17
vO 
t->
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CHAPTER 5
THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER
(1973-1982)
Introduction
The HSC is required to report on the performance of 
his functions to the Secretary of State for Scotland.1 
And similarly, as HSC in England and Wales he is 
required to submit reports to the Secretary of State 
for Social Services and Secretary of State for Wales, 
respectively.2 To date, the. HSC has submitted a 
single report annually commenting on all three 
countries to the three Secretaries of State.
Since the creation of the office of the HSC 
in 1973, the Health Service commissioner has 
published an annual report the first of which, 
however, covered only a six month period. The annual 
reports are our major source of information about the 
HSC. The published reports of investigations tells 
us what he does, but the annual reports tell us why
he does it and how. It is all the more lamentable
then for Ombudsman-watchers, and the public in 
general, that the reports are so uncompromisingly 
bureiaucratic in tone, unattractive in presentation 
and expensively packaged.3 One could say that this 
is true of all Parliamentary papers but one might
have hoped for some concessions from the Ombudsman in
acknowledgement/...
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acknowledgement of his role vis a vis the consumer. 
Structure and Form
The reports do not form a single homogeneous 
group. The most marked difference is between the 
first three reports and the following six. The first 
three reports, as well as being annual reports, are 
also the first of a series of reports made in the 
year by the HSC reporting on investigations.
In 1976 it was decided that investigated cases 
should be published separately and the annual report 
became thereafter a distinct document with its own 
cover and title differentiating it from all other 
publications from the HSC Office.
1. A most important influence on the content of the 
annual report is the form which the published 
investigations take. For example, in 1973 the HSC 
had only been in existence for six months and had 
issued only 23 reports of investigations. In the 
appendix to the 1973 annual report the HSC 
gave summaries of 19 of the cases and this 
necessarily confined his Annual Report to only three 
pages of comment. Of course, in those early days the 
HSC had very little to comment on, and he did not use 
the Annual Report as a means of explaining his 
function or publicising his existence; he had 
separately published leaflets for that.
In/.
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In the Annual Reports for 1974 and 1975 the 
HSC had many more reports of investigations to 
summarise and because the complaints were becoming 
more complex and raising more points of grievance 
each summary became longer. The Annual Reports for 
these years are much longer than the 1973 Annual 
Report but the amount of space devoted to the Annual 
Report proper remained practically the same.
In 1976 reports of investigations were first 
published separately. This gave the HSC more room to 
expand the Annual Report. Previously he had written 
the Annual Report in the form of a series of short 
paragraphs with sub-headings. Now, he retained the 
sub-headings but expanded on them, for sometimes two 
pages at a time. But the result was still a slim 
leaflet which read like a short address.
In 1977, the HSC introduced chapters and in 
1979, an index of contents. In 1983 the HSC 
introduced a separate section summarising the facts 
and findings in each case. He hoped National Health 
Service staff would use this to identify those cases 
which they would like to read in full, rather than 
dismissing the whole document because it was too 
long.4 With each succeeding year the Annual Report 
became fatter, relying more and more on tables and 
statistics to make sense of the investigations. As 
long as the investigations are reported in a manner 
which makes the volume incomprehensible, i.e. lack of 
subject not content index then a major function of 
the/...
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the Annual Report will be to reorganise the material 
on investigations in a thematic way as well as 
commenting on the significance of whatever themes now 
became apparent.
2. Naturally, what happens in the previous year
affects the form of the Annual Report which emerges 
at the end of it. As the HSC has said "the nature of 
my workload, depending as it does to such an extent 
on unrelated and unpredictable events, means that 
some fluctuation from one year to another will be 
inevitable.5
Although there is a common core of subjects 
which are dealt with every year, some subjects which 
emerge as full-blown chapters are omitted in 
succeeding years. For example, in 1973, when the 
office of the HSC was still an unknown quantity, the 
HSC included sections on the background to the 
creation of the office, the procedure which he . 
followed during the investigation of a case, and the 
role of medical advisers, none of which he ever 
mentioned again presumably because they have remained 
unchanged.
Similarly, in 1979 the HSC took space to deal 
exhaustively with a topic to which he had previously 
only referred, "complaints which are not 
investigated".6 He described, in the form of a 
verbal flow chart, the process by which complaints 
are screened to determine whether or not they are 
within the HSC's jurisdiction. He demonstrated amply 
the lengths to which he and his officers go to ensure 
that/...
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that cases are only rejected as a last resort. The 
complainant is given every opportunity, through 
further correspondence and interview if necessary, to 
show that his complaint or part of it is within the 
HSC's jurisdiction. If the HSC does reject a 
complaint, as well as giving reasons for doing so, he 
tries to suggest alternative remedies so that 
complainants are not left feeling too dissatisfied.
Nevertheless, as the HSC himself recognises, the 
very high rate of rejection7 does mean that there 
will be many disappointed complainants.8 At the 
moment the HSC is more concerned with trying to 
educate the public as to his true role than with
compaigning to amend the restrictive sections of the
legislation which give rise to the problem in the 
first place.
3. A third consideration which affects the Annual
Reports is the personality of the HSC. Obviously 
this is a factor which affects style more than 
content but it is interesting to note that the 
publication of the first Annual Report proper
coincides with the replacement of Sir Alan Marre by
Sir Idwal Pugh as Ombudsman. With the appointment of 
Sir Cecil Clothier as HSC in 1979, the Annual Reports 
settled down into a more predictable style but this 
may be due to the fact that Sir Cecil has now held 
the post longer than anyone else as much as to hisown 
personality.
4. Recently, the expense of producing the report 
has become a consideration.9 By this I do not mean 
the publishing costs which are inevitably entailed 
but the cost to the staff of compiling and drawing up 
tables/...
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tables and statistics. This has not involved 
employing additional staff but diverting existing 
staff resources from investigative work. The HSC 
dropped a table from the 1981-82 Annual Report 
because he thought that the time and expense involved 
in preparing it was disproportionate to the value of 
the table. It is rather hard for a layman to 
understand this economic argument since most of the 
information which the HSC publishes in the Annual 
Reports is information which the HSC acquires anyway 
by virtue of his work. It is difficult to see what 
savings are made by simply not publishing it.
CONTENT
Introductions
The introductions to the annual reports are an 
excellent example of the changing style of the annual 
reports themselves. Increasingly, discursive and 
lengthier with every passing year the Health Service 
Commissioner draws together:
(i) conclusions about his year's work
(ii) comments on trends
(iii) highlights of his work which do not fall into
any other category
(i) In the early years the introduction
seemed to be simply the first paragraph. Nor 
is it a genuine introduction; a preliminary 
discussion of themes which are to be discussed 
in/...
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in more detail later in the report.
The HSC has reached two main conclusions, 
both of which he reiterates constantly. 
Firstly, that despite great efforts on his 
part the public remains ignorant of the 
existence of the HSC, and those who do know of 
him misunderstand his function. Secondly, 
that the major factor underlying the majority 
of complaints is bad communication between 
staff and patients.
Neither of these conclusions is 
particularly helpful to those who would like 
to improve relations between NHS staff and the 
public. The HSC is partly at fault, as we 
shall see, because he spends so little on 
publicity and he spends it on the wrong 
things. There are no figures to indicate 
advertising costs but total expenditure by the 
90 members of the combined PCA and HSC staff 
on travel, telephone, machinery, stationery, 
printing and advertising only comes to 
£155,000.10 Even if one were to accept that 
in today's economic climate it would be 
unrealistic to expect that more money should 
be made available for publicity work, it will 
become obvious when we look at publicity in 
more detail that the HSC does not always 
dispense his funds effectively. Of course 
there will always be those who argue that as 
long/. ..
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long as the HSC remains in his present state 
i.e. hedged about with restrictions and 
exclusions there will never be more than a 
minority of people who understand him 
properly, regardless of the level of 
publicity.
The HSC's conclusion that the major cause 
of complaints is bad communication will not 
surprise those already working in the health 
field. As early as 1966, Vera Carstairs 
working in Scottish hospitals highlighted 
communications as a problem.11 The 
difficulties result from expert talking to 
layman, the psychologically strong talking to 
the psychologically vulnerable, the socially 
superior to the socially inferior.12 It 
exists between staff and patients but can also 
exist in a modified form between various 
levels of staff.
Perhaps this may be putting the case too 
strongly, in so far as the general public are 
so much better educated about health and less 
in awe of professionals nowadays. But the 
problem does exist. The HSC does not make any 
positive suggestions as to how the problem 
could be resolved. He shies away from the 
solution that health professionals’ training 
should be altered to take account of these 
human problems. Glasgow University Medical 
Faculty is hoping to implement plans for 
courses/...
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courses on behavioural science in doctors' and 
nurses' curricula.13 As with publicity, the 
HSC is very careful not to antagonise NHS 
staff and so adopts a studied, neutral pose. 
How at odds this is with the media image of 
the Ombudsman as consumer protector.
(ii) As more superfluous people have come to
know about the HSC the rate of complaints has 
risen although the total made in any one year 
is still well below a thousand. As more 
complaints are being made, they are becoming 
more complex.
It is likely that one of the reasons is 
that most complainants undergo a series of 
experiences within the National Health Service 
rather than just a one-off happening. It may 
begin in their own home with a GP visit 
followed by a journey in an ambulance, 
delivery to an Accident and Emergency Unit, 
then a transfer to a hospital ward. Only then 
do their experiences in the hospital begin. 
This is capable of giving rise to multiple 
complaints which would be bound to complicate 
otherwise straightforward problems simply by 
virtue of the numbers of staff involved.
The significance of this for the 
complainant is that investigations may take 
more time than he imagined they would. It is 
to/...
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to the credit of the HSC office that he has 
succeeded in slightly reducing the average 
length of time taken for an investigation 
despite the increasing workload.
Another significant trend has been the 
number of general enquiries which the HSC 
office receives, many by telephone. In 1977 
the HSC mentioned these for the first time. 
Although they were not within his 
jurisdiction, strictly speaking, they were 
occupying an increasingly large amount of his 
staff's time.
It is appropriate that the HSC 
should report on how his publicly funded 
office is spending its time. He does not 
encourage enquiries, and does not advertise 
his office as an enquiry service but he thinks 
it right that people should be re-directed to 
the correct agencies or given advice if it is 
within his power to do so. This demonstrates 
the confusion in the minds of the public, the 
need for such a service and certain weaknesses 
in existing services, e.g. CABx.
This experience raises the questions 
whether the HSC should be doing a job which is 
not his and diverting resources from the more 
immediate problem of how to reduce the times 
for length of investigations. It is 
disappointing/...
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disappointing that the SC on the PCA 
have not commented on this new self-acquired 
function, particularly in view of their own 
pre-occupation with the problem of publicity.
Another interesting trend, or lack of it, 
from the Scottish viewpoint are the Scottish 
statistics which have remained virtually 
static while those of England and Wales have 
risen substantially. That is until 1982, when 
the HSC came up to Scotland in February and 
March and spoke to the press, radio and T.V.
By the end of the year, Scottish complaints 
had risen by almost 27% but almost half of 
this increase came in the months of February 
and March themselves. This suggests the 
increase is almost wholly attributable to the 
publicity created by the HSC Scottish visit - 
or to the HCS taunt that Scotland was an 
uncomplaining nation!1k
Reasons for the comparatively low level 
of complaining in Scotland are the greater 
concentration of the kinds of poeple who are 
the least likely to complain.
(iii) The HSC has taken the opportunity in his
introductions to answer criticisms levelled at 
him and to redress the balance by emphasising 
the constructive aspects of his office.
It/.
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is only natural that NHS staff should be on 
the defensive although the HSC is at pains to 
emphasise that he is a neutral investigative 
officer and not a consumer officer. Perhaps 
he is adopting an unrealistic stance for in 
the event he is doing precisely what NHS 
staff accuse him of; taking up patients1 
complaints against staff. NHS staff are 
notoriously suspicious of all forms of 
external accountability and there is probably 
nothing that the HSC could do to appease them 
short of recommending his own abolition.
Members of the SC on the PCA 
are confused in their thinking about the role 
of the Ombudsman. These MPs prefer to 
emphasise the Commissioner’s Parliamentary 
links, and, by association, the idea of 
people's representative.15
What the HSC does do is to remind 
NHS staff that both he and they are working 
towards the same end, namely to inspire public 
confidence in the National Health Service.16 
It is rather hard to evaluate the degree of 
success of this plea to disinterestedness.
In the Annual report for 1981-82 the 
HSC went so far as to pinpoint 2 Area Health 
Authorities who had acted well in excess of 
what the complainants had the right to 
deserve./...
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deserve. But it was rather an empty gesture 
for, of course, the AHAs were not named and so 
no credit accrued to them.
In the introduction to the 1979-80 Annual 
Report, the HSC publicly justified his recent 
decision to publish only summaries of the more 
important cases. This does make it difficult 
to talk about the cases in a meaningful way 
since we no longer have access to them all but 
it is an instant guide to those cases which 
the HSC thinks are significant. The Health 
Service Commissioner said that one of the main 
reasons why he decided to publish only a 
selection of the investigations was to make it
easier for those working in the NHS to isolate
those areas which are likely to give rise to 
similar problems. It is questionable whether 
this is true since the HSC still drafts cases 
in such a way as to obscure the general theme. 
The recent introduction of epitomes or 
abstracts is more likely to meet this need.
Another major concern of the HSC 
has been the question of clinical judgements 
made by medical and nursing staff. These have 
always been the main reason why he has been
forced to reject complaints and the SC
on the PCA took this up. In its report on 
hospital complaints the SC recommended that, 
as one way of reducing the high rejection 
rate,/...
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rate, the HSC jurisdiction should be extended 
to enable him to investigate clinical 
judgements.17 The HSC has given advice to the 
SC on the implications for his office of such 
an extension but did not participate in the 
decision of the SC to recommend extension.
The HSC refused to comment on the 
recommendation but probably still felt that he 
was too closely allied with the SC on the PCA 
in the eyes of National Health Service staff. 
In his Annual Report for 1981-82 he,attempted 
to dissociate himself from the SC 
recommendation:
"I have never suggested that complaints 
about clinical judgement should be 
brought within the remit of the Health 
Service Commissioner, but I have 
expressed the view that some recognised 
procedure for investigating complaints of 
this type was needed."18
This statement is perfectly true as an 
expression of the HSC's own intentions but it 
was well-known to doctors and nurses through 
the pages of their professional journals that 
the government fully intended to implement the 
SC recommendation unless the profession came 
up/...
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up with an alternative.
Background, Procedure and Medical Advice
In his first Annual Report the HSC 
discussed these three topics because the 
office was so new that no-one really knew what 
his function was or his methods. One 
unanswered question then was how the HSC 
would fit in with existing complaints handling 
machinery such as the MWC in Scotland and the 
HAS in England. Experience has shown that the 
HSC has had no real problems in co-existing 
with other agencies. The problems have all 
been on the part of the patient who has to 
make sense of them all.
For that reason the HSC described what he 
would do with a complaint when he received it. 
He had his experience as PCA to fall back on 
and described exactly the same procedure.
What he could not have foreseen then perhaps 
was how reliant the HSC would become on 
interviews. On the PCA side, staff 
investigate on the basis of civil servant 
files, but doctors' notes do not serve the 
same function and are much less informative. 
Also, complainants find it more difficult to 
articulate precisely what their grievances 
are.
There/
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There have been few complaints about 
HSC procedure since it is so obviously fair to 
all parties involved. The only criticism that 
might be made is that the degree of fairness 
involved is at the expense of a speedy 
resolution.
In that first report, the HSC 
also thought it expedient to comment on the 
role of medical advisers. It will be recalled 
from Chapter 2 that this was a controversial 
item during the passage of the bill.
It seems now that the British Medical 
Association was over-reacting to an apparent 
threat to their members. The HSC has declared 
confidently that he finds no difficulty in 
deciding whether or not cases involve clinical 
judgement and very rarely calls upon his 
medical adviser. (But we are not given any 
statistics). No doubt the situation would 
change rapidly if a HSC took a less stringent 
view of his own jursidiction.
Appendices
The HSC has used an appendix to reproduce 
a letter which he sent to all the Chairman of 
Local Health Councils on their creation 
clarifying his position vis a vis the 
Councils. /...
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Councils. The effect of it was to encourage 
LHC to become a "patients' friend" and advise 
them of their rights. Most LHCs now actively 
participate in the complaint-making process 
since they feel many patients are incapable 
of doing so for themselves. The HSC is happy 
to accept complaints from them in this 
capacity. The real difficulty is in 
restraining LHC who would like to take an even 
more active role even though it meant 
exceeding the terms of the legislation.
The early appendices were the means by 
which the HSC published summaries of some of 
the cases he had investigated. After 1973, 
when the cases were reported separately, the 
HSC expanded his section on the 
investigations. Now that the cases were no 
longer at hand the HSC had to summarise the 
details of the cases before he could comment 
on them. To a certain extent this defeated 
the point of separate publication since a 
great deal of space was still Spent outlining 
the details of the cases and too little on 
identifying common themes.
Investigations
The HSC dealt with the investigations by 
identifying those subjects which had given 
rise to several cases of interest. It is 
interesting/...
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interesting that over the years, despite the 
efforts of the HSC it is still the same types 
which crop up year after year but, as with 
statistics, the HSC is usually unwilling to 
commit himself in print by speculating why 
certain problems occur. This can have the 
effect of trivialising certain types of 
complaints which are all put down to clashes 
of personality for want of a better reason.
The most satisfying cases are those where 
the HSC identifies what has gone wrong and is 
in a position to recommend a course of action 
to prevent it from happening again. The 
HSC does not have a follow up procedure to see 
if AHAs or Health Boards have acted on his 
recommendations but occasionally they write to 
him to tell him that they have done so.
Certain groups of patients recur in the 
HSC investigations viz., the old, the pregnant 
and the mentally ill. Many complaints 
investigated by the Commissioner concern 
elderly patients. The course of the problem 
is that governments, both central and local 
have not yet faced up to the problem of what 
to do about our increasing geriatric 
population and so the old clog up the hospital 
system. No previous generation has ever had 
so many elderly relatives in hospital and 
their/...
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their impression of the NHS is not a happy 
one.
Few of the complaints made relate to 
nursing care. In fact, many old people are 
not acutely ill. They just have the chronic 
illness of old age which require a little 
nursing care. Relatives expect elderly 
patients to be treated for their illness just 
like other patients but they also expect that 
treatment to be dispensed in a special way 
because the patients are old. Nurses are one 
of the last paid groups of people who are in a 
position to provide T.L.C. - tender, loving 
care.
The HSC tries to impress upon 
complainants that geriatric patients will not 
be cared for in hospital in the same way or 
manner as at home, but this does not 
necessarily give rise to a complaint.19 
Geriatric patients may seem depressed or under 
the weather. This is natural - they have just 
been moved into a strange disturbing 
atmosphere.
In this category of complaints, perhaps 
more than any other, the HSC must continuously 
explain and justify staff action. He takes 
the time to do so because, as he says 
elsewhere, the complainants are so obviously 
acting/...
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with the best intentions.
Another group of patients who complain 
vociferously are expectant mothers. The 
problem here is not one of unexpected demand 
on the NHS because the birth rate has fallen 
and the slack in resources has been used to 
improve existing facilities so that they are 
now fully equipped. The problem is rather 
that mothers themselves now have a totally 
different attitude to childbirth. The 
majority of women control their own fertility, 
they decide when to have their baby, they 
practise regimes designed to make them 
healthier and they are not prepared to 
relinquish control to doctors at the moment of 
the birth itself. All this is at odds with 
the attitudes of staff who have been trained 
to "manage” childbirth without allowing the 
mother any say in the process. Gradually, 
hospital staff are beginning to recognise that 
mothers can be given a voice, which increases 
their satisfaction but which does not endanger 
the unborn baby. The HSC becomes involved in 
these cases where the staff are still set in 
the old, authoritarian ways.
A third group of patients who are 
frequently involved in complaints are the 
mentally ill and the mentally handicapped.
One question concerns the competence of the 
mentally ill to consent to treatment 
especially/...
166
especially if it is treatment to which their 
relatives object e.g. E.C.T. Or the treatment 
may be one sought after by the relatives but 
to which the patient objects e.g. 
sterilisation. In this area, the HSC 
has been concerned by the casual standards 
followed by doctors. It is true that the 
legal and ethical situation is not always 
clearcut. The medical defence societies and 
professional bodies simply caution their 
members to err on the side of prudence but 
offer no guidelines.20 The HSC stresses that 
mentally ill patients have the same rights as 
other, sane patients and these must be 
respected just as strictly because of, and not 
despite their mental affliction.
The HSC has also found that the staff of 
hospitals are rather lax about fulfilling the 
technical aspects of certification, the effect 
of which is to deprive someone of his liberty 
wrongfully. As with the question of consent 
to treatment the HSC is here meeting examples 
of what the voluntary organisations in the 
field of mental health have been complaining 
about for years.21
On the positive side, mentally ill 
patients enjoy a much more pleasant and freer 
regime than formerly. They may be free to 
leave their ward, even the hospital itself, to 
mix with other people, including people of the 
opposite/...
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opposite sex. The price to be paid for this 
freedom is in suicides, accidents, illicit 
relationships and unexplained disappearances. 
Admittedly these are exceptional occurences 
but they are so serious that the HSC 
has dwelt on them at length in his Annual 
Reports. He considers that it is appropriate 
to interpret his function to justify existing 
mental health policies to relatives rather 
than to condemn staff outright for deficient 
supervision.
While the HSC was being established the 
Davies Committee was looking at the way 
hospitals handle complaints and they 
recommended a hospitals complaints procedure. 
The situation was much more stable in 
Scotland, but in England and Wales there was 
little uniformity or certainty about hospitals 
complaints procedures. It is not surprising 
then that in the first few years the HSC 
has some strong things to say about the way 
AHAs handled complaints. We have seen from 
Chapter 4, Part III the way AHAs mishandled 
complaints. The HSC believes that one reason, 
initially, was that hospitals did not have 
proper complaints procedures. That is less 
likely to be the case nowadays but the figures 
are still high. Why? The HSC believes that 
one reason is that AHAs are misled by their 
legal advisers who act very cautiously to 
protect/...
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protect the AHA in the drafting of replies.22 
The HSC does not criticise legal advisers for 
doing their job. What he does say is that 
they act on this basis without a single shred 
of evidence that the complainant is 
considering legal action. The net result is 
to antagonise complainants who would not 
otherwise have taken their complaints any 
further.2 3
The view has also been expressed that 
some members of AHAs and Health Boards who 
used to be on the old Boards of Governors and 
Hospital Management Committees prior to 
reorganisation are much more autocratic and 
less committed to the ideal of a board of 
people representing community interests.24 
Certainly, the figures formerly published by 
the HSC breaking down the number of complaints 
by regional health authority area showed some 
disparities.
Each year, in writing investigations the 
HSC has gradually focussed fewer issues and at 
greater length. The usual form is still no 
use two or three cases to illustrate the 
heading which may be "events following deaths 
in hospitals" or "disclosures of medical 
records" but he usually prefaces these with a 
few sentences on why he receives complaints 
under this heading and what could be done to 
avoid/...
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avoid them. He never does more than indicate 
a few generalities. By confining himself to 
this level of comment, he avoids controversy 
but still says enough to NHS administrators to 
let them know what standards are expected.
Publicity
One of the problems is that the HSC 
cannot assume that the public or NHS 
administrators know a great deal about him.
The HSC hopes that NHS staff read his annual 
reports and cases of selected investigations 
but one would imagine that the cost and length 
of the reports are deterrents. Could the 
HSC not publish some of his main findings in 
circular form? It would be worthwhile if only 
to attract the attention of every member of 
the administrative staff and not just those 
who sit on the board.
Right from the beginning the HSC set out 
to present himself to the public in a 
simplified form. He did so, at first by 
printing leaflets (see enclosures). These are 
very uninspired items, with their dense, fine 
print and extensive quotations from and 
allusions to the legislation. It might be the 
kind of leaflet which is sufficiently 
informative and detailed to be of use to 
someone/...
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someone working in an advisory capacity but it 
probably would not tell a member of the public 
much.
This form of publicity did not have a 
great effect on the numbers of people 
complaining nor the rejection rate. In 1975 
the Department of Health and Social Security 
agreed to refer complainants to the HSC 
if they so desired and in 1976 the HSC 
recorded one of his highest rates of complaint 
ever.
In 1976 the HSC took a more positive and 
active approach in publicity campaigning by 
speaking to the press, radio and T.V. In 1977 
the HSC stated in his Annual Report that he 
had employed the professional services of the 
/ Central Office of Information and had also 
published papers.
The HSC has said in his early Annual 
Reports that the success of his office 
depended on the public knowing about and 
understanding his office, but he is prevented 
from embarking on a fullblown publicity 
campaign because it would lay him open to the 
charge of encouraging complainants, rather 
than simply making it easier for people to 
express existing complaints. In his Annual 
Report for 1977-78 the HSC tried to lay this 
ghost to rest. "But once I am satisfied 
that/...
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that I am taking all reasonable measures to 
make my services known to the public I do not 
look upon it as my duty to stimulate 
complaints about the health service."25
The HSC started to talk to local press 
and local radio. The HSC's Scottish tour 
suggests this is a fruitful form of publicity 
campaigning. Before 1980 the HSC had confined 
his attention to the national radio network 
and the heavyweight national daily newspapers. 
He could probably achieve much more by gaining 
exposure in one of the daily tabloids or 
speaking on popular radio. One cannot imagine 
that this would seriously detract from his 
authority.
Even if the HSC were prepared to take 
such a radical step by stepping into the 
popular arena he would still have the problem 
of presenting material which cannot be readily 
simplified. In his 1981-82 Annual Report the 
HSC announced his intention of uniting with 
the PCA and local ombudsman to issue 
jointpublicity material explaining the role of 
the Ombudsmen (see enclosures). And, in a far 
sighted decision, the HSC announced the issue 
of a video on the work of the Ombudsmen for 
distribution to schools, colleges and 
interested groups.
External Relations/.
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External Relations
The HSC has used his Annual Reports to 
clarify the nature of his relationship to the 
other Ombudsmen. This has always been a 
subject of confusion in the public mind. The 
problem for the HSC himself was 
cross-jurisdictional complaints.
In his Annual Report, 1973-74, the 
Commissioner said that the HSC office began 
well because it could rely on the experience 
staff had gained under the PCA. At this point 
the HSC said that having a combined PCA-HSC 
staff was an advantage in dealing with 
overlapping complaints. This was certainly 
true but the full advantages could not be 
taken because of the problems attributable to 
the legislation which created the fiction of 
two separate offices while allowing for the 
reality of one operational office. Thus, 
complaints containing PCA elements had to be 
routed through an MP while the HSC complaints 
came direct from the complainant.
Fortunately, in a minority of HSC complaints 
they are also directed via an MP.
Additionally, if complaints combined 
HSC-PCA elements copies of the final report 
had to be issued to parties who would not 
normally/...
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normally be allowed one if the complaint 
related to the Health Service Commissioner 
alone, viz. the MP. Furthermore, if the 
complaint combined HSC and local government 
complaints the HSC and local Ombudsman had to 
publish separate reports. One can imagine the 
chaos caused by a tripartite investigation.
In his 1977-78 Annual Report the HSC 
created a new separate chapter in his Annual 
Report entitled "External Relations" to 
explain the relationship of the HSC to the 
other Ombudsmen as well as voluntary and 
statutory organisations. This was explicit 
recognition by the HSC that he was just one 
agency in the complaints handling system.
This was also the first year in which he 
started publishing statistics on general 
enquiries handled in the office.
In 1977 the HSC also announced that he 
had formalised arrangements with the other 
Ombudsmen in the event of joint investigations 
but did not make public their exact nature. 
When one considers that one man holds two 
posts, and that the PCA and HSC share staff it 
becomes harder to understand that 
justification remains for failing to unify the 
Ombudsman system in Great Britain.
The/.
174
The complaints handling system in the 
National Health Service has been allowed to 
grow in such a haphazard manner that it seems 
to throw up anomalies. For example, the 
HSC may investigate the way FPCs handle 
informal complaints, but not formal 
complaints. In Scotland, the HSC cannot 
investigate complaints against service 
committees at all. The HSC will not accept 
complaints from LHCs because they are not 
aggrieved individuals but will accept 
complaints from them if they are acting on 
behalf of a patient who is unable to act for 
himself.
It was not until the publication of the
1978-79 Annual Report that the HSC announced 
that he would actually notify the LHC 
that he had completed his investigation but 
still would not tell them the result of his 
report nor issue them with a copy of it. Not 
surprisingly, Local Health Councils were not 
very happy with the way they were being 
treated by the HSC. They thought that the HSC 
was not doing the public a service by 
insisting on such an independent approach e.g. 
in his publicity the HSC refused to allow 
himself to be connected with any other 
organisations. The Local Health Centres want 
to expand and link with other complaints 
handling/...
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handling agencies in the interests of 
providing a unified service for the public.
The HSC wants to remain strictly within the 
letter of the legislation and says he is not 
responsible for providing the public with a 
comprehensive statement about how to make a 
complaint about the National Health Services.
I
The HSC no longer includes a chapter on 
external relations in his Annual Report. 
Presumably he now believes that the 
Ombudsman's relationships are settled.
Staff
The HSC has good relations with the 
health authorities even after he comments upon 
them adversely in his reports. Some people 
would say that this is because he is not 
powerful enough so that the health authorities 
have nothing to fear from him, or even that 
his reports are so colourless that the press 
never pick them up and publicise the anonymous 
authority involved.
The HSC himself pays tribute to the tact 
of his staff in dealing with National Health 
Service administrators. One other reason must 
be that the HSC employs staff in his 
investigative work on secondment from the NHS. 
This/...
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This means that they have friends and contacts 
in the NHS and know NHS methods and problems.
There are those who question whether the 
HSC can be really independent if he employs 
NHS staff as well as civil servants. This is 
probably the complainant's view but one which 
is not shared by NHS staff who are very 
unlikely to believe that the HSC is 
compromised in any way. Ultimately, the 
HSC is right in saying that he gets the 
advantage of NHS expertise.
Jurisdiction
In the first Annual Report, the HSC 
was only able to define his jurisdiction in a 
very general way by indicating who was 
entitled to submit a complaint and on what 
grounds. In the 1974-75 Annual Report the 
HSC had by then had 18 months experience and 
encountered his first major jurisdictional 
obstacle, clinical judgement. Contrary to the 
expectations of doctors the HSC had not found 
this difficult to determine and had only 
occasionally called on the help of his medical 
advisers. What had surprised doctors was the 
extent to which the HSC immersed himself in 
clinical details and the HSC attempted to 
justify this.
It was apparent to the HSC that other 
complaints handling agencies were either 
failing/...
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failing in their jobs or did not exist to 
handle the number of complaints he received 
about clinical judgement. Initially, the 
HSC seemed to be hopeful that the Davies 
Committee which was then considering the 
subject would formulate some helpful 
proposals. The Davies Committee did report 
but the government failed to implement its 
proposals on "investigative panels" to look 
into complaints about clinical judgement.26
Like others, the HSC realised that the 
government was not going to act on the Davies 
Committee proposals which left him with an 
embarrassingly obvious problem.27 Year after 
year, clinical judgement was the main reason 
why he had to reject complaints. The SC 
investigated the problem, and, perhaps not 
entirely to the satisfaction of the HSC 
recommended that the HSC be allowed to look 
into such cases. The HSC as office-holder, 
was only too acutely aware that in making this 
recommendation the CS had flown in the face of 
medical opinion. The scheme was doomed before 
it even started. Fortunately, the BMA 
introduced a new scheme of its own which it 
hoped would resolve the problem.28
In 1976 the jurisdiction of the HSC was 
extended by the Health Services Act to cover 
private patients treated in NHS facilities. 
Although it was an important extension 
politically, it has not given rise to any 
cases/...
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cases.
Other interesting jurisdictional problems 
are discussed in the Annual Report 1979-80 
paras. 22-29. In 1979 the HSC encountered a 
potential problem caused by the proposal to 
dismiss Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham AHA 
for overspending and replace them with Special 
Commissioners. While the AHA was subject to 
the jursidiction of the HSC the Special 
Commissioners who would be assuming the same 
functions as the AHA would have been immune 
from his jurisdiction. Of course, the 
patients within the area would have recourse 
to the PCA so the anomaly was bound to be 
confusing, and really depended only on a 
technical omission in the legislation. The 
HSC requested that the department draw up 
amending legislation but none was ever 
produced and the situation is hardly likely to 
recur.
The HSC also encountered a real, not 
theoretical problem, over the status of 
Community Physicians.
This is a comparatively new post. Such 
doctors are employed by the Health Board or 
AHA but as community doctors working closely 
with many social services provided for by the 
local authority they are frequently involved 
with local government affairs. A typical 
complaint would relate to a housing waiting 
list maintained by the council. Community 
Physicians could determine priorities within 
the/...
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list by recommending rehousing on medical 
grounds. However, because these doctors are 
employed by the AHA or Health Board the HSC 
and local Ombudsman are required to carry out 
dual investigations. This is just another 
example of the absurdities thrown up by such 
divisive legislation.
Even the HSC is driven to say that the 
legislation is worded too restrictively when 
it prevents him from investigating a complaint 
about a layman masquerading as a surgeon (see 
footnotes to chapter 3 fn. 18).
When the HSC encounters such 
jursidictional problems he does not 
automatically assume that the correct solution 
would be to amend the legislation to allow him 
to investigate the case. He does this only 
when the case is excluded from his 
jurisdiction by an apparent oversight on the 
part of the draftsman or involves a situation 
which the draftsman could not have foreseen or 
considered. For example, in relation to 
clinical judgement the HSC has not been 
wholeheartedly behind the SC proposals to 
extend his jurisdiction to include clinical 
judgement. The HSC has serious reservations, 
and not just about the need for medical 
co-operation. The HSC is also concerned about 
how such a scheme would affect his 
relationships with the courts. If his reports 
were used by unscrupulous complainants as a 
basis for legal action would this not endanger 
his/...
180
his frank relationship with NHS staff in 
future investigations? And how would judicial 
decisions rebound on the HSC if the judge 
disagreed with HSC findings? The obvious 
means of overcoming this difficulty is to 
introduce an exclusion rule whereby parties 
who come to the HSC are barred from then going 
to the courts. A statutory rule of this kind 
is distasteful to all the parties involved and 
may not even be sufficient in every case to 
usurp the jurisdiction of the courts. §
Despite the HSC own doubts about tackling 
clinical cases himself he remains convinced it 
is still a problem and seems unimpressed by 
the first year's operation of the BMA 
clinical complaints procedure.29 It seems 
certain that the HSC will take up this problem 
again.
Statistics
This chapter is the most important source 
of information about the HSC Office contained 
in the Annual Report. It has grown each year 
to reflect this status and, no doubt, in 
response to calls from the SC on the PCA for 
more information. It is the only chapter 
which presents hard facts although these are 
somewhat limited. However, comparative work 
is made more difficult because of the changing 
contents of this chapter. Generally speaking, 
it has expanded but at the expense of 
consistency. It is difficult to say whether 
this/...
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this has occurred in response to changing 
circumstances or the differing views of the 
officeholder. The result is that we do not 
have a nine year run on most tables. Even 
tables which are repeated annually may change 
internally, making them useless for HSC 
comparative purposes e.g. in 1977 the HSC 
first published his analysis of reports issued 
indicating which aspects of health care were 
most complained against. The category (such 
as "ambulance") which appears one year, 
perhaps in response to industrial action might 
disappear the next to be subsumed under a new 
category the following year.
Recently, the HSC has hinted that one 
major factor which determines the content of 
this chapter is the time and effort involved 
in preparing a table weighed against its 
statistical value.30 A recent casualty to 
this line of thought was the table breaking 
down complaints into the English Regional 
Health Authority areas. It is not an argument 
which bears up to examination since it could 
be validly argued that none of the information 
contained in the chapter is of real 
statistical value and presumably all the 
information required is to hand, anyway. On 
the other hand, surely if the Annual Report is 
to be as informative as possible for the 
public and a precautionary tale to NHS 
administrators then not enough information can 
be published.
1. The volume of cases with which the HSC
is/...
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Is dealing yields a database too small to be 
reliable for analytical purposes, e.g. in the 
Annual Report 1978-79 para. 21 p.8 the HSC 
reported that in the Mersey Regional Health 
Authority area the total number of population 
per complaint has risen from 1 in 225,000 to 1 
in 83,000. On the face of it, this seemed a 
serious deterioration in health care. But, as 
the HSC noted the actual number of complaints 
made in the Mersey Region had merely risen 
from 11 to 30, of which only 8 were capable of 
being investigated and of these only 6 found 
to be justified.
The HSC recognises the dangers of trying 
to deduce from insufficient data and this 
leads on to the second criticism.
2. The HSC tends, as elsewhere in the Annual
Report, to present information baldly without 
commenting on its possible significance. No 
doubt he is influenced by the fact just 
referred to but he is the person best placed 
to comment on the significance of statistics 
related to his office and the SC and public 
are entitled to look to the HSC for that 
information.
The written sections in the chapter 
usually repeat verbally the information 
contained in the tables simply highlighting 
the/...
183
the main trend, if there is one, and allowing 
the rest of the material to pass unremarked. 
Recently, the HSC has included in his written 
sections useful conversions of the main 
figures as percentages. While it is essential 
to retain the absolute figures as a reminder 
of the dimensions of the problem it would 
probably be more helpful if the HSC 
converted many more of the figures into 
percentages for comparative purposes.
3. The HSC publishes the Annual Report
because he is under a statutory duty to do so. 
At least one member of the SC on the PCA 
to whom I spoke questioned whether it had any 
value as a medium for disseminating 
information.31 He was concerned that those 
who work for the NHS only became aware of the 
HSC when they became involved in an 
investigation. The public only become aware 
of the HSC when the press and T.V. draw 
attention to his work so in writing a chapter 
on statistics the HSC does not really know who 
he is writing for - other than the members of 
the SC on the PCA who are already privy to 
this information,
One of the difficulties of using the 
statistics is that the HSC has not set them 
against any background or in any particular 
context./...
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context. When he does do so, it is against 
the general population. It would be more 
meaningful if the HSC discussed his own work 
in relation to hospital in-patient figures or 
National Health Service contact rates than 
just the world in general.
Similarly, when the HSC discusses his own 
statistical rates he does so in relation to 
the total figures of complaints received and 
not the much smaller figures of those where 
the complaint was wholly or partially 
justified. It gives the impression of a very 
busy office (which is no doubt accurate) but 
glosses over the rather small, hard core of 
justified complaints. In fact the early 
Annual Reports did include statistics which 
were more biased towards justifying the office 
than in explaining how it spent its time.
For example, in the very first Annual 
Report the HSC published statistics on the 
number of complaints received, the number of 
cases closed or cases screened and 
rejected/investigated, the number rejected as 
being outside jurisdiction, the number 
discontinued or withdrawn, the number of 
reports issued as well as a note of whether 
complaints were against the then Regional 
Health Boards, Boards of Governors, Boards of 
Management, Hospital Management Committees and 
Executive/...
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Executive Councils (the last two being 
Scottish terms). All the figures mentioned 
were also broken down in English, Scottish and 
Welsh totals. 4
In the 1974-75 Annual Report the HSC 
had to include a new category to take account 
of the length of time his office was taking to 
complete investigations viz. "complaints 
brought forward". In that first year the 
figure was 119. It is now almost double that, 
and hovers around the 200 mark, although it 
has exceeded this.32 As a proportion of the 
complaints received, however, it has remained 
the same despite an increase in the complexity 
of the cases.33 This has been part of a 
deliberate campaign by the HSC to keep the 
lengths of investigations down to a minimum.
In 1976, the first year in which Sir 
Idwal Pugh had a free hand to write the Annual 
Report without taking into account the views 
of his immediate predecessor, Sir Alan Marre, 
and also the first year in which the 
summarised investigations were published 
separately, the HSC introduced a much 
strengthened section on statistics. The 
HSC introduced new tables of information and 
presented the year's figures alongside the 
previous year's in brackets, for instant 
comparison.
The/.
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The HSC introduced 2 new categories in 
his 1976-77 report. The first gave the total 
number of complaints examined in the year.
This figure exceeds the total number of 
complaints received in the year because it 
includes complaints brought forward from the 
previous year. This would enable us, if we 
thought it were a valid exercise, to analyse 
the HSC office efficiency and costs by 
relating the number of staff and office 
expenditure to the number of reports issued.34
This was also the first year in which the 
HSC commented on the published tables and 
converted the main figures into percentages 
e.g. HSC says that in that year 72% of all 
complaints received were rejected as being 
outside his jursidiction (i.e. 423 out of 
582). The HSC has continued to give his 
percentage each year and attaches great 
significance to it since, in his opinion, it 
reflects how well the public understands his 
powers and function. (see table).
This is perhaps misguided since this 
figure of rejected complaints also includes 
cases which have been discontinued after a 
partial investigations or withdrawn by the 
complainant.35 The percentage then suggests a 
higher rejection rate than is actually 
justified. There are all sorts of reasons for 
cases/...
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cases being discontinued or withdrawn e.g. the 
health authority or staff complained against 
may resolve the complaint to the satisfaction 
of the HSC or complainant, the complainant may 
decide that an alternative service such as the 
courts or Local Health Councils will be more 
useful to him than the HSC. But the Health 
Service Commissioner does not distinguish 
these cases from those which the HSC 
rejected because they fall outside his 
jurisdiction.
The HSC admits that the rejection rate is 
high, no matter on what basis it is
-f'
calculated. To give some indication of what 
the main stumbling blocks are the HSC 
provides a breakdown of the reasons for 
rejection into 13 headings. The main reason 
in 1976, and now, for rejection is that the 
complaint concerns the clinical judgement of a 
doctor.36
The emphasis on the high rejection rate 
detracts attention from a much more 
significant aspect of the HSC work. Each year 
of the hundreds of complaints received and 
investigated, only a tiny minority are found 
to be justified. This is a much more telling 
basis for criticism of the value of the Health 
Service Commissioner office.
In/.
188
In the Annual Report, 1977-78 and with 
the agreement of the chairman of the SC 
on the PCA, the HSC published an analysis of 
cases according to frequency of occurrence in 
the English Health Regions. The HSC 
did not breakdown the Scottish and Welsh 
figures because, he said, they did not have an 
equivalent to the regional health authority. 
Strictly speaking, this is not true. The 
AHAs in Wales and the Health Boards in 
Scotland are the equivalent of RHA. The 
argument used against breaking the Scottish 
and Welsh figures down further is that it 
would enable one to identify the hospitals 
referred to in the cases since the areas are 
so much smaller.37 But it probably would be 
possible to do exactly the same in the case of 
the Regional Health Authorities. Since then, 
the HSC has decided to drop the table 
entirely.
In 1977, the HSC first discussed the 
source of complaints. Surprisingly, 
considering the fact that complainants have 
direct access, only 50% of complaints come 
direct from the complainant. Another 31% are 
raised by relatives. This equates with 
information the HSC has previously released 
about the numbers of cases concerning 
geriatric and mentally ill patients. 19% of 
complaints come from a third party e.g. MPs, 
LHCs,/...
189
LHCs, CABx. Significantly, in all cases 
brought by someone other than the patient 
himself 24% of the patients had died.
In the Annual Report, 1981-82, the HSC 
published an analysis of the results reports 
issued showing which aspects of health care 
were involved. There were 10 main headings 
and also an indication of whether the 
complaints had been found justified or not, or 
remained unresolved. The largest number of 
grievances were about nursing care (111), 
closely followed by complaints about the lack 
of information to patients' relatives from the 
doctors (99). The third largest group of 
complaints were made against the way that 
health authorities handled complaints at first 
instance (61) but this was also the category 
with the highest number of complaints that 
were justified. The category in which there 
was the highest number of complaints without 
justification was that of lack of information 
from nurses and this was the same category in 
which there was the highest number of cases 
which could not be resolved.38
In the 1978-79 Annual Report the HSC 
considered the number of cases which he 
received which were out of time. Contrary to 
expectations these did not disappear after the 
first few years and currently run at 20-30 a 
year./...
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year. The HSC has had to accept that thanks 
to the dilatory correspondence that frequently 
occurs between complainant and health 
authority, some complaints will be out of 
time. The HSC also accepts complaints from 
complainants who were dissatisfied with the 
way their complaint was handled but who were 
not made aware of the HSC's existence.
The most basic criticism which can be 
levelled against the Annual Reports is that 
they are short term. At the most they compare 
one year with another. The HSC never tries to 
take a long term view, looking back or 
forward.
Remedies
The raison d'etre of the HSC is not the 
attainment of remedies for complainants but he 
has included chapters on this subject in his 
Annual Reports. In the 1980-81 Annual Report 
the HSC devoted a chapter to discussing the 
nature of remedies which he obtained. They 
may seem nebulous to some but the value of the 
HSC is not necessarily to be found in the 
remedy obtained. Rather it is in the 
independent investigation leading up to it.
The thoroughness of these investigations can 
seem disproportionate to the seriousness of 
the cases. This is especially so for those 
working in the National Health Service but it 
appears/...
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appears from what the HSC says that he 
maintains cordial relationships with the 
AHAs.
It is easy to undervalue the Annual 
Reports because they have so little impact on 
the public mind but it is essential to 
remember that the Annual Reports are 
Parliamentary papers and not exercises in 
public relations. The HSC could probably make 
the Annual Reports more interesting to the 
news media without compromising his duty to 
Parliament.
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p. 8:
body complained of outside jurisdiction 5.9%
complaint against FP, dentist etc 12.5%
FPC Service Committes and Tribunal
Regulations 1.3%
Clinical/Judgement 25.9%
Legal remedy available 5.5%
Personnel matter 5.9%
Out of Time 3.8%
Authority not given prior chance to
answer 20.3%
Right of appeal to tribunal 0.3%
no prima facie failure/malaministration 5.4%
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Complaint from local authority, other
public body or nationalised industry 0.29%
Functions of MWC (Scotland) 0.29%
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38. see Chapter 4 Part III
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CHAPTER 6
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE PARLIAMENTARY 
COMMISSIONER FOR ADMINISTRATION
Origin and Constitution
The SC on the PCA was set up in 1967 with the 
following order of reference: "To examine the
Reports laid before the House by the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration, and matters in 
connection therewith." In 1973 this order was 
extended to include the Reports of the Health Service 
Commissioners for England, Scotland and Wales.
Reference has already been made to its 
supportive role in obtaining remedies for aggrieved 
citizens who bring their complaints to the HSC 
or PCA. In addition, like other specialised 
committees in the House of Commons, the SC on the PCA 
exercised inquisitive and information-gathering 
powers, but, as will become apparent, the SC on the 
PCA is not entirely similar to other select 
committees.
An initial difficulty in discussing the work 
of the SC on PCA is the confusion which arises from 
its dual role. As will be obvious from its name, the 
SC on PCA is responsible for supporting the work of 
both the PCA and the HSC although the former 
occupier most of its time. However, it will 
sometimes be relevant to refer to the PCA only.
The/.
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The 1968 Government White Paper which 
recommended the creation of a "Health Commissioner" 
suggested that he might be on the analogy of the 
PCA. It did not go so far as to suggest that one man 
should hold both posts and, perhaps influenced by the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by health authorities over 
day to day matters, proposed that the Parliamentary 
link should perhaps be through a minister.1
In 1972, Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary for 
Social Services announced the appointment of a HSC 
in the House. When asked by Mr. Michael Stewart, MP, 
"What would be the relationship between the proposed 
commissioner and the Select Committee of this House 
to which the present Ombudsman reports?" Sir Keith 
replied that this needed further consideration.2 
Yet the government had already decided that one man 
should hold both posts of PCA and HSC subj ect to the 
view of the SC on PCA.3
In its report, the SC pronounced itself firmly 
in favour of the HSC also being the PCA. It also 
"expressed the hope that as far as possible the 
relationship established between the Parliamentary 
Commissioner and themselves would be continued with 
the HSC."1*
To/.
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To a very limited extent then the SC 
may be credited with extending the Ombudsman 
principle to the National Health Service and 
determining the form it took. But the government was 
clearly executing its own wishes anyway and where it 
disagreed with the SC, as over the question of access 
the SC's recommendations were ignored.5
MPs then, as now, were concerned that the 
Ombudsman should not usurp their traditional role as 
grievance chasers. It was this factor which had 
undoubtedly led them to propose strengthening the 
parliamentary links by the imposition of an MP filter 
into the HSC scheme. It also led them, at the 
committee stage of the PCA Bill 1967 to reject the 
suggestion that the H.L. should also have a Committee 
on the PCA.6 This is confirmation of the view that 
MPs saw the Ombudsman as an extension of their own 
grievance handling powers.
Since it will be argued that this fundamental 
misconception of the role of the SC is still 
prevalent in the minds of some MPs it is not 
surprising that the SC's existence has been 
threatened twice. It happened in 1970 when the 
newly-elected Conservative government launched its 
review of the SC structure.7 On that occasion, the 
PCA, Sir Edmund Compton, convinced the government of 
the value of the SC.8 Secondly, and more seriously, 
in 1978 the SC on Procedure conducted an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the select committee system. 
It/...
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It concluded that the imbalance of power between 
Parliament and the Executive could be corrected by 
strengthening the committee system. Specifically, it 
proposed increasing the powers of SCs, increasing 
their secretarial and technical assistance and 
re-organising them on a departmental based system 
which would encompass expenditure, administration and 
policy. The SC on Procedure proposed the abolition 
of the SC on the PCA, distributing its cases among 
the departmental committee to which they related and 
assigning any residual functions to the Treasury 
Committee.9
The HSC submitted a strongly worded memorandum 
to the SC on Procedure arguing in favour of the 
retention of the SC on PCA.10 The HSC pointed out 
that the SC on PCA was not like other specialised 
committees; it was more like the Public Accounts 
Committee (which the SC on Procedure intended to 
retain). Together, the SC on the PCA and the PAC 
were responsible for the "general supervision of the 
quality of administration by Government departments". 
Perhaps the Health Service Commissioner is 
exaggerating here in implying that the SC on the PCA 
is of the same stature as the PAC. The HSC concedes 
as much himself when he says later, in the same 
memorandum, that the SC on the PCA "though of recent 
origin is growing into a formidable instrument" (my 
own emphasis).
The/.
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The HSC argues that the worth of the SC is to be 
measured by its effectiveness in obtaining remedies. 
He also commends the value of considering cases in a 
particular as well as general context. He questions 
whether departmental committees could build up the 
background or experience to do this. Also, who would 
be responsible for giving general guidance on 
jurisdictional issues, publicity and so forth? The 
HSC thought it unlikely that the Treasury Committee, 
whose main responsibilities would be elsewhere would 
be in a position to do so.
The HSC concluded by saying that even if it were 
possible to distribute the PCA workload amongst a 
number of committees it would be impossible to do so 
in the case of the Health Service Commissioner 
workload which, in the main, centres on one specific 
subject which is outwith the normal system of 
Parliamentary accountability:- "In view of the nature 
of my work and functions as HSC I consider it even 
more important that there should be only one single 
Committee dealing with that."
The SC at least in theory, is very valuable to 
his work. In the memorandum which the Chairman of 
the SC on PCA, Sir Antony Buck, submitted to the SC 
on Procedure, the Chairman seemed to echo these 
views.11 He described the SC as a "valuable ally" of 
the PCA and HSC as well as a successful means of 
bringing maladministration and failures in the civil 
service and National Health Service to the attention 
of the House. But in his evidence before the SC on 
Procedure/...
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Procedure he proved to be more equivocal in his 
^iews. He seemed to imply that the SC on the PCA 
has had to develop its own role to justify its 
existence. It appears that Sir Antony, though a 
founder member of the SC on PCA as well as chairman, 
is not completely convinced of its value. In his 
evidence, he said: "I was a little sceptical about 
the need for this Committee (SC on PCA) 
when I sat on the committee which considered the 
original legislation which created the Parliamentary 
commissioner ... I have been frankly sceptical about 
our need from the point of view of the Committee, but 
we have strengthened the need for it by successive 
Ombudsmen ... You will find that they have thought it 
very important to have this back up which, indeed, 
other Ombudsmen do not have in the Scandinavian 
situation or indeed in Germany or France."12
But the majority opinion of the House in 
debate13, and the SC itself was in favour of the 
status quo.14 The government took note of the SC's 
views15 and it was decided to retain the SC on 
PCA.16
Membership
The SC has eight members, of whom any three 
constitute a quorum. Initially, its chairman was 
drawn from the Opposition benches. This is no longer 
the case and the present incumbent, as well as being 
a Conservative MP, has also held a Ministerial post. 
Four/...
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Four members of the SC are Conservative, three are 
Labour and one is SDP. None of the members has a 
specialist interest in the National Health Service.
In fact, their interests are fairly evenly divided 
between business and trade unions.17
The presence of a Conservative chairman suggests 
that the SC is not seen as being politically 
controversial (or perhaps that its findings are not 
politically significant?). This is in contrast to 
the PAC whose chairman is always drawn from the 
opposition benches. It is perhaps more surprising 
that none of the members of the SC has a declared 
interest in the health service. If it is at all 
possible to characterise the members it would be to 
say that they are committee "types" who sit on lots 
of other benches. This makes their commitment to the 
SC on PCA somewhat questionable e.g. Mr. Tony Durant, 
MP, is a member of eight committees and associations 
and chairman of four of these.
The SC has power (conferred on all the new 
departmental committees):
(a) "to send for persons, papers and records, to sit 
notwithstanding any adjournment of the House, to 
adjourn from place to place and to report from time 
to time.
(b) to appoint persons with technical knowledge 
either to supply information which is not readily 
available or to elucidate matters of complexity 
within the committee's order of reference."
In/.
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In fact, the SC on the PCA does not have a 
research officer, but obtained the services of one on 
ad hoc basis for its review of hospital complaints in 
the National Health Service.18
Standing Order 83A permits the SC to meet the 
public. The SC found that civil servants were 
concerned to maintain the anonymity of the PCA/
HSC reports but the SC noted that in the past no 
witnesses had ever asked for their evidence to be 
heard in private. Consequently, the SC meets in 
public in cases relating to the PCA but in camera for 
HSC cases because of the sensitive and sometimes 
confidential aspects of these.19 And, although since 
April 1978 SC proceedings are liable to be broadcast 
on radio this does not apply to the SC 
on the PCA.20
It is difficult to define the nature of the 
constitutional relationship between the SC and the 
HSC. There is plenty of evidence to support the view 
that the PCA is a Parliamentary servant but it is 
more difficult in the case of the HSC whose links 
with Parliament are much more attentuated.21 The HSC 
looks to the SC as a final sanction and for guidance 
but he does not act at their bidding or accept 
complaints from MPs in the House.
At least one member of the SC says that the HSC 
is a public not a Parliamentary servant.22 But this 
is not a meaningful statement in practice^
Function/.
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Function
In general, select committees are intended to 
investigate, scrutinise and report on government 
activities with the purpose of obtaining information, 
stimulating debate and keeping civil servants on 
their toes.23 But the SC on the PCA is not like the 
other SCs, the main difference being that it is a 
passive or reactive body whose actions spring from 
the reports submitted by the HSC/PCA. It cannot 
initiate major inquiries into subjects in the same 
way as departmental committees because its brief 
confines it to examining the HSC reports and 
therefore it has little scope for positive action.
The SC has little option but to accept this limited 
role. The only time the SC has launched a major 
inquiry was at the invitation of the government.
When the SC was established to deal solely with 
the PCA it was envisaged that its function would be 
to examine the PCA's reports, follow them up by 
questioning witnesses, if necessary, and making 
recommendations for future legislation.2u In other 
words, the SC on the PCA was to have a supportive and 
disciplinary role. Lord Shackleton described it as a 
"management instrument" for the PCA ... "so far as 
there is one."25
As expected the SC on the PCA has been largely a 
Steering Committee. It is not an overseer of the PCA 
or HSC nor will it look into complaints about the 
Ombudsman.26 In his evidence to the SC on Procedure, 
the chairman of the SC on the PCA summarised the 
Committee's/...
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Committee's role.27
1. "To concern itself particularly with any report 
of the Commissioner where maladministration has 
been held to have been present resulting in 
injustice and where that injustice has not been, 
or is not proposed to be, remedied and where 
appropriate to press for further action by the 
department concerned;
2. To examine a department's procedures where there 
has been a finding of maladministration with a 
view to ensuring that appropriate steps have 
been taken, or will be taken to minimise any 
possible repetition of the maladministration 
complained of;28
3. To concern itself with the adequacy of the 
Commissioner's powers to perform his functions 
and matters concerned therewith."
This is indeed a very limited definition of the 
function of the SC with emphasis being put on its 
reactive role to HSC reports. As the brief (quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter) indicates, this 
limitation is largely self-imposed and the 
responsibility rests with the members of the SC, the 
chairman especially.
The first task of the SC is to examine the 
Ombudsman's reports. It may be observed that the SC 
only examines and scrutinises, it does not 
re-investigate the case. Where the SC interviews 
witnesses/...
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witnesses it does so with a view to ascertaining 
their objections to providing a remedy and not a 
re-trial of the case to confirm or overturn the 
Ombudsman's decision. The SC is not a higher court 
of appeal to which disgruntled complainants can turn 
if the Ombudsman does not find in their favour.
To date, the SC has always been successful in 
obtaining the remedy recommended by the HSC. 
Successive Ombudsmen have highlighted this aspect of 
the SC as the most significant. Describing his 
period in office, Sir Idwal Pugh said: "... while I
recognise that the position of the Ombudsman rests on 
the statute I came to believe that his authority 
rested pretty fundamentally on Parliamentary 
sanction."29
When the SC on Procedure considered whether or 
not the SC on the PCA should continue in existence, 
Mr. Alan Beith, MP, questioned Sir Antony Buck 
closely on this point. Mr. Beith asked "But how does 
it add to the weight of the Commissioner who, after 
all, can make his report public and the response to 
that report must itself of necessity be public...?
Do you believe that the appearance of the Permanent 
Secretary before the committee adds some new 
dimension or threat which is not present from the 
exchange between the Commissioner and the Department 
in the initial stages?" Sir Antony Buck replied yes, 
without specifying what dimension he had in mind, but 
described a SC cross-examination as having a 
"terrifying effect."30
Mr./.
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Mr. David Lambie, MP, a member of the SC on the 
PCA, has said that he believes the SC is successful 
in HSC cases because doctors are so jealous of their 
reputations and fear the slightest taint, despite the 
fact that the SC proceedings may be held in private.
The Second task of the SC is to identify general 
areas of weakness and find out what steps have been 
taken to remedy the situation. An HSC 
investigation in the past has resulted in the past in 
the Department of Health and Social Security issuing 
departmental circulars. Where the HSC highlights a 
precise and specific problem the health authorities 
and central government have demonstrated a 
willingness to accommodate him.31 Action is less 
forthcoming where the problems are more diffuse e.g. 
consent to treatment by mentally ill patients or the 
supervision of minors.32
The third task of the SC is to consider whether 
or not the legislation establishing the Ombudsman is 
sufficiently flexible to meet current needs and to 
meet any gaps which might emerge by re-interpreting 
the Act in the light of new problems or making 
recommendations for amending legislation. In respect 
of the HSC the SC has not been at all active in 
issuing new guidelines or suggesting amendments.
This is partly because many of the initial problems 
were ironed out in the PCA pre HSC days, partly 
because successive Ombudsmen have interpreted the Act 
to the limits of credibility33 and partly because 
the/
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the major problems have been posed by what is 
excluded from the Act rather than what is in it.
The SC has a fourth informal function which the 
chairman did not describe to the SC on Procedure but 
which is an accepted part of its role as a steering 
committee. The Ombudsman liaises with the SC 
and attains their approval before changing adopted 
procedures e.g. the decision to publish only a 
selection of investigative reports or to change the 
format of the annual report. The Ombudsman acts with 
the encouragement of the SC and they have possibly 
contributed to the "opening out" of the office. The 
SC has been much less successful in its proposals to 
amend legislation. Its major report on the 
hospitals complaints system which recommended giving 
the HSC power to investigate cases concerning 
clinical judgement and the power to initiate 
investigations lies unimplemented. The existing SC 
is not powerful enough to persuade any government to 
act on its proposals but this is probably true of 
most other select committees.
The work of the SC
When the House is in session, the SC on the PCA 
meets with the Commissioner fortnightly, totalling 
about 20 meetings a year. Each meeting lasts 
approximately an hour to an hour and a half so, one 
could say, that the total workload is about 30 hours 
a year. Average attendance at the meetings is 
somewhere between four or five.34
The/.
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The SC output is usually two reports each 
session, one on the PCA and one on the Health Service 
Commissioner. In a supplementary memorandum 
submitted to the SC on Procedure the Chairman of the 
SC on PCA gave some indication of how the SC 
spends its time between PCA and HSC matters. In 
1975-76, the SC considered 17 PCA cases and 19 HSC 
cases. In the following year, it considered 8 PCA 
cases and 10 HSC cases. Quite apart from the fact 
that these figures are very low, they can also be 
misleading. While in both years, the SC examined the 
report of each PCA case individually they only looked 
at the HSC cases under sub-headings (5 in 1975-76 and 
6 in 1976-77).
The SC on Procedure was unimpressed by these 
figures. Mr. Nigel Spearing, MP, commented: "From
your answer it would seem that the residual 
responsibilities for matters relating to 
Parliamentary Commissioners in general, as distinct 
from cases in particular, are relatively small."35
Mr. Alan Beith, MP, said: "I have the feeling 
that part of the purpose of setting up the Select 
Committee was to demonstrate that this, new creature, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner, was the servant of 
Parliament and not some constitutional hybrid for 
whom no place could be found. I feel that, that 
purpose has probably been served and that the 
justification for the Committee's existence must be 
elsewhere."
The/.
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The SC examines the reports on the basis of a 
list submitted by the HSC. It does not read them all 
so tends to act on the HSC list though it is free to 
add to it. One could go so far as to say that the SC 
is too dependent on the HSC for determining its 
agenda. The SC does not ask to look at cases which 
the HSC has rejected, and it is reported by reliable 
sources that when the HSC lays his reports before the 
SC it asks questions from a brief prepared by the 
HSC office.
Select Committee Reports
SC reports focus on three main areas:
a) to follow up procedural defects revealed by the 
HSC investigative reports;
b) to clarify jurisdictional issues, and
c) to conduct an inquiry into a subject independent
of the reports.
Almost all reports fall into categories (a) and
(b). The SC on the PCA has only conducted one
inquiry of type (c) and that was at the
government1s behest.
Type (a) reports
It is hardly surprising that one of the first 
reports concerned itself with how the Department of 
Health and Social Security was tackling waiting lists 
since these were a traditional subject of criticism 
in the National Health Service. The HSC had 
identified this as an area of weak management. His 
concern/...
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was with the actual management of the lists, 
determination of priorities and the dissemination of 
information, not reduction in length. The Permanent 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Social 
Security appeared before the SC to announce that as a 
result of the HSC's comments his department had 
issued a circular. The SHHD had also issued a 
circular to Health Boards in Scotland which gave 
general guidance, reinforced by several points which 
the Commissioner had made. In addition, the SHHD 
had asked the Health Boards to report back on 
progress being made to implement the circular.
The SC concluded that these types of 
improvements, arising directly from HSC 
investigations, were.one of the most important 
results of establishing the office. The Permanent 
Secretary to the Department of Health, and Social 
Security said that it was clear that the 
existence of the HSC put the health authorities "on 
their mettle" and that the office of the HSC had had 
an invigorating effect on the National Health 
Service.36
The SC has been accused of being complacent and 
self-congratulatory.37 The SC's experience with 
individual health authorities perhaps bears it out.
For example, in 1975-76 the SC expressed 
disapproval of a consultant who withdrew from 
treating a complainant who had taken her case to the 
HSC.38 The consultant said that his relationship 
with/...
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with his patient had been vitiated by the HSC 
investigation. The SC was very concerned why a 
consultant should feel that his patient had lost 
confidence in him when none of the complaints had 
been connected with clinical services. Secondly, it 
deplored the way the consultant had withdrawn from 
the case without providing for anyone to take over.
The consultant was very defensive. He had been 
alarmed by the legalistic tone of the letter of 
notification he had received from the SC in 
particular by the reference to bringing a "friend", 
possibly a MDU representative. The SC had to 
reassure the consultant Mr. A. B. "We are not 
re-trying this matter. This is not a court of 
appeal." But the SC could not persuade the 
consultant to admit that his action had been wrong or 
over-sensitive. Eventually, the consultant was able 
to evade this charge by attributing his withdrawal 
from the case to an accumulation of administrative 
and other pressures, and not solely to the HSC 
investigation.
In another case, concerning unjust detention in 
a mental hospital, the SC could not conduct a proper 
investigation because the MDU had forbidden the 
psychiatrist in charge of the case to talk to anyone 
and the AHA's own legal advisers had told it to grant 
an ex gratia payment.39
A woman had been detained for 29 days in a 
mental hospital after her status had been changed by 
the consultant from formal to informal (which meant 
she/...
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she was free to leave). The HSC called on the AHA 
to grant the woman an ex gratia payment commensurate 
with her period of detention. The AHA initially 
refused but, after receiving a request to appear 
before the SC it then sent a cheque for £150 for only 
one day's illegal detention. (The AHA had argued 
that the other 28 days detention had been due to 
errors but were not illegal).
During its meeting with the AHA the SC 
congratulated itself that in calling the AHA 
as a witness it had been instrumental in bringing 
about a remedy. The AHA denied that this was the 
case. It conceded that an error had been made but 
denied that it was their responsibility. The AHA 
claimed that the consultant's decision to change the 
patient's status from formal to informal was clearly 
clinical and as such was entirely his responsibility. 
Therefore, in accordance with departmental guidelines 
the AHA had refused to grant an ex gratia payment 
until the consultant's medical protection society had 
agreed to contribute, and the society'e refusal to do 
so until much later, and not the invitation to appear 
before the SC had been the reason why the payment was 
delayed and then finally made.
On one occasion, the SC was called upon to 
defend the HSC's handling of a complaint against 
Clwyd AHA4 0 and in doing so effectively held a 
re-trial.41 The complaint concerned the death of a 
103 year old woman following her discharge from the A 
& EU of Rhyl Hospital in the early hours of a 
winter's/...
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winter's morning.
The local medical committee criticised the HSC 
for his apparent breach of the rules of natural 
justice by failing to give the doctor a right of 
reply. And they took exception to the HSC 's 
description of the doctor's decision as "inhuman" and 
passed a resolution of no confidence.42
The SC felt it necessary to express its 
confidence in the HSC and also confirm his competency 
to handle such cases. The SC rejected the local 
medical committee's argument that a clincial 
judgement was "Total" and could not admit of 
administrative elements. Recalling earlier 
statements in relation to the PCA the SC 
said that the decision to discharge the old woman was 
"obviously bad" and went to some lengths to justify 
the HSC's conclusions, particularly in the light of 
the procedural defects that had been revealed.
The SC felt that the HSC had failed in his moral 
duty, though not legal, in failing to contact the 
doctor concerned. Certainly, the AHA had not 
contacted the doctor either, when he still living in 
this country and they were dealing with the complaint 
at first instance, but they did send copies of the 
HSC report to him along with some questions and this 
revealed new evidence.
Finally the SC reached the same conclusion as 
the HSC that the decision to discharge was wrong. 
But/...
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But the SC's decision was based partly on a 
technicality which overlooked the substance of a 
complaint, namely the failure to "name" the doctor 
and partly on the fresh evidence uncovered by the AHA 
which confirmed the SC's view that the decision to 
discharge was administrative as well as clinical. In 
order to reach the same verdict as the HSC the SC had 
to indulge in some ex post facto rationalisation and 
the fact that it did so was an implicit recognition 
that certain aspects of this investigation were open 
to criticism.
The case attracted some notoriety and the 
Secretary of State for Wales wrote to the chairman of 
the SC as well as speaking personally to the chairman 
of Clwyd AHA.43 As a result of the case, the area 
reviewed and improved its information system and 
complaints procedures.
Type (b) Reports
In its report for Session (1978-79) the SC 
commented on the difficulties which successive 
commissioners had encountered in dealing with 
complaints which involved FPCs in England and 
Wales.44 The SC presented this problem as if it were 
a jurisdictional dispute as much as a lack of 
co-operation from FPC administrators, no doubt in the 
hope of obtaining an authoritative government ruling 
on the matter.
The HSC cannot investigate complaints about 
services provided by General Practitioners or other 
independent contractors or about the way FPCs 
investigate/...
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investigate complaints. But complaints to a FPC 
which have not been the subject of the formal 
procedure are within his jurisdiction, although some 
FPCs are totally opposed to this. In September 1978, 
Sir Idwal Pugh met a deputation from the British 
Medical Association on this issue.
The SC seemed to imply that the government 
should consider amending legislation to permit the 
HSC to look at all the actions of FPCs or to exclude 
FPCs from the HSC remit entirely. The existing 
compromise solution was not to the satisfaction of 
either party. The government emphatically denied 
that there was any unresolved dispute about the scope 
of the commissioner's jurisdiction.45 It re-stated 
the HSC position that he could look at any of the 
FPC operating the recognised informal procedure, or 
any preliminary effort at a reconciliation between 
doctor and patient providing none of the actions 
complained of were covered by the Service Committee 
and Tribunal Regulations. The government did hint 
that it was considering some amendments to the 
committee complaints procedure at a later stage but, 
that, whatever these were, it was more likely that 
they would curtail the HSC's powers to look into the 
actions of FPCs than extend them.
In 1979, the SC issued a report recommending a 
significant extension of the HSC powers.46 The 
National Health Service Act, 1978 s.93(2) lays down 
that the HSC may investigate a complaint from someone 
claiming/...
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claiming to have suffered injustice or hardship as a 
result of alleged failures in service or 
maladministration on the part of a health service 
authority. The two main requirements are that the 
complainant must have suffered injustice or hardship 
or is acting on behalf of someone who has, and, there 
must be prima facie evidence that the alleged failure 
or maladministration resulted in the injustice or 
hardship which forms the basis of the complaint.
The HSC received a case which he thought it was 
in the public interest to investigate but which he 
was forced to reject because it failed to meet the 
above two requirements.47 An AHA had, accidentally, 
employed a butcher masquerading as a doctor. The 
"doctor" performed operations during his period of 
employment with the AHA. Eventually, his real 
identity was disclosed and he was convicted. The AHA 
decided not to tell all these patients who had been 
treated by the bogus doctor. The Patients' 
Association heard of this, but were not able to find 
any patients who had been victims of the bogus doctor 
to bring a complaint. The HSC had to reject the 
complaint from the Patients' Association because they 
were not bringing it on behalf of anyone. Also, even 
if the Patients' Association had been able to trace 
former patients there was no indication that they had 
necessarily been harmed by being treated by an 
unqualified person. Perhaps the HSC has interpreted 
the terms injustice or hardship too narrowly if he 
always insists on discernible and permanent 
consequences./...
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consequences. In this case the injustice was surely 
the risk to which patients were exposed.
The SC thought that the facts of this case 
highlighted a very severe restriction on the HSC 
which was at odds with the public interest. The 
HSC called upon the SC to consider whether or not he 
should have the power to initiate investigations 
where he considered it would be in the public 
interest to do so. The SC seemed to endorse this
request but so far no government has taken any action
to give effect to the recommendation.
In 1977 the SC showed how far it was prepared to 
interpret the legislative provisions on jurisdiction 
extending to alleged failures of service.48 The HSC 
had considered a case where a General Practitioner 
had been unable to obtain an emergency bed for an 
acutely ill, elderly patient. Believing that her 
life was in danger and that she required medical 
care, the General Practitioner had the patient 
admitted into a private nursing home. Later the 
woman's son attempted to recover the fees from the
AHA on the grounds of its failure to provide a
service which it was under a duty to provide. Acting 
on legal advice, the AHA refused to make an ex gratia 
payment as directed by the HSC on the grounds that by 
so doing it would be laying itself open to claims 
from all the residents of private geriatric homes.
The SC stressed that it was concerned with the 
AHAs/...
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AHAs public duties, not legal ones. In this case, 
the SC concluded that the AHA had failed in its duty 
to provide an adequate accident and emergency unit to 
meet the needs of its population. But, it could not 
be held liable for a failure in service merely 
because it did not have a sufficient number of beds 
for geriatric patients. On the facts of the case, 
the hospital ought to have admitted the patient 
because she was acutely ill, but the fact that she 
was also old was irrelevant.
This SC decision was probably the most sensible 
one in view of competing priorities and is also in 
accordance with prevailing medical opinion that 
longterm plans for future geriatric services in the 
UK will centre on the social services, not health 
services.
Type (c) Reports
In 1973, the Davies committee reported on 
hospital complaints procedures in England and Wales, 
following a series of well-publicised scandals. The 
Committee had been formed prior to the creation of 
the HSC and had not taken his office into account 
when making proposals to improve complaints 
procedures in hospitals. The Davies Committee's most 
controversial recommendation was the creation of a 
system of investigating panels, to consider 
complaints which might become the subject of 
litigation, for every England and Welsh AHA. The SC 
realised/...
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The SC realised that such, complaints are outwith the 
jurisdiction of the HSC but there was the possible 
danger of some overlap in jurisdiction as well as 
certain confusion in the minds of the public. The SC 
urged the government to aim for a coherent system.49 
The SC probably feared that the implementation of the 
competing Davies committee proposals would put a 
blight on the growth of the newly-created HSC. 
However, the SC did express itself in favour of 
issuing a code of practice for handling complaints, 
as recommended by the Davies Committee. The SC 
believed that the publication of such a code would 
clear up any confusion there might be as to the 
respective roles of the various complaints-handling 
agencies and hoped that the Department of Health and 
Social Security would not delay publication until the 
outcome of the SC’s own enquiry into the jurisdiction 
of the HSC.50
The Department of Health and Social Security 
agreed with the SC and circulated a draft code 
amongst interested parties51 but the initial comments 
of the medical profession were critical and it was 
some time before all the parties could agree on a 
common procedure.
The SC reported in the following year on its own 
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the HSC, taking into 
account the Davies Committee proposals on 
investigating panels. The SC was mainly concerned 
with complaints about clinical judgement. It found 
that/...
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that approximately half of all complaints received 
(1,700 in Scotland by Health Boards) involved 
clinical judgement but that the vast majority of 
serious cases concerned clinical judgement.52 Even 
although this was a very low rate of complaint per 
in-patient cases per year it still gave the SC 
cause for concern.53
Even taking into account the Davies Committee 
proposals, the SC felt that the existing arrangements 
for handling complaints about clinical judgement were 
unsatisfactory. Firstly, they seemed too complicated 
arid too slow. Staff especially were worried by the 
time consuming bureaucratic procedures and thought 
that they contained an element of solicitation of 
complaints. This viewpoint was not borne out by the 
SC’s own findings. Secondly, the SC thought that the 
ad hoc committees of inquiry appointed to investigate 
specific cases tended to act in a non-judicial way. 
The Davies committee had proposed that where a member 
of staff, but not the complainant, was dissatisfied 
with an inquiry verdict, he would have the right to 
refer the case to an investigating panel. The SC 
disapproved of turning the panels into courts of 
appeal particularly where the same right was denied 
to the complainant. Thirdly, complainants were still 
dissatisfied with the composition of the committees 
of inquiry and their reluctance to release 
information. This criticism would still hold true of 
the investigating panels since they would be composed 
largely of medical professionals and, unlike the HSC, 
they/...
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they would have no power to compel the attendance of 
witnesses or the production of notes.
The SC considered whether clinical judgement, 
by its very nature, should be excluded from 
independent review. But, even taking into account 
the opposition of doctors and the dangers of 
defensive medicine, the SC concluded that clinical 
judgement should be open to some form of independent, 
though not lay, review. The Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland gave evidence of the 
experience of reviewing clinical judgement and said 
that it thought that clinical judgement was often 
used as an excuse. Nurses and midwives, too, gave 
evidence that they wanted clinical judgement to be 
open to review. It is no longer true to say that 
doctors bear the prime responsibility for clinical 
judgements since so much health care is administered 
by "teams" of doctors and nurses. The SC 
was not persuaded that independent review would 
adversely affect the doctor-patient relationship 
since the relationship had already been undermined by 
the patient complaining.
The SC concluded that what was needed was a form 
of inquiry characterised by authority, 
confidentiality, speed and flexibility. It believed 
that the HSC along with expert advisers, could supply 
all these.
The HSC agreed that there was a gap in the 
existing/...
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existing mechanisms but "The medical profession will 
have to be convinced of this since they have not 
universally accepted the need for even the limited 
investigations that my office can at present 
undertake."5 4
In addition to this problem, the SC 
was also concerned how the decision to extend the 
HSC remit would be reconcilable with the other 
provisions of the Act. The terms of the Act forbid 
the HSC from accepting cases if the complainant 
intends going to court but even when such assurances 
have been given there have been cases where the 
complainant has subsequently litigated.55
Even if the problem of double jeopardy could be 
overcome there is still the statutory requirement 
that the injustice or hardship complained of must 
have flowed from maladministration. It was suggested 
to the HSC that removing clinical judgement from the 
schedule of exclusions would not have a great effect 
since it would be difficult to show that clinical 
judgement had been exercised with maladministration 
and even if this could be established it would not be 
an advantage in the great bulk of complaints which 
were purely concerned with the nature of the clinical 
decision taken. The HSC disagreed. He said that 
obviously some complainants would want a review of 
the clinical judgement per se but "I think many 
complainants would be satisfied if it were possible 
to give them an assurance from an independent source 
that/...
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that the doctor took the steps, that, bearing his 
experience in mind, he should have taken to enable 
him to reach an informed conclusion".56
This statement obviously does not go so far as 
it might first appear from the SCs bold proposal to 
remove clinical judgement from the list of 
exclusions, and it is interesting to note, from the 
case law, that the HSC has implemented it informally 
in a very few cases where he could clearly identify 
an administrative element in a clinical judgement.
But the representatives of the British Medical 
Association were totally opposed to the SC's 
suggestion, even if the alternative were an increase 
in litigation. The British Medical Association 
thought that the HSC was in addition and not an 
alternative to the increase in mal-practice 
litigation. No doubt their opposition has been the 
major factor in the government's refusal to implement 
this report or to take action on the recommendations 
of the Pearson Report which examined associated 
topics.5 7
In the House of Commons, the Secretary of State 
for Social Services answered, in reply to a 
Parliamentary question on the future of the SC 
report, that he doubted whether the recommendation 
(to extend the HSC jurisdiction to include complaints 
concerning clinical judgement) carried with it the 
consent of the medical professional which the 
committee/...
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committee considered necessary for it to be 
successfully implemented. Instead, the government 
was awaiting alternative proposals from the British 
Medical Association Joint Consultants' Committee, 
which were eventually adopted on a trial basis in 
1981.58
Criticisms
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the SC on the PCA. Though valued highly by all 
commentators its value as a deterrent is difficult to 
measure. The SC has little opportunity to show its 
power, though this is not necessarily the only 
criterion for effectiveness, since so few subjects of 
complaint ever refuse to grant the remedy recommended 
by the HSC. The SC's role is largely confined to 
confirming the Commissioner's reports and noting 
satisfactorily the outcome of his investigations. In 
these cases, the SC has played no direct part in 
obtaining the remedy but its mere existence is 
probably of some significance since few people would 
relish the prospect of being called before a select 
committee. As it has been said of the Swedish 
experience: "The importance of the office cannot be 
measured by the scandals it has revealed but rather 
by the absence of any major scandals."59
It may well be then that the SC has achieved 
some successes which would not otherwise have been 
brought about but which cannot be proved. Although 
each successive commissioner has been a 
prestigious/...
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prestigious and influential appointee in his own
right, the SC by virtue of its status in the House
has been responsible for reinforcing his personal 
authority.
Professor Gregory has stated that the success of 
the SC is not due to the calibre of its members but 
to the institutional status enjoyed by a SC
of the House of Commons.6 0 According to the evidence
given by the chairman of the SC to the SC on 
Procedure only a minority of members are hard-working 
and some are not committed at all. It is not unknown
for a meeting to delay commencement or lapse because
of the inability to sustain a quorum of 3.61 The 
Minutes of Evidence of SC meetings bear out that the 
members are not particularly knowledgeable about 
health service affairs and the HSC's office confirm 
that MPs are not keen to obtain places on the SC. My
own personal experience as an observer of SC meetings
confirms that most of the SC MPs are lamentably 
ignorant about the workings of the National Health 
Service and the HSC and either because of this or 
other factors have the greatest difficulty in asking 
relevant questions or making-cogent or perceptive 
comments on the evidence presented to them.62
The SC has been effective in its relations vis a 
vis Parliament. As a means of identifying abuse and 
correcting it, it has been successful. It is helped 
in this by the provision of reports of investigations 
submitted/...
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submitted by the HSC which form the basis for SC 
action. Flowing from this, the SC can make very 
precise recommendations to fit specific circumstances 
which individual health authorities are in a position 
to control.63 In this role, the SC enjoys a close 
working relationship with the HSC. He suggests what 
cases might justify further inquiry, gives expert 
advice, suggest a possible brief of questions and is 
present at SC meetings with health authority 
officials to assist in the questioning.
In other aspects of its work, the SC 
has been less successful as a means of informing 
Parliament. As already mentioned it does not have a 
research department. Like other SCs although it has 
the means to investigate and report on matters, it 
has no means of bringing its reports to the attention 
of the rest of the House. Very few SC reports, in 
general, are debated. The SC on Procedure thought 
that this reflected the uncontroversial nature of 
many SC reports.6 k
SC reports do not attract public interest 
generally, and the reports of the SC on the PCA 
do not arouse much interest on the floor of the 
House. When the government responds positively to 
SC recommendations it appears to do so for its own 
convenience and not because of pressure from the 
House. For example, in 1975 the SC criticised the 
government's method of selecting and naming the 
Ombudsman without reference to the SC or even its 
chairman/...
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chairman. The government agreed to consult the 
chairman of the SC and consider any candidates he 
might care to nominate.65 However, it denied that 
the question of who should appoint the Ombudsman, the 
House of Commons or the Queen, was even open to 
debate and refused to give an undertaking that the 
Ombudsman would be drawn from the ranks of 
independent nominees as well as ex civil servants.
In other words, the government was only prepared to 
consider adopting the SC's views when they would not 
restrict its own discretion.
Former Ombudsman, Sir Idwal Pugh, was under no 
illusions about the influence of the SC. In an 
address to the Royal Society for Arts he said: "The
government has hitherto accepted only one of the 
committee's recommendations and that a relatively 
minor one. It is, I suppose, the lot of select 
committees, to make wide-ranging recommendations 
across the board and to have only a few of them 
accepted for implementation. But I think it is 
enormously dispiriting that after a careful review by 
a select committee... the government should have 
declined to take any significant action.66
The lack of interest shown by the government has 
not dissuaded outside commentators from trying to 
bring about reform in their own way, by stimulating 
debate and public argument about the future of the 
Ombudsman. The group Justice has been especially 
active in maintaining a continuous debate on the 
Ombudsman's/...
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Ombudsman's record and there are now signs from 
within the Ombudsman's office that he too is not 
wholly satisfied that the SC in its present form or 
with its present composition is as effective as it 
might be.6 7
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CHAPTER 7 
EXTERNAL AGENCIES
Introduction
It would be misleading to present the HSC 
as the only* or major, complaints-handling agency of 
the National Health Service. On the contrary, many 
others handle a far larger case-load and maintain a 
more public profile. Unfortunately, few meet the 
criteria enunciated by the Franks Committee (1957) as 
guaranteeing the impartial execution of investigatory 
functions. It is this which distinguishes the HSC's 
office.
For example, in composition the majority of 
external agencies fall severely on one side or the 
other of the professional/patient borderline. This 
has been a factor in shaking public confidence in the 
service committee procedure. Even where 
professionals sit in a minority, their influence is 
disproportionate to their numbers. Laymen have shown 
themselves all too ready to assimilate without 
question professional values at the expense of 
patient interests. This is a common phenomenon, 
observed in other types of tribunal where laymen and 
professionals sit together.
Health authorities are single-purpose 
authorities, without the responsibility of 
revenue-raising, dominated by professionals and 
insulated from party politics.1 Lacking medical 
expertise/...
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expertise, laymen are unable to challenge the medical 
assumptions implicit in current policies yet have 
failed to define adequately other areas, such as 
financial or administrative, where they might be on 
an equal footing with doctors. The general standing 
of party politics is also no encouragement to those 
concerned about the public accountability of the 
National Health Service since it deters suitable 
people from accepting appointments on health boards.
This situation has given rise to the comment: 
"external bodies or authorities are ineffective or 
even counter-productive; they may either provide a 
focus of largely irrelevant conflict or seem to 
absolve doctors ..."2 This is best exemplified by 
the experiences of local health councils at one end 
of the spectrum and the service committee procedure 
at the other.
The external agencies cannot be the subject of 
neat categorisation. They are confused as to primary 
function, many carrying out more than one, whether 
formally or informally. My concern has been to 
consider those which have the quasi-judicial function 
of inquiring into grievances and which are 
independent of the National Health Service. It may 
also be necessary to take into account that these 
agencies have certain characteristics which might 
compromise their impartial performance of their 
quasi-judicial function but this is not a factor in 
determining whether or not they are to be excluded 
from this note.
There/.
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There are four heads to consider:
(a) the resolution of grievances on a collective 
level
(b) the resolution of individual grievances
(c) the resolution of grievances by referrals
(d) the resolution of grievances by the courts
(a) The resolution of grievances on a collective
level
i. The Scottish Hospital Advisory Service 
(SHAS)
The SHAS is the Scottish counterpart of 
the English Hospital Advisory Service. The 
SHAS was established in April 1970 at the 
instigation of Mr. R. Crossman/ Secretary 
of State for Social Services as an 
immediate response to the disclosure of 
scandals in Britain's long-stay hospitals 
(ref. infra to Ely/ Whittinghame reports 
etc.). Therefore, not surprisingly, its 
remit is confined to hospitals which 
provide long term care i.e. for the 
chronic sick, geriatric, mentally ill and 
handicapped patients. Within this sphere, 
the role of the Scottish Hospital Advisory 
Service is to visit hospitals, report on 
them and advise management on patient and 
staff needs with a view to promoting 
standards of care.3
The SHAS consists of medical, nursing 
and social work staff seconded from their 
parent/...
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parent departments by the Common Services 
Agency. Its professional composition is 
one reason why it commands the support of 
hospital staffs who welcome SHAS visits as 
an opportunity to express their 
frustrations.
The SHAS is unique amongst the agencies 
under consideration as being the only body 
to have visited nearly all of Scotland's 
long term institutions at least twice. In 
the course of these visits, the SHAS has 
had specific problems brought to its 
attention and has recommended specific 
solutions in its reports.
The SHAS is a form of inspectorate 
which is acceptable to the medical 
profession. It commands respect because it 
consists of fellow-professionals. It 
offers peer review to doctors in isolated 
positions, it focuses much-needed attention 
on the "Cinderella" specialities and 
operates in specialities renowned for their 
undogmatic approach to medical treatment.
The SHAS would not wish to compromise 
its position by undertaking to investigate 
individual complaints but it has shown 
itself willing to put questions to 
individual hospital authorities where it 
reaches/...
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reaches the conclusion that an individual 
complaint is indicative of a more 
generalised problem. While such a discreet 
approach may placate medical staff it does 
not satisfy the complainant's need for 
explanation and information, quite apart 
from a remedy.
The SHAS is similar to the MWC 
for Scotland and the same criticisms can be 
directed against both.1* Both are 
essentially passive, reacting to 
staff/patient criticism and failing to act 
on their own initiative. It is 
questionable whether either was conceived 
of as being anything else but they may have 
to adopt a more positive stance to counter 
the criticisms of such groups as MIND that 
a gross imbalance exists within the 
National Health Service between 
professional and patient representation. 
While consultative committees within the 
National Health Service are openly centred 
on professional interests, which are likely 
to be clearly distinguishable from 
patients' interests, confusion may result 
when this distinction is overlooked.
ii. Committee of Enquiry into Maternal Deaths 
in Scotland
The Committee exists to conduct an 
investigation into maternal,deaths in 
Scotland, and to report on each individual 
case/...
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case in turn in volumes published 
quinquenially.5 The Committee does not act 
at the instigation of bereaved husbands and 
families but on information provided by the 
Registrar General for Scotland. Thus, the 
committee investigates every case of 
maternal death occurring and not just those 
where mismanagement is suspected.
The enquiry itself is confidential, no 
witnesses from the deceased's family are 
present. Evidence is taken of the medical 
management of the case and the strictest 
standards of medical practice apply.6 
However, the completion of the enquiry is 
entirely dependent on the co-operation of 
the consultant involved and this cannot 
always be obtained.
Each report points out all avoidable 
factors in the mismanagement of the case 
and identifies cases where the provision of 
care fell below current practice. This 
information is immediately available to the 
hospital but the deceased's family are not 
notified. The report may only be published 
years later and is intended for general 
circulation amongst health professionals, 
not concerning members of the public.
Perhaps because of this, the reports are 
very frank and full. They are very 
technical but contain all the information 
which, translated, would appease the 
bereaved/..
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bereaved family.
(b) The Resolution of Individual Grievances
The Committee of Enquiry is an example of 
how the medical profession shoulders its 
responsibility of self-regulation when it 
considers that a serious error has taken place. 
Self-regulation as a means of protecting the 
public interest is less successful when patient 
and doctor differ as to the significance of an 
event. This is illustrated by the activities of 
the General Medical Council,
i. The General Medical Council (GMC)
The Medical Act, 1858 gave the GMC 
responsibility for maintaining a register 
of doctors licensed to practise. The 
GMC uses it power of temporary or 
permnanent erasure from the register to 
discipline its members. The council hears 
cases where a doctor is thought unfit to 
practise by reason of mental or physical 
illness or ’’serious professional 
misconduct."7
Like the other agencies already 
considered the GMC’s concern with the 
resolution of individual grievances is 
almost incidental. As Sir Alec Merrison 
has said: "It (the General Medical Council) 
is not a patient's ombudsman, obliged to 
look into every aspect of doctor's 
professional dealings... The crucial role 
of/...
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of the GMC in this field (is) looking at 
the doctor who is a public risk."8 The 
GMC does not get involved in the less 
serious cases because it would involve 
scrutinising the day-to-day running of the 
National Health Service and other schemes 
exist for handling complaints of that 
nature.
A particular problem, in fact, are 
those members of the public who do complain 
directly to the GMC and are likely to be 
frustrated when they are told to lodge 
their complaint with the competent health 
authority. But it is explained that if, 
upon investigation, the complaint is 
established and serious, the GMC will 
consider the matter.9
The 93-man GMC appoints one person as a 
preliminary screener who sifts through all 
the cases received10 and weeds out those in 
which the doctor concerned is sick. 
Providing he accepts treatment and sick 
leave the matter will proceed no further. 
If he refuses, the case wil be heard by a 
Health Committee which has the power to 
erase a name from the Medical Register, 
temporarily, in the hope of persuading a 
sick doctor to accept treatment. The 
majority of cases involve drugs and 
alcohol/...
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alcohol.
The Preliminary Proceedings Committee 
considers all other cases. It may refer to 
the Health Committee, too or to the 
Professional Conduct Committee in the case 
of serious professional misconduct. 
Alternatively, the Preliminary Proceedings 
Committee may inquire into the case itself 
and, if appropriate, issue a warning 
letter. A typical case would be a first 
criminal offence involving alcohol.
The Professional Conduct Committee 
considers criminal convictions which 
indicate that a doctor is no longer fit to 
practise e.g. possession of drugs, non bona 
fide prescribing, abuse of alcohol, 
indecent assault etc. The ultimate 
sanction is for a doctor's name to be 
erased from the register.
Other than in the case of criminal 
convictions which are automatically 
referred by the courts to the GMC these 
procedures are not activated unless the 
GMC is informed about an offending doctor. 
The GMC relies on information being relayed 
to it by doctors and members of the public; 
this tends to be very little and of poor 
quality. Doctors may have a misplaced 
sense of loyalty to their colleagues; 
patients/...
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patients know very little about the GMC.
In evidence to the Merrison Committee 
(1975) the group MIND said: "while it is 
proper that disciplinary action should be 
taken on different levels by different 
bodies, this situation is confusing for the 
public, and much greater initiative could 
be shown by (the General Medical Council) 
in making clear its disciplinary role."11
Few individual complainants understand 
that their complaint must relate to a 
doctor's fitness to practise, and that 
their complaint must be in the form of the 
statutory declaration.
Sir Denis Hill, the first Preliminary 
Screener, was disappointed that the Medical 
Act, 1978 which created the Health 
Committee and named the other two 
committees had done little to relax the 
formality or punitive nature of General 
Medical proceedings.12 For example, the 
profession had demanded that the Health 
Committee include legal as well as medical 
representatives although this runs directly 
counter to the spirit which prompted the 
creation of the Health Committee. Despite 
these legal safeguards, some members of the 
GMC were still concerned that the Health 
Committee was nothing but a "trial 
jury".13
Sir/.
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Sir Denis Hill had hoped that the new 
Health Committee scheme would evoke a 
greater response from doctors both 
individually and collectively, but, to 
date, only two specialities have introduced 
sick doctors' schemes which would enable 
sick doctors to seek help and obviate the 
necessity of invoking the GMC formal 
procedure.1 * '
It must be obvious that the primary 
function of the GMC is to protect the 
public from doctors who are no longer fit 
to practise. The role of the individual is 
peripheral. An individual complainant's 
statutory declaration may prompt a General 
Medical inquiry but the complainant will 
not be called as a witness in informal 
cases. Even in formal inquiries, the 
Professional Conduct Committee might rely 
on other evidence. Furthermore, as the 
Professional Conduct Committee does not 
give reasons for its decision the 
complainant may never get a satisfactory 
explanation of his own case although he may 
have the satisfaction of knowing that the 
doctor concerned is no longer practising.
ii. Action for the Victims of Medical Accidents 
(AVMA)
AVMA is a charitable organisation 
established in July 1982 following the 
transmission/...
243
transmission of the play "Minor 
Complications" on television.15 It 
portrays the enormous difficulties 
encountered by a woman seeking compensation 
after an operation goes wrong, and was 
based on a real case. The author, Mr.
Peter Ransley, received so much mail from 
the public that he became convinced of the 
need for such an organisation as AVMA.
Action for the Victims of Medical 
Accidents is a referral and advice centre, 
confined to the greater London area and 
funded by the GLC and the Rowntree 
Charitable Trust; it was refused a grant by 
the Department of Health and Social 
Security. Its function is to help medical 
accident victims assess what has happened 
to them, and if negligence is a 
possibility, put victims in touch with 
solicitors and solicitors with medical 
experts.16 AVMA is insistent that it does 
not seek to promote unnecessary litigation 
but to make it easier for ordinary people 
to pursue remedies to which they have a 
right.
AVMA itself will not investigate 
complaints but hopes to be active in 
assisting victims to obtain information 
from the hospital and Department of Health 
and/. . .
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and Social Security relevant to their case, 
including medical accident statistics and 
details of out of court settlements. The 
AVMA is supported by the Association of 
Community Health Councils for England and 
Wales and accepts referrals from them.17
Already, the advice centre has handled 
more than 600 cases.18 This experience has 
confirmed the view of AVMA that ultimately 
no-fault compensation is probably the 
answer but to campaign for such would 
endanger their charitable status.19
Although the AVMA Steering Committee 
consists of both doctors and lawyers, as 
well as nurses and laypeople, the medical 
profession has reacted adversely to it, and 
in one case is sceptical of its value. A 
committee member resigned after only three 
meetings because she was made uneasy by the 
attitudes of other committee members who 
appeared to want confrontation with 
doctors.20 AVMA itself is having "great 
difficulty" in building up panels of 
medical experts.21 On the other hand, the 
group has attracted so much attention from 
the legal profession that it has set up a 
lawyers' Support Group. But, as a 
correspondent of the British Medical 
Journal/...
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Journal asked of the AVMA : "Does it really 
believe that it can make important 
improvements within the present negligence 
system, especially if opposed by the might 
of the defence unions?"22
(c) Resolution of Grievance by referrals - the Local 
Health Councils (LHC)23
Strictly speaking, Local Health Councils 
have no role in investigating and reporting on 
individual complaints which remains the direct 
responsibility of health service management and, 
where appropriate, the HSC, MWC or other outside 
agencies. However, since their inception Local 
Health Councils24 have increasingly devoted 
their time and efforts to this area. They do so 
because they perceive an unmet consumer need 
which they are in a position to meet. Their 
view is borne out by the fact that their 
aggrandisement does not appear to have been at 
the expense of other agencies. No doubt, Local 
Health Councils have been unconsciously 
propelled along this route by their singular 
failure to make an impact on health authorities 
in any other area.
As originally conceived, Local Health 
Councils were intended to voice consumer opinion 
to Health Boards on the delivery of health care 
in their area.25 They bore some resemblance in 
theory to the consultative councils for the 
nationalised/...
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nationalised industries but in operation they 
were intended to be quite different. Earlier, 
the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries had reported 
disparagingly on the consultative councils 
because they were so weak, so limited in scope 
and so little-known.26 The new Local Health 
Councils were to be so structured as to give 
nationwide coverage at district level and 
guarantee consumer access to district and area 
administration. In determining their function, 
however, the government was less clear-cut as to 
the aims of Local Health Councils.
Health Councils were advised that their 
role was "(to) review the operation of the 
health services and make recommendations for 
improvements and will otherwise advise the 
Health Board on any matters relating to the 
operation of the health service."27 However, 
Local Health Councils were given a great deal of 
latitude in interpreting what this meant. They 
were told that each Local Health Council could 
make up its own mind on how best to fulfil its 
statutory role. This discretion has remained 
unfettered by the formation of an Association of 
Scottish Local Health Councils which does not 
attempt to lay down national policy.28
Although the Local Health Council is the 
most consumer-orientated of all the agencies so 
far considered, its ostensible independence from 
the National Health Service has been compromised 
in/...
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in a number of ways.
1. Health Boards have a psychological 
advantage in that they were responsible, 
initially, for creating the schemes to set up 
Local Health Councils. They determine their 
form, location, accommodation and staffing. To 
a lesser extent by their unco-operative stance 
they have determined the extent of the powers 
and spheres of interest of the Local Health 
Councils.29
2. In particular, Health Boards have a large 
say in determining the composition of the 
councils. Health Boards are reponsible for 
appointing two-thirds of the members of a 15-30 
member council thus guaranteeing that their 
nominees will always hold a majority. The 
nominees' names are all drawn from voluntary 
organisations and Health Board members cannot 
become Local Health Council members. A survey 
of Health Board nominees in Local Health 
Councils reveals that Health Boards favour 
trade union representatives from NUPE and COHSE, 
retired medical personnel who devote their time 
to voluntary work, and charitable associations 
working in the fields of mental health, children 
and terminal illnesses. Local authorities are 
responsible for selecting the remaining 
one-third members. They too are attracted by 
candidates who have prior knowledge of the 
health service. The Local Health Councils 
appear to represent the public but in fact the 
members are drawn from a closed circle of people 
who/...
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who are quite unrepresentative of the average 
patient. It would make little difference if the 
members were nominated by the local authorities 
or Secretary of State since they, too, in all 
probability, would have to rely on the same 
kinds of people. The position is unlikely to 
change until it ceases to be dependent on people 
already active in the field and urges ordinary 
members of the public to volunteer.30
Fortunately, Local Health Councils have 
found that this arrangement can work to their 
advantage. The National Health Service is a 
complex organisation and lay members of the 
council can be overwhelmed by their task or fj,nd 
it difficult to make relevant and appropriate 
recommendations. Retired medical professionals, 
on the other hand, are already very familiar 
with the system and are very active in council 
meetings.
3. Each Local Health Council has a full-time 
secretary and supporting staff. However, 
although Local Health Councils may select their 
own secretary, their choice is subject to any 
objections raised by the Health Board via the 
Secretary of State for Scotland. Clerical staff 
are seconded from National Health Service Health 
Board staff. Thus, although ultimately the 
Local Health Council scheme is regulated by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, the parameters 
of daily work are controlled by the Health 
Board.
The/.
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The Health Board bears the entire cost of 
salaries and expenses incurred by Local Health 
Councils and grants them a small annual budget. 
This renders the SHHD injunction to Local Health 
Council staff to regard themselves as "in the 
service of the local health council and 
accountable to it for the performance of their 
duties" rather hollow.31
4. Even as regards accommodation, 
responsibility has devolved from the Scottish 
Office to the Health Boards. Health Boards are 
responsible for finding vacant offices from 
existing National Health Service properties 
which would be suitable as offices and meeting 
places. This unfortunate decision may result in 
Local Health Councils being seen by the public 
as being too closely associated with the Health 
Boards. Much of the accommodation is 
inconveniently located from the public viewpoint 
preventing the development of the Local Health 
Council.offices as advice centres or public 
information offices.
At least one Local Health Council in 
Greater Glasgow Health Board is actually located 
in a hospital itself.32 Rather than deterring 
complainants, the Local Health Council finds 
that the close links with hospital staff, 
patients and visitors resulting from its 
physical proximity mean that the Local Health 
Committee receives some complaints of which it 
might never otherwise know. The value of this 
relationship/...
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relationship must be weighed against the danger 
that the Local Health Council might be seen as 
an extension of the staff and the success of the 
Local Health Council above is largely 
attributable, in my opinion, to the personal 
attributes of the Secretary, the nature of the 
hospital (geriatric) and the very limited goals 
the Local Health Council has set out for 
itself.
5. The discretion permitted Local Health 
Councils to determine their own role in local 
circumstances has not served the Local Health 
Council movement well. There was a great deal 
of discussion about the role of the Local Health 
Councils in the early days but members have not 
been able to define, with any accuracy, what 
their function actually is. The rejection of 
the consultative council model seemed to throw 
Local Health Councils towards attempting to 
influence management decisions. Health Boards 
are required to consult Local Health Councils on 
changes in health service provision in their 
district i.e. closures, changes of use, 
developments. In order to make informed 
judgements, the Local Health Councils need 
information, policy papers and access to Health 
Board meetings. Few Health Boards have such a 
close relationship with their Local Health 
Councils, despite the duty imposed upon them. 
Health Boards are lax about providing Local 
Health Councils with the information they 
require and when they do consult them they only 
do so after they have already taken a decision 
and/....
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and not in the formative stages.33
Local Health Council members have no right 
to attend Health Board meetings or demand 
minutes of papers. In the Greater Glasgow 
Health Board area, it is known that only one 
Local Health Council has succeeded in obtaining 
access to district administration Executive 
Group minutes.34 Unlike their English 
counterparts, the Scottish members of Local 
Health Councils have no right to be represented 
on Health Boards.3 5 But this trend towards 
participation in Health Board matters confused 
Local Health Council members as to whether they 
are becoming part of the management structure 
and not just participating in it.36 There is 
some conflict as to whether it is possible to 
reconcile decision-making with consumer 
representation.
Local Health Councils in Scotland are not 
seeking a generalised power base within health 
authorities. They recognise that current 
consultation procedures between Local Health 
Councils and Health Boards are inadequate. In 
particular, Local Health Councils are fighting 
to obtain observer status at meetings of the 
Health Board Policy and Planning Committee, a 
move which is being resisted by the Health 
Boards.3 7
The Local Health Councils can do little to 
persuade authorities to be more co-operative 
other than courting administrative officials 
personally./...
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personally. Local Health Councils find it hard 
to get Health Boards to take them seriously. As 
Perth and Kinross Local Health Council said in 
its evidence to the Royal Commission on the 
National Health Service, as long as Local Health 
Councils have no fiscal or executive authority 
their influence can only be marginal.38
Consequently, there has been little left 
for Local Health Councils to do. The impression 
gained from Local Health Council members is that 
they are trying to manufacture a role. The 
Scottish Office had already advised Local Health 
Councils that they should be able to give advice 
to individuals on the appropriate complaints 
machinery without pre-judging the merits of the 
case themselves or entering into its resolution. 
In view of the large numbers of complainants who 
turned to Local Health Councils it seemed only 
natural that they should concentrate their 
efforts there.
Health Boards have responded equivocally to 
this development. While their tendency to work 
in private has deprived the Local Health 
Councils of one useful function they deplore the 
Local Health Councils activities in relation to 
complaints.
The CAMO for Lanarkshire Health Board 
expressed the views of many Health Board members 
when he wrote that: "The main danger, and one 
which is fully recognised by most Health 
Councils, is that they turn into a patients' 
complaint/...
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complaint bureau. This is a minimisation and, 
in some ways, a degradation of their 
function."39 While there may be some truth in 
this statement, it is clear the solution lies in 
the hands of the Health Boards themselves and it 
is revealing that the same author also 
states:"... the allocation of resources in 
priority is, in the last analysis, a function of 
management - a function which is best effected 
free from pressure group influence."
Leaving aside the lack of commitment on the 
part of health authorities to consumer 
participation, it is clear that there has always 
been pressure on Local Health Councils from the 
community to take up complaints. As early as 
1973, National Health Service observers saw the 
Local Health Council scheme as a natural link-up 
to the HSC.40 It was suggested that Local 
Health Councils ought to do much of the sifting 
of complaints for the HSC. This has in fact 
happened, where the Local Health Council merely 
acts as a referral centre. But again, much 
depends on the attitude of the Health Boards 
involved. Lothian Health Board refuses to take 
cognisance of complaints coming from Local 
Health Councils whereas Greater Glasgow Health 
Board will liaise with Local Health Councils by 
means of letter and phone. The Secretary of 
State seems unwilling to intervene in the 
interests of obtaining uniformity.
Of course, Local Health Councils can do 
nothing/...
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nothing to determine facts or allocate blame but 
they are rightly included in this section 
because for some of them it is their role in 
handling complaints which justifies their 
existence, because they work closely with other 
complaints systems it is interesting but not 
unexpected to find that they are not impressed 
by them.
At first, the Local Health Councils turned 
to the service committee procedure but were soon 
disappointed by the outcome. The service 
committees rarely concluded that there was any 
breach of the terms of service. The Local 
Health Councils are suspicious of the 
composition of the service committees and fear 
that they overawe complainants. It is not 
uncommon for complainants to fail to appear at a 
hearing. Furthermore, Local Health Council 
members have not been able to obtain any real 
experience because procedural rules prevent them 
from appearing as "patients1 friends".41 At 
least one Local Health Council has taken a 
policy decision not to involve clients in the 
service hearing procedure.42
Similarly, Local Health Councils have been 
disappointed by the HSC. In their experiences 
with him they have found him sympathetic and 
frank but they share his frustration at the 
limited remit of his office.43
It is evident that although Local Health 
Councils/...
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Councils are seen as patients’ complaints 
bureaux, and they actively promote this image 
themselves, there is in fact little practical 
help they can offer complainants once they have 
advised where and how to lodge a complaint.
Their main contribution seems to be to provide 
moral support and to stiffen the resolve of a 
would-be complainant.
(d) Resolution of Grievances by the Courts
Since the introduction of the National 
Health Service in 1948 and more recently the 
Legal Aid and Advice scheme there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of actions 
for negligence brought against doctors and 
hospitals. The number of actions is stimulated 
by the publicity given to large personal injury 
awards and the impersonality of modern medical 
practice.44 Patients eventually turn to the 
courts because they remain the only forum 
whereby financial compensation might be 
obtained. The law itself is outwith the limits 
of this discussion but suffice it to say that it 
is hedged about by uncertainties and patients 
assume an enormous financial risk in embarking 
on litigation. In particular, the law has yet 
to develop fully standards of care which meet 
the advances of medicine, e.g. the 
reconciliation of the concept of informed 
consent with participation in clinical trials or 
prescription of experimental drugs. However, it 
is worth noting that courts are influenced by 
general considerations when deciding individual 
cases. Judges shrink from being responsible for 
bringing/...
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bringing about defensive medicine, i.e. 
deterrence of innovation and advance in clinical 
treatment.
As Lord Denning said in Woolley & Roe v. 
Ministry of Health & Others (1954) 1 WLR 65: "We 
should be doing a disservice to the community if 
we imposed liability on hospitals and doctors 
for everything that happens to go wrong.
Doctors would be led to think more of their own 
safety than of the good of their patients. 
Initiative would be shifted and confidence 
shaken."
The judiciary believe that by imposing too 
strict a standard of care on doctors, with a 
resulting increase in awards made against them, 
the result would be catastrophic for the 
community as doctors sought refuge in 
"defensive" medicine to protect themselves 
against future litigation. Each patient would 
be seen as a potential claimant resulting in 
poor practices45 e.g. performing unnecessary 
diagnostic tasks to take account of every remote 
possibility in case an expert witness alleges it 
should have been done; refusing to carry out 
tests in case they have side-effects; refusing 
to prescribe new drugs or unconventional 
therapies.
The resulting course of treatment usually 
takes longer, costs more and may have an adverse 
effect on the doctor-patient relationship.
Not/.
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Not only is there little evidence that 
British conditions are ripe for a boom in 
malpractice litigation, a view expressed as 
recently as Whitehouse v. Jordan (1980) 1 All 
E.R. 650, but there is now evidence emerging 
from USA that defensive medicine can be a good 
thing. In a British Medical Association 
Conference session in the United States of 
America, an American consultant presented data 
which suggested that medical standards may have 
been raised by the epidemic of litigation.46 
One indication was the reduction in fashionable 
but unnecessary operations e.g. to remove 
tonsils, adenoids, heart by-passes. Another was 
the reduction in deaths occuring on the 
operating table because of faulty monitoring by 
anaesthetists.
Interestingly, a similar process took place 
in Britain when a number of patients were left 
in a state of coma following an operation under 
general anaesthetic. Eminent consultants 
campaigned in the correspondence columns of 
newspapers to raise standards and staffing. 
Obviously there comes a point when, however 
health services are financed, good medical 
practice becomes so expensive as to be 
unobtainable.47 On the other hand judges may be 
moved to award expenses against a doctor because 
they are unduly influenced by the tragic 
circumstances of the case.48 Doctors allege 
that awards appear to be made on the basis of 
who can best bear the loss.49 In the case of 
Whitehouse v. Jordan the parents of a severely 
brain-damaged/...
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brain-damaged child were awarded compensation of
£100,000 after ten years of fighting, in the
court of first instance, only to lose it all
when the Court of Appeal reversed the
judgement.50 The courts themselves are keenly , 
aware of the iniquity of making large awards to 
medical victims on the basis of negligence when 
all injuries and disabilities are equally real 
to the victim regardless of how incurred. The 
courts have publicly called for reform in this 
area. As a result, the Pearson Commission on 
Personal Injuries re-examined the workings of 
the present system and ventilated some of the 
arguments for a no-fault system of compensation. 
But its recommendations have not been fully 
implemented.
Courts remain the preferred solution of the 
medical profession. Although it is a drastic 
remedy it is hedged about by safeguards for 
their career and reputation. Doctors feel 
threatened by the informal methods of other 
complaints-handling agencies which cut right 
across the concept that truth is revealed by 
cross-examination.51 Unfortunately for the 
public the medical profession appears to insist 
that this adversarial method of complaints 
resolution be pursued at every level of the 
health service, almost regardless of the 
seriousness of the complaint.
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CHAPTER 8 
ISSUES AND THEMES
PART I
A number of themes have recurred throughout 
this work. A review of them gives rise to some 
observations which are classified as follows:-
1. Attitudes to Patients' Rights
2. The Nature of the HSC
3. Some Consequences from the Nature of the
Office
4. The Value of the SC on PCA
5. Performance Criteria
6. Case for Reform
7. The Will to Reform
1. Attitudes to Patients' Rights
Attitudes to the evolution of patients' rights
vary according to the role of the individual in the
medical process. However, doctors and patients 
share a suspicion of the legal system.
When Dr. John Harvard, Secretary of the 
British Medical Association, was asked, "Is the law 
capable of dealing with medical negligence cases?" 
his reply echoed the views of other doctors. He 
said that Anglo-Saxon law was inherently incapable 
of dealing with medical and scientific issues 
because of its unscientific basis and its inability „ 
to keep up with technological changes.1 While this 
raises a fundamental query it overlooks the many 
routine aspects of medical treatment.
However/.
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However, if Dr. Harvard is implying, however 
obliquely, that courts are not the appropriate 
forum to settle cases of medical negligence because 
they are manned by laymen, then he chooses to 
ignore the many other highly specialised fields in 
which judges function effectively and also 
overlooks the more fundamental objection that 
judges are deciding ultimately on matters of law, 
not medicine. But he is correct in asserting that 
because judges proceed by precedent they have 
difficulty in handling new issues thrown up by 
medical advances.2 The result can be apprehension 
as to the consistency and predictability of outcome 
from the medical profession who are convinced that 
medicine is not yet sufficiently ascertainable to 
be amenable to the legal process.
Doctors believe that when judges find for 
patients, public sympathy and heightened economic 
expectations boost the quantum of damages awarded, 
setting up a vicious circle which has resulted in a 
steep rise in the insurance premiums payable by 
doctors.
The longer experience of doctors in the USA of 
a high litigation rate suggests that their fear of 
becoming the subject of a law suit has an 
inhibiting effect on their medical practices to the 
detriment of the patients. Regardless of the 
outcome of court cases, doctors feel stigmatised if 
only because publicity of this nature is adverse 
both personally to their reputation and 
economically to the size of their patient lists.
2. The Nature/.
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2. The Nature of the HSC Office
For the patient's part, the fear is that 
patients' rights are insufficiently defined and 
developed. A practical illustration of this was 
the apprehension felt by the Scottish Consumer 
Council on the publication of its self-help guide 
to resolving health service complaints entitled, 
"Patients' Rights".3 The booklet referred to legal 
redress as only one of a range of alternative 
systemscavailable. Nevertheless, as the Council's 
legal advisers pointed out, this title is a 
misnomer because the law of delict only provides 
that a patient has a right of action where, a doctor 
fails to exercise a duty of care owing to him, 
resulting in damage. Thus a patient has no legally 
enforceable right to obtain say, the disclosure of 
the consequences of a proposed course of treatment 
unless he can show that there was a breach of duty 
which resulted in harm. However, although patients 
do not enjoy absolute legal rights they do benefit 
indirectly from the ethical and legal duties 
imposed on doctors, and the Health Service 
Commissioner takes cognisance of these.
The Commissioner is also receptive to the 
changing attitudes of the public to perceived 
patients' rights. Sustained compaigning and 
lobbying by charitable welfare organisations have 
focused media attention on the principles 
underlying these and highlighted some of their 
weaknesses. For example, anti-abortion groups have 
shown a readiness to avail themselves of the courts 
of law, however inappropriate the legislative 
provisions may be, in order to seek the abolition 
of medical practices of which they disapprove.* 
Cases/...
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Cases are taken to court or referred to the 
Ombudsman with the intention of uncovering 
unsavoury, suspect or arbitrary practices and 
thereby stimulating public concern as much as with 
any hope of succeeding. The strategy however has 
succeeded. Publicity has pressurised the British 
Medical Association into re-formulating its codes 
of conduct. And, as a result of the publicity 
generated by the unsuccessful prosecution of Dr. 
Arthur .Leonard, at the instigation of LIFE 
organisation,5 the BMA has re-written and extended 
its guidelines on the treatment of severely 
mal-formed babies. Because of the pressure from 
AVMA and television documentaries on the subject, 
the BMA set up a Working Party in May 1983 to 
report on no fault compensation for medical 
injuries.6 Press coverage on the DHSS proposal to 
conduct experiments into the incidence of mental 
handicap by depriving some expectant mothers of 
vitamins means that doctors are now debating in the 
correspondence columns of their journals how 
informed consent can be reconciled with such 
clinical trials, i.e. the medical profession - at 
every level - is becoming more receptive to the 
sensitivities of the public.
The term "patients' rights" is slowly but 
surely being abstracted from its purely legal 
connotation, and the HSC has a part to play in this 
process. It is surely significant that the 
majority of SC members were impressed by the 
philosophy exemplified by the World Health 
Organisation in its codes and charters, that 
patients' rights derive from the basic human right 
of self-determination and should prevail over the 
domestic laws of a country. The HSC is well aware, 
as/...
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as a barrister, that the term has no legal 
significance but it has a moral dimension which is 
both persuasive and easily understood.
Patients, doctors, as well as observers are 
confused as to the role of the HSC and continue to 
assess his performance by inappropriate criteria.
It is impossible to judge the success or failure of 
the HSC until such appropriate performance criteria 
have been evolved. These in turn are determined by 
the agreed function of the HSC. (A further 
question might be, who should legitimately 
participate in the process of "agreeing"?)
Obviously, the role of the HSC will be partly 
influenced by the individual office-holder.
However he is only free to influence events within 
his remit. A major factor therefore is the nature 
of the legislative provisions regulating the 
exercise of the HSC's powers. Later in this 
Chapter, the provisions of the Act will be reviewed 
critically to assess whether or not they are 
conducive to promoting the public interest.
One body of opinion holds that the HSC is a 
kind of adjudicator with all of the judicial 
characteristics which this entails. This view is 
superficially attractive bearing as it does an air 
of compromise. However, the image of HSC as 
adjudicator is an essential pre-condition for those 
who would like to make the HSC a stronger figure 
with mandatory powers. They take their example 
from the Northern Ireland Commissioner for 
Complaints whose recommendations are enforceable by 
leave of court, but this is such an automatic 
procedure that most parties implement the 
recommendations without waiting for an application.
The/.
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The HSC has found that while adopting a 
quasi-judicial style of procedure protects him from 
criticism, it inhibits staff from speaking freely 
or at all. Adopting a more relaxed attitude can 
also have its dangers. A recent investigation 
drew criticism when the HSC investigated and 
reported on unsupported allegations made by staff 
against a patient about matters which the patient 
had not raised in her complaint nor was given a 
chance to answer.7 But it would be fair to say 
that while the HSC generally abides by the 
principles of natural justice he tries not be 
hidebound by technical procedural rules.
The Chapter on the case-law supports the view 
that the HSC has rejected the role of adjudicator. 
The nature of the complaints received by the HSC 
show that they are not amenable to being broken 
down into clear issues. The HSC has had the 
greatest difficulty in devising coherent categories 
for the subjects of complaints which appear in his 
reports. When complaints are broken down in this 
way the subject headings can appear very numerous 
and trivial. Some complaints, while amenable to 
analysis, are not easily remedied. The bringing of 
the complaint may be in consequence of the lack of 
communication between patients and staff which can 
be remedied ultimately only by changes in medical 
education.® Alleged failures in service may be 
attributable to financial shortages; a deficiency 
which can only be met by recourse to Parliament.
In this respect, heightening the judicial 
characteristics of the HSC office will not make it 
more effective.
The empirical findings of the HSC coincide 
with the views of Professor K. Bell in her study of 
tribunals/...
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tribunals in the social services. She concluded 
that increasing the legal input to tribunal 
proceedings did not significantly advance the 
complainant's cause. The presence of lawyers or 
the availability of legal aid resulted in cases 
taking much longer therefore costing more, and the 
arguments became more technical.9
Consumer groups are unhappy that the HSC 
appears to favour the legal process as his model. 
The HSC's analysis of complaints in terms of rights 
and duties implies that someone is right, someone 
is wrong, and that his function is to determine 
whom. Consumer groups believe that this 
confrontation model is detrimental to 
doctor-patient relationships and, furthermore, 
irrelevant. The complainant has nothing to gain 
but an explanation, the subject of the complaint 
should have nothing to lose by providing one.
Since this is the case, patient groups would prefer 
the possibilities offered by a conciliation-type 
process. Consumer groups want to enable patients 
to have a dialogue with their doctors, preferably 
directly. On the contrary, the HSC actually keeps 
the parties apart and by invoking legal techniques 
and procedural safeguards actually makes staff feel 
more threatened than they need be. The HSC 
heightens tension between the parties, rather than 
relieves it, and irrevocably harms doctor-patient 
relationships.
Chapter 5 on the case-law of the HSC 
illustrates some of the allegations made against 
the HSC by consumer groups. There is an 
under-current of truth in them, but the 
alternatives offered by voluntary organisations are 
unrealistic. They assume that the parties have 
trust/...
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trust and confidence in each other and are willing 
to communicate. They ignore the fact that when the 
patients complain it is because they have lost 
their trust and confidence in their doctor and 
because one or both of the parties are no longer 
willing to talk to each other.
Professor D.C. Rowatt in his review of 
Ombudsmen around the world makes it clear that the 
most successful Ombudsmen are those who adopt an 
informal investigatory procedure.10 Capp's thesis 
on the assimilation of the Ombudsman idea in the UK 
demonstrates how the British political 
establishment took and modified the Ombudsman plan 
to fit into the existing British political and 
legal climate.11 He is not a consumer champion but 
a quasi-judicial officer having many of the 
characteristics attributed to legal agencies. This 
transformation makes the Ombudsman politically 
acceptable and might well have been predicted but 
also accounts for the initial disappointment of 
observers who hoped for someone in the Scandinavian 
tradition. The judicial model has many drawbacks 
which it was hoped the creation of an 
Ombudsman-like figure would obviate.
In Britain, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, 
the Ombudsman is associated with the legislature 
yet enjoys de facto independence.
Ombudsmen, including our own, at a Conference 
of Australasian and Pacific Ombudsmen, agreed that: 
"The Ombudsman is not an extension of the judicial 
process, he is an extension of the legislative 
process."12 As Sir Cecil has said elsewhere, it 
would not make constitutional sense or be 
democratically acceptable for the HSC to set 
himself/...
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himself up as adjudicator or one-man court without 
rights of appeal for the parties or pre-determined 
rules of procedure or evidence.13
A former chairman of the SC on the PCA 
described the Ombudsman in this way: "The Ombudsman 
can be regarded, in a case where he has found
maladministration, as a kind of prosecutor ....
but he is not the judge. The final judge ....
must be this House."1* MPs who are conscious of 
the dignity of the House tend to over-emphasise the 
significance of Parliamentary links. The Ombudsman 
is not a servant of the House, but a servant of the 
Crown and it is this which guarantees his 
independence.15
This mixed conception of the HSC might suggest 
that he lies somewhere between the administrative 
and judicial ends of the spectrum of investigatory 
bodies. While this is certainly true as a 
functional analysis it is misguided as an indicator 
of role The model for the HSC remains the CAG and 
the person who holds the office of HSC is also the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
While this title - "Parliamentary" - is slightly 
misleading in its emphasis it is an essential 
institutional link which determines how the HSC can 
carry out his work.16
It is tempting to describe the HSC as a 
mediator especially since the French created their 
"mediateur" but there are few points of comparison 
- not even physical features such as the 
compensation fund from which the "mediateur" can 
make discretionery awards. The term "mediateur" 
has/...
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has a pacifying image which the HSC feels uneasy 
about. He resents the suggestion that in any way 
his office has "no teeth11.17
It is some measure of his office that he has 
never failed to initiate and complete an 
investigation into any competent case. In reserve 
he has the powers of a court to facilitate his 
investigations and the support of the SC on the 
PCA and ultimately, Parliament, to ensure his 
recommendations are implemented.
Sir Idwal Pugh, Ombudsman between 1976 and 
1979, takes as his starting point the view that the 
Ombudsman is an investigator albeit with a much 
narrower jurisdiction than other Ombudsmen around 
the world. He emphatically rejects the notion of 
Ombudsman as mediator.
"To act on any scale as a mediator would in my 
mind totally alter the nature of the Ombudsman and 
certainly call for different skills and larger 
resources. I believe the Justice All Souls 
Committee has got the perspective right in 
considering Ombudsmen in this country as part of 
the institutional requirements in the area of 
administrative law".18
He adds the proviso that their approach must 
be flexible. Sir Idwal is drawn, not to the 
adjudicator role, but to the office of Controller 
and Auditor-General. In particular he covets the 
power to initiate actions on one's own volition.
And he concludes that this is the role favoured by 
Justice and the SC on the PCA. Slowly, the 
Ombudsman is being moved along this road.
I
Despite/...
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Despite many of the criticisms expressed 
above, it would not be true to say that the HSC has 
become a mere mediator who has been taken into the 
bosom of the establishment as claimed by the 
magazine "New Society".19 As'Hill explains 
elsewhere, although it is true that Ombudsmen 
everywhere have become institutionalised this does 
not necessarily detract from their capabilities:
"Instititionalism is the process by which
organisations acquire value and stability ....
(but) ..... not only must an organisation defend 
itself against its environment, but also it must 
have an offensive capability. It must carry out 
its mission, a programatic goal more demanding than 
mere survival, as well as having an impact upon 
that environment."20
Undoubtedly, the HSC has made an impact. He 
could not have done so without "teeth".
3. Some Consequences from the Nature of the
Office
Parliament has placed the HSC towards the 
judicial rather than administrative end of the
investigatory spectrum, with all the safeguards 
that this offers. In the context of complaints in 
medicine, however, these same characteristics can 
become drawbacks. Because of the scrupulous 
fairness shown in obtaining evidence from every 
party associated with a complaint, investigations 
do take a long time.21 Investigations are also, 
relatively speaking, expensive, especially if costs 
are/...
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are linked to the number of completed 
investigations rather than complaints received.
The public find the HSC inaccessible like the 
courts and frequently require some advisory source 
to guide them towards the HSC. The process by 
which the HSC conducts his investigations is often 
baffling to complainants and shares the same sense 
of mystique which surrounds courts and overawes 
those who are unfamiliar with it. Again, like 
courts, HSC investigations contain a coercive 
element which might be suspected of further 
alienating doctor from patient.
The most frustrating aspect of the HSC 
office for complainants is his limited 
jurisdiction. The public find it difficult to 
determine or understand the rationale which 
dictates that the HSC may only investigate certain 
aspects of their complaint. Consequently, many 
complainants are dissatisfied because the subject 
of the HSC investigation is frequently not 
consonant with the issues which they have raised in 
their complaint.
These drawbacks are not wholly attributable to 
the legal characteristics attaching to the HSC.
It cannot be sufficiently stressed that the HSC 
methods of operation constitute the only modus 
vivendi which is acceptable to the Department of
Health and Social Security and National Health 
Service Staff. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
the HSC office-holders since 1973 also suggest that 
this is the only method of operating which is 
acceptable to them.22
And/.
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And yet, the HSC has been at pains to distance 
himself from the courts and contrast their 
proceedings with his own. He described his own 
investigations as "cheap, quick and private."23 
Such a judgement is only valid in comparison with 
court cases and these are widely criticised for the 
delays involved. The PCA and HSC agreed at a 
meeting of UK Ombudsmen that they did not want the 
same powers of enforcement as the Northern Ireland 
Commissioner for Complaints because they did not 
want to become involved with the courts. The 
Ombudsmen thought that there would be a great 
temptation for the courts to look at the facts even 
if there were statutory exclusion clauses.2*
It is possible that critics have been misled 
by the procedure adopted by the HSC. The HSC has 
chosen to use many of the trappings of the courts 
but he employs these to his own advantage. His 
legal powers enhance his authority and sanction his 
exercise of power in the eyes of the National 
Health Service staff. However he rarely invokes 
them formally in practice. The HSC uses his 
discretion to obviate the need for procedural 
reforms but is possibly less successful in meeting 
the need for substantive changes.
4. The Value of the SC on PCA
Chapter 6 explained the historical reasons 
which brought the SC on the PCA into being and the 
nature of the brief allocated to it. We must now 
ask whether those reasons remain sufficient to 
justify the continued existence of the SC in 
its present form.
Although/.
275
Although it is not appropriate to discuss here 
the wider question of the success or otherwise of 
the select committee system in the House of 
Commons, it is worth noting that the experience of 
the SC on the PCA is not atypical of the problems 
which arise, i.e. the difficulties in obtaining 
members of sufficient calibre, with the time and 
interest to attend meetings and with the degree of 
knowledge and commitment which membership of a 
particular SC would imply.
It is difficult to evaluate the contribution 
of the SC to the work of the HSC since it is 
largely one of deterrence. The success of the HSC 
can be counted in the number of cases which have 
never arisen because of his work rather than the 
number he investigates. The HSC is accountable to 
Parliament and the SC is the concrete means of 
making this possible, but, as Chapter (6) reveals 
the SC on the PCA has not been very active in the 
kind of routine work expected from SCs. The 
publicity value of the SC is not sufficient to 
justify its existence.
5. Performance Criteria
The confusion resulting from the doubts 
concerning the true character of the HSC's office 
is largely responsible for another problem, namely 
the lack of agreed criteria by which to assess the 
commissioner's performance.
The SC has failed to formulate performance 
criteria for the HSC which could serve as a 
cornerstone for public discussion of the office.
It has failed to make it clear whether the 
interests/...
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interests of consumers or producers should 
predominate, or, if neither, how a consensus of 
opinion is to be reached. Much of the criticism of 
the HSC is confused because the parties adopt 
different standards. Some observers judge the HSC 
by the level of public consciousness, others by the 
level of public confidence in the office or its 
alleged inefficiencies.25 Those who adopt a less 
stringent view believe the HSC is efficient but not 
effective. There is little the HSC can do, for 
example, to remedy failures in the National Health 
Service created by a lack of resources. More 
fundamentally, it appears that insufficient 
criteria were developed initially to enable the HSC 
to identify the specific needs to which he should 
be addressing himself. Thus, he receives a very 
wide spectrum of complaints, some of which seem 
wholly unsuitable.
6. Case for Reform
The issues already raised suggest that some 
reforms, however limited, must be made to the HSC 
scheme if it is to become more effective. The 
General trend of these reforms should be to make 
the HSC more active and to give him more power and 
authority.
A reformed HSC might be capable of forging new 
relationships, formal or informal, with outside 
bodies. At the moment, the HSC holds himself aloof 
from other organisations because he believes it 
would compromise his impartiality. A reformed HSC 
might have to reconsider this decision although 
obviously a great deal would depend on the nature 
and/...
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and existence of future LHCs and service 
committees. .
7. The Will to Reform
Only Parliament can sanction amendments to 
the Act but it lacks the political will to do so. 
The government seems unconvinced of the merits of 
the case and unprepared to confront established 
interests. The SC has already made recommendations 
for reform and been ignored by successive 
governments; perhaps it could press harder. The 
HSC has endorsed these recommendations in private 
but has not used the influence of his opinion 
because he believes the question must be resolved 
in the political arena. Instead, the HSC uses the 
discretion afforded him by the Act to make such 
changes in style, presentation and interpretation 
as he thinks necessary. By their nature, these 
must be minimal.
It also seems unlikely that any group will 
emerge outside Parliament which is sufficiently 
influential to secure reform. Although the group 
"Justice" was influential in securing the adoption 
of the Ombudsman plan in Great Britain it has not 
been successful since in bringing about changes to 
it.
The medical profession is also a very 
proficient lobbyer but is certainly not interested 
in promoting an item which it considers runs 
contrary to its interest.
Likewise, the public is uninterested in the 
issue of reforms to the Ombudsman, and while this 
remains/...
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remains the case, the prospect of government action 
remains remote.
Part II
The body of this work contains many detailed 
criticisms of the institution of the HSC. In the 
broader context Professor Gwyn has pronounced the 
Ombudsmen in Britain only a qualified success in 
comparison with other Ombudsmen around the 
world.26 In saying this he is reinforcing a long 
and respectable line of academic criticism since 
the inception of the HSC. But as Burbridge, Hill 
and others have pointed out, each country which 
adopts the Ombudsman plan modifies it to meet its 
own needs and make it consonant with its own 
political culture. Within this narrower context, 
the appropriate criterion for success must 
therefore be to ask: how successful has the 
Ombudsman been relative to institutions with 
similar purposes?27 As Chapter 7 indicated, in the 
field of health services the Ombudsman is one of 
the most competent complaints-handling agencies, 
and this is despite all the flaws to which 
reference has been made.
The following proposals for reform, therefore, 
are made with these points in mind. Added to this 
is the requirement that they be practicable, i.e. 
within the existing powers of the HSC or could 
command sufficient support from Parliament to be 
passed as amending legislation if the government 
were prepared to introduce such a Bill. Proposals 
1-5 are aimed at increasing the effectiveness of 
the/...
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the HSC office while proposals 6-8 are intended to 
strengthen the link between Parliament and the 
Ombudsman.
1. The need to publicise the HSC Office.
2. Possible improvements in the content and style
of reports.
3. The significance of the provisions concealing 
the indentity of the parties to the complaint.
4. Fragmented structure of the Ombudsman system.
5. The case for extending the jurisdiction of the 
HSC.
6. Method of appointment to position of HSC.
7. The role of the SC and PCA.
8. Transformation of HSC from reactive to active.
1. Publicity: No matter how effective or
efficient the HSC becomes, it is to no avail if the 
public remain unaware of his existence. Therefore, 
the basic barometer of his success is public 
consciousness. The combined HSC and PCA
office currently employs an information officer 
who, as the name implies, is essentially a passive 
figure to whom one has recourse. He does not 
actively campaign on the Ombudsmen's behalf. The 
Ombudsmen should employ a professional public 
relations officer who would manage their publicity 
campaign and inject some professionalism into their 
promotional literature.
2. Published Reports: The need for publicity and 
the ability to generate it is one of the 
Ombudsman's real weapons. He somewhat diminished 
this deterrent by deciding in 1980 that he would no 
longer publish full reports of his investigations. 
He took this decision on the grounds of cost and 
lack/...
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lack of public interest. It must be accepted as an 
irrevocable decision in the light of the current 
economic recession but was nonetheless a retrograde 
step. As Mr. Drewry protested in the 
correspondence columns of "The Guardian", the 
published reports amounted to "a public code of 
administrative conduct."28 The fact that they were 
not read by many (and this includes some members of 
the SC of the PCA) ignores the real point; that 
they should at least be available to be read.
Current volumes of reported investigations and 
annual reports make fairly unpalatable reading 
mainly because they are almost entirely factual 
rather than discursive. If the Ombudsman feels 
that these publications are not the appropriate 
forum for comment then he should be urged to make 
more use of his power to publish occasional reports 
to the Secretary of State for Scotland on such 
topics as he thinks fit.
3. Anonymity of Reports: The current form of
reports makes them unattractive to the media, in 
particular the fact that they are anonymous. 
Ostensibly this provision is to protect the parties 
to the complaint from media harassment, public 
embarrassment or loss of reputation. These are all 
good reasons but the main beneficiaries are the 
hospitals and their staff. By publishing the names 
of the parties as well as those of the hospital and 
health authority the HSC reports would become 
better known and more influential. It is thought 
that the complainants are unlikely to feel 
embarrassed because before reaching the HSC they 
will have recounted their story to strangers so 
many times that it has become impersonal. The 
refusal/...
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refusal by the SC to reconsider the issue of 
publishing names might be interpreted as meaning 
that it is not confident that the Ombudsman's 
decisions could stand up to public challenge and 
debate.
Professor Gregory, in his memorandum to the 
SC on the PCA recommends that it should be open to 
the complainants to request that their names be 
published. Justice goes further in proposing that 
the onus should rest on the complainants to object 
if they do not want their names to be published.30 
This seems sensible in the light of human apathy 
yet retains the essential condition that the 
complainants have a right to veto. Unfortunately, 
neither proposal takes account of doctors and other 
members of National Health Service staff who must 
surely be accorded the same rights. This would not 
be likely to render the scheme unworkable. The 
Ombudsman's statistics on the number of justified 
complaints show that this provision would be 
equally agreeable to the medical profession since 
they are more likely to be praised or cleared by 
the Ombudsman than criticised.
4. Unification of the Ombudsman system: The
critical issue here is the extent to which 
unification is politically practical. The UK 
certainly has something of a proliferation of 
Ombudsmen. We have the PCA, the HSC for England, 
Wales and Scotland, a series of Commissioners for 
local administration in England, Wales and Scotland 
as well as the Commissioner for Complaints for 
Northern Ireland. Sweden, Israel and New Zealand 
all have unified and centralised Ombudsmen systems. 
This/...
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This is not the case in the UK where an aggrieved 
citizen with a composite complaint may have the 
greatest difficulty in deciding where to go with 
his complaint. It poses complicated procedural 
problems for the Ombudsmen involved in deciding on 
a form of investigation. The increasing complexity 
of the welfare state makes the likelihood of these 
complaints more, not less, likely to recur.
Sir Alan Marre, reviewing his five year tenure 
of office in 1975, noted the spread of the 
Ombudsman concept and wondered whether sufficient 
regard was being paid to the convenience of members 
of the public.31
The suggestion that there should be a single 
"post office" for the Ombudsmen is not really a 
satisfactory solution since it is not simply a 
matter of redirection - access to each Ombudsman 
also differs. This obstacle could be overcome by 
introducing a method of access common to all 
Ombudsmen but this is politically unacceptable.
MPs would not wish to allow direct access to the 
PCA.32 Referral via MP is unacceptable to the 
local commissioners for administration who see the 
natural route as being via local councillors. 
Furthermore, the SC would be a constitutional 
anomaly in relation to the Local Government 
Commissioners.
Clearly, formal unification is not a viable 
proposition and is contrary to the wishes of the 
Ombudsman himself who believes it would make the 
office too impersonal.33 Equally clearly, on the 
grounds of efficiency, maximum co-operation between 
the various offices is essential.34 This is 
facilitated/...
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facilitated by the fact that the PCA is also the 
HSC and occupies one office, and is an ex officio 
member of the Commissioners for Local 
Administration for England, Scotland and Wales.
The PCA, HSC and local Ombudsmen issue joint 
literature but in this matter they could do a great 
deal more to present a coherent image to the
public.35 The Ombudsmen already have informal
!>
contact with one another and these should be 
reinforced. Immediate steps should be taken to 
clarify the confusion about nomenclature. The term 
"Ombudsman" has been accepted and should now be 
used extensively instead of the statutory titles in 
promotional literature.
5. Jurisdiction: The Ombudsman's remit is to
investigate cases where there is alleged 
maladministration (as well as failures in the 
service). This concept of maladministration is 
relevant to jurisdiction since it relates to the 
form complaints must take if they are to qualify 
for investigation. It has been alleged that 
although this is a vague concept it is a severely 
limiting one. In fact, the SC believe it is no 
impediment at all.36 The Ombudsman appears to 
interpret it loosely and frames the 
maladministration provisions around the complaints 
he receives.
However, the concept has confined the 
Ombudsman to procedural irregularities and these 
can appear trivial. The SC urged the Ombudsman to 
adopt the doctrine of "constructive 
maladministration", i.e. where a decision is 
plainly bad, maladministration is inferred. Mr. 
Fletcher-Cooke, a former chairman of the SC 
said/...
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said that the doctrine was developed to make it 
possible to deal with those cases where the 
Ombudsman, like the complainant, thought the 
decision was wrong but could do nothing about it 
because it had been reached correctly.37 The 
Ombudsman has refrained from applying this doctrine 
because he appreciates that this would amount to 
questioning the merits of a decision, an activity 
forbidden by the Act.38 Furthermore, as he has no 
means of enforcing it, it might well result in loss 
of prestige and co-operation.39
This discussion is crucial to the question of 
clinical judgement. The exclusion of clinical 
judgement from the jurisdiction of the HSC has been 
controversial. The HSC himself has repeatedly 
identified this area as a weakness in his own 
powers and a gap in the entire complaints system. 
The available statistics on the operation of the 
new clinical complaints procedure indicate that it 
does not answer the Ombudsman’s criticisms. The 
HSC has not experienced any.decline in the numbers 
of cases which he receives relating to clinical 
judgement. In England, 16,274 written complaints 
were received by health authorities in 1981 about 
hospitals and community services. 40.6% of these 
related to clinical judgement yet only 13 were 
referred to the new procedure.40 In Wales, a 
special regional office was set up to implement the 
second hearing system because it does not have a 
regional tier of health administration. The 
regional office handled 95 cases. In Scotland, the 
Chief Administrative Medical Officers of the 
combined Scottish Health Boards handled only three 
cases.
Sir/.
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Sir Cecil put it to the Department of Health 
and Social Security at a meeting of the SC that the 
new procedure was under-utilised and not supported 
by the health authorities.41 He cited two of the 
four cases in which he had recommended that the 
complainants use the new procedure. In one case 
the AHA said it had not yet implemented the scheme 
and in another the RHA refused to commence the new 
procedure because it considered it a waste of 
time.
The Department of Health and Social Security 
was unable to defend itself against these 
allegations other than to counsel patience. It 
pointed out that the figures were low because, in 
Scotland, at least, the health boards were still 
relying on the old procedure and were satisfied 
with it. In England and Wales, many cases were 
rejected as unsuitable for the second hearing 
system because the complainants appeared to 
contemplate legal action.
Sir Cecil and the SC were unhappy with the 
Department of Health and Social Security 
monitoring, although it acknowledged that the 
Department of Health and Social Security had acted 
quickly to prepare a report for the SC. For 
example, there were no figures on how many cases 
referred to the new procedure related to clinical 
judgement. Sir Cecil, in particular, felt this was 
an unfortunate omission but the chairman of the SC 
concluded by hazarding that whatever the relevant 
statistic might be the new procedure seemed to have 
made no impact on the work of the HSC and that this 
left his dilemma unresolved.
The/.
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The medical profession is understandably 
defensive, and it believes that the HSC is not 
competent to assess expert decisions even with the 
benefit of hindsight especially in an area of 
scientific uncertainty. The HSC has responded by 
saying that he would work with a panel of medical 
assessors and would judge cases by the standard of 
what was reasonable at the time. While it is the 
conventional wisdom that clinical judgements are 
essentially subjective, studies have shown that, in 
fact, ultimately the objectivity of clinical 
judgements is extremely high.42
The Select Committee said that the health 
services complaints system would be more coherent 
if all complaints were dealt with by individual 
hospital authorities and, if still unresolved, were 
then referred to the HSC.43 The attraction of this 
apparently simple proposal is marred because HSC 
cannot deal with a large segment of those 
complaints, viz. those on clinical judgement. Thus 
the problem of fragmentation is perpetuated.
The HSC must enlist the co-operation of the 
medical profession if he is ever to tackle the area 
of clinical judgements successfully. He must 
convey to doctors that the purpose of his 
intervention is educational and preventative, not 
punitive.44
It is submitted that, if the HSC 
were allowed to investigate cases involving 
clinical judgement, the consequences would not be 
as fearful as the medical profession anticipates. 
The HSC has divided the complaints which he 
receives concerning actions arising solely from the 
exercise of clinical judgement into four groups:-
(i)/-
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(i) death or injury through alleged 
negligence;
(ii) alleged medical incompetence which has 
no permanent effect;
(iii) death or injury through mischance;
(iv) disagreement with or disappointment in a 
treatment.
Although it may be difficult at times to 
separate these categories the HSC is confident that 
he could handle those cases falling into the last 
three categories; he would continue to advise 
complainants in category (i) to seek a judicial 
remedy.
It is thought that the effects of these 
investigations would not be as drastic as the 
medical profession fears yet still advance the 
public interest. The HSC would still insist on 
evidence of some maladministration. It seems that 
this burden is easily discharged; where there is 
injustice or hardship the HSC tends to attribute 
this to maladministration. Does this mean that the 
maladministration requirement would emasculate the 
exclusion of clinical judgement? The HSC does not 
think so:
"Certainly some complainants want a 
clinical judgement per se reviewed and would 
not be content with an investigation that 
merely sought to establish whether there had 
been maladministration in arriving at the 
clinical judgement. But I think many 
complainants would be satisfied if it were 
possible to give them an assurance from an 
independent/...
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independent source that the doctor took the 
steps that, bearing his experience in mind, he 
should have taken to enable him to reach an 
informed conclusion."1*6
The HSC is not saying that an adequate 
explanation will necessarily preclude a finding of 
maladministration but that the absence of an 
explanation is likely to result in such a finding.
The HSC already asks himself whether the staff 
who are the subject of a complaint used all the 
information available to them to reach a reasonable 
decision. In the future he will go further and 
determine what the exact nature of this information 
should be. He cannot look at the merits of the 
decision. Clinical judgements are not to be 
equated solely with the merits of decisions. There 
is a distinction between the way a doctor reaches a 
decision and the decision reached. The HSC should 
be able to look at every aspect of the former but 
not the latter.. Therefore, although the HSC is 
thus enabled to criticise unreasonable decisions 
the British Medical Association need have no fear 
that he will be moving towards a system of absolute 
liability.47
Amending legislation should be passed to allow 
the HSC to investigate complaints about the 
services provided by general practitioners and 
other independent contractors such as dentists and 
opticians. The service committee procedure has 
been discredited, and no longer commands the 
support of the public.48 Insofar as the HSC has 
dealt with complaints which have been the subject 
of/...
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of the informal procedure he has already proved his 
ability.h9
6. Method of Appointment: The method of
appointing the Ombudsman is significant because it 
depends on a small cadre of suitable candidates 
already in public service coming to the attention 
of the government. It is essentially a 
self-limiting system. Until recently, the 
government appointed the Ombudsman without 
consultation. As a result of the controversy 
created in 1975 by the appointment of Sir Idwal 
Pugh, the government conceded that in future it 
would consult the Chairman of the SC on the PCA on 
possible candidates. In the opinion of many 
critics this proposal does not go far enough to 
meet the criticisms of the SC. The candidate 
should be subject to the annulment procedure. This 
would have the effect of involving Parliament, 
however nominally, in the selection procedure.50
7. Role of the SC on PCA: HSC investigations
bring the HSC into close contact with health 
authorities and the Department of Health and Social 
Security but not individual MPs. The 
relationship of the HSC via the SC to Parliament is 
a very tenuous one. The house journal of the House 
of Commons describes the function of the SC in this 
way: "Its function evolved into providing the
presence of Parliament around the Commissioner and 
pursuing the cases were he has passed an 
opinion."51 This is a much more accurate summary of 
the SC work than a reading of its brief would 
imply.52 As any observer of SC meetings can 
confirm, the SC exercises very little supervision 
over the HSC. It receives the reports on a 
pro-forma/...
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pro-forma basis and appears to do little more than 
rubber-stamp the HSC conclusions. Although the SC 
has issued some policy guidelines in the past these 
appear to have originated from the Ombudsman.
Chapter 6 is intended to show that the 
Ombudsman, in fact, utilises the SC system to his 
own advantage as a public forum for cases and 
issues which concern him. Sir Idwal Pugh drew a 
useful analogy in this context by comparing the 
relationship of HSC and SC on PCA to the PAC and 
the Comptroller and Auditor General. The HSC is 
not in any way an expert adviser to the SC and he 
does not act as an investigatory agency on the 
Committee's behalf. However, although it is not 
the raison d'etre of the HSC to create the 
conditions under which the SC can operate 
effectively, the fact remains that the HSC provides 
the SC with all the information it needs upon which 
to act, and the advice as to how to make the best 
use of it.5 3
It would not be fair to infer from this 
evidence that the SC is ineffective. It suffers 
from all the usual handicaps imposed on the SC 
system in the House, as well as deficiencies of its 
own. Neverthless its intangible institutional 
authority makes it an essential ingredient in the 
success of the HSC and more than justifies its 
retention. However, it could be improved in a 
number of ways:
(i) The current calibre and commitment of members 
of the SC calls for a change of personnel. This is 
acknowledged in private by sources close to the 
HSC5V  but it can only be brought about by pressure 
on/...
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on the party whips who are responsible for 
controlling the nominations to select committees. 
The whips will have to be persuaded that the 
prestige and influence of the SC on the PCA 
warrants such a change. Proposal (iii) may be 
instrumental in this.
(ii) The SC has been successful in pursuing 
remedies but less successful and less active in 
pursuing reforms to the office of HSC. A 
re-constituted SC should take the opportunity 
presented in the House via Parliamentary Question 
Time, Early Day Motions, Private Members' ballot to 
press for a government response to SC 
recommendations for reform.
(iii) The reports of the HSC and SC should be 
debated in the House of Commons at least once 
annually. The purpose of this regular set-piece 
debate would be to strengthen the ties between 
Parliament and the Ombudsman and stimulate debate 
in the House, and interest from the media. It must 
be conceded that the last debate (1978) was not 
well attended - there were only 12 MPs present.55 
But that debate was held on a Friday morning when 
many MPs traditionally travel home to their 
constituencies. It is evident that much of the 
power of the SC derives from its ability to take 
matters to the House, and although this has on 
occasion been ignored by the protagonists there is 
no doubt that providing for a regular opportunity 
to ventilate the issues would enhance the authority 
of the SC still further.56
8. Reactive to Active: The HSC should have the 
power to initiate investigations. At the moment 
the/...
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the HSC is always seen to be acting at too late a 
stage and after the harm has become irreversible.
If the HSC were allowed to initiate actions he 
would be able to underline his preventative role 
and, moreover, reach those cases where there is 
discernible suffering or hardship resulting from 
maladministration or failures but no individually 
named complainants.57 His present inability to do 
so is not conducive to promoting the public 
interest.
The SC has given his suggestion its qualified 
approval; the SC proposed that the HSC should only 
be able to act with the approval of the 
Chairman.58 This is probably a sensible provision 
since it promotes the analogy between the HSC and 
Comptroller and Auditor-general rather than turning 
the HSC into a kind of troubleshooter. However, 
the SC has taken an over-narrow view of the 
situation in which the HSC might act. The SC 
thinks that if the HSC is investigating an 
individual's case and finds it reveals a "hornet's 
nest" then he might consider conducting a full 
investigation.59 The SC is overlooking the fact 
that the press is the most likely source of cases 
warranting consideration. Perhaps the SC 
believes that this would open the door to a flood 
of cases which would overstrain the resources of 
man-power available and alter the nature of the 
office but this is thought to be unlikely. The 
experience of Ombudsmen elsewhere in the world who 
enjoy this power suggest that it is one used with 
extreme caution, and there is no reason to believe 
that the UK Ombudsmen would act differently.60 
But there is every indication that the minority of 
cases/...
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cases in which it arose would be amongst the most 
significant dealt with by the Ombudsman.
Conclusion:
The tenor of this work has been critical but 
one also hopes it has been constructive because the 
office of HSC is worth preserving. Some of the 
shortcomings encountered have undermined the raison 
d'etre of the office but never completely. The 
arguments set forth by Justice in their Whyatt 
Report for the creation of a Commissioner are more 
persuasive than ever.
The HSC represents at its core, a simple and 
appealing ideal of justice for the individual under 
the heavy hand of government. No government, of 
whatever persuasion, is likely to reverse 
substantially the volume of government activities 
which necessitate the existence of such an officer. 
Indeed, as the public sector expands, so must the 
remit and powers of the HSC.
The HSC's powers and jurisdiction were 
inadequate in the first place. There is now no 
counteracting argument which is sufficiently 
compelling to warrant further delay in the 
introduction of reforms on the lines detailed in 
Part II of this Chapter.
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by any part ol the .National Health Service or that 
you have been treated unjustly through bad administration, 
the Health Service Ombudsman may be able to help you.
Can the
The Health Service Ombudsman is 
completely independent of government 
and of health authorities.
His services are free.
Health Service
Your complaint should be made first to the health authority.
If their reply is not satisfactory, 
you can approach the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman
For further information, write to:
The Health Service Ombudsman,
Second Floor, 11 Melville Crescent, Edinburgh EH3 7LU.
Telephone 031-225 7465
help you?
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by a central government department 
and you have not had a satisfactory reply to your complaints, 
the Parliam entary Ombudsman may be able to help you.
Can the
The Parliamentary Ombudsman is 
independent of government departments. 
He investigates cases of maladministration. 
His services are free.
Parliam entary
If you have a complaint against 
any central government department, you can ask 
a Member of Parliament to send it to the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman
For further information, write to:
The Parliamentary Ombudsman,
Church House, Great Smith Street, London SW IP 3BW.
Telephone 01-212 7676
help you?
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